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D.P. Chattopadhyaya

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

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From the Editorial Desk

Linear history is a hostage of chronology, its commitment being the study of the past and a faithful reconstruction of the same. The overwhelming driving force of historiography therefore is power politics, territorial concerns and disputes, treaties made and violated, diplomatic alliances, pragmatic partnerships. Economic policies are also politically motivated and follow suit. The story of what we today call South Asia is no different. It is a cluster of nations that should not be viewed as a conveniently described political entity. There is much more to it. South Asia emerges as a subcontinent torn asunder by power disputes, terrorism, illegal migrations, ethnic problems and all that should not be there amongst nations that have so much to bind them.

Mercifully civilizational history looks for other parameters that speak of bonding, that piece together fragments to weave a unified canvas that transcends time and space and emerges not as a geopolitical entity but touches the sensibilities. We speak here of South Asia as a unified cultural entity. And the grace is that nation-states may integrate or disintegrate culture runs through the psyche of peoples and gives a cohesiveness which is very marginally disturbed by political acrobatics. That is what spontaneity is all about.

Even a casual visitor through South Asia would not miss the strong interrelationships between the peoples of various countries. The identification is spontaneous because the sources of inspiration, the ethical outlook, the creativity are derived from the same ancient texts and epics, the overpowering presence of the Himalayas and the strong influence of Prakrit and Sanskrit. To the extent that art imitates life it is but natural that there would be unmistakable similarities in iconography, architecture, music, dances and literature. It is also significant that Arts of South Asia derive so much from religious texts and epics and are more in a spirit of dedication.

Artists create their own kingdoms, the easy communication of common languages, literary texts, similar musical notes that touch the soul, worship of the same deities, make for representation in substance and form that leads to remarkable interchangeability.

This issue of Sandhan presents a whole range of contributions that traverse from political analysis to mysticism (Sufis) Siddhas and the mother of all—Sanskrit language. Our many thanks to the contributors.

D.P. CHATTOPADHYAYA
Editor

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Sandhān, Vol. IV, No. 1, January–June 2004

ARTICLES

Partha S. Ghosh

Globalization, Hegemony and Conflict in South Asia: An Indian Perspective

THE PARAMETERS

This paper covers the period between the 18th and the 20th centuries although there are references to the earlier periods also. The paper has been broadly divided into three parts. The first part discusses globalization as a continuous process during the last five centuries with particular emphasis on its three phases and their impacts on India. The question here is when and how much was India incorporated into the global economy. The second part addresses itself to the external relations of India during the period under survey, with particular reference to India's neighbours. And, the third part tries to identify the interconnections between the forces of globalization and those of localism and the resultant identity centric demands leading to nationalistic upsurges, societal conflicts and international tensions. In the conclusion certain tentative ideas have been discussed to see whether there can be a substitute for globalization or whether India would have to reconcile itself to this reality and make the best out of a bad deal keeping in mind its national interest.

I

GLOBALIZATION AS A CONTINUUM

What is Globalization?

It is difficult to define globalization but probably it is most easy to feel its impact if we just look around. Everything that one wears, eats or talks about has some global connection or the other without one being aware of it. Without, therefore, trying to define globalization as such, let us first see its essential characteristics. The following may be noted:

- First, globalization involves the *creation* of new and the *multiplication* of existing social networks and activities that increasingly overcome traditional, political, economic, cultural, and geographical boundaries.
- The second quality of globalization is reflected in the *expansion* and the *stretching* of social relations, activities, and interdependencies. Today's financial markets stretch around the globe, and electronic trading occurs around the clock.
- Third, globalization involves the intensification and acceleration of social exchanges and activities. The Internet relays distant information in mere seconds, and satellites provide consumers with real-time pictures of remote events.... The 'local' and the 'global' form the endpoints of a spatial continuum whose central portion is marked by the 'national' and the 'regional'.
- Fourth, the creation, expansion, and intensification of social interconnections and interdependencies do not occur merely on an objective, material level [but] globalization processes also involve the subjective plane of human consciousness.... Their awareness of the receding importance of geographical boundaries and distances fosters a keen sense of becoming part of a global whole. Reinforced on a daily basis, these persistent experiences of global interdependence gradually change people's individual and collective identities, and thus dramatically impact the way they act in the world.

Based on these features, the definition of globalization can be as follows: 'Globalization refers to a multidimensional set of social processes that create, multiply, stretch, and intensify worldwide social interdependencies and exchanges while at the same time fostering in people a growing awareness of deepening connections between the local and the distant.'[1]

The above definition, however, applies more to the present situation although the process was in the making during the entire last millennium, more particularly after the Industrial Revolution. In its expansion, economics played the most important role but the impact of culture and religion cannot be ignored either. To make this complex story somewhat simpler let us agree that there have been three phases of globalization as we broadly understand the concept and that the engine of each phase was driven by a particular kind of international economic thrust. It must, however, be underlined that in each phase, insofar as India was concerned, the global local dichotomy persisted to which we have referred in the definition of globalization above.[2]

The First Phase

The first phase of globalization took place in the 16th Century when new technologies in shipbuilding and navigation led to a vast system of sea-borne commerce in goods, capital and slaves and when as a result of these processes the European powers opened up to Africa, Americas and Asia to new or greatly expanded trade. In 1498 Vasco da Gama of Portugal arrived in Calicut, which soon led to the establishment of Portuguese presence in certain parts of India's western coast. The Portuguese not only replaced the Arab traders, they also entered into a ruthless proselytizing venture which did away much of the good work that was done by the Jesuits and the Mendicant Orders. A process of cruel persecution was unleashed by the introduction of the Inquisition in Goa after 1560. There were other contenders for influence too, like the Dutch and the French, but it was the British who ultimately held the sway, primarily because of their superior naval power. In 1588 they defeated the Spanish Armada, which made them the undisputed masters of the seas. It was against this background that in 1618 Sir Thomas Roe of England, as an emissary of James I, entered into an agreement with the then Mughal Emperor Jehangir to have trade rights in India. Already, on 31 December 1600, the East India Company of merchants of London had been granted the Charter by the King to expand their trade internationally. A significant feature of this first globalization was the introduction of the element of force for the promotion of foreign commerce.

> When the Portuguese reached the Western coast, they found merchants, both Hindu and Muslim, plying their vocation cordially and peacefully, i.e. if we ignore the occasional acts of piracy. The Portuguese realized that since their financial resources were meager they would fare very badly in peaceful competition with Indian and other

> Asian merchants. They could make a breakthrough only with brute force by taking advantage of their naval superiority. This they proceeded to do with a ruthlessness unprecedented in the history of Asian commerce.[3]

What the Portuguese had started, the British mastered in the subsequent centuries.

In this first phase of Europe-oriented globalization the European 'expansionists' did not face much of a challenge in the East, South and South East Asia as they did in the Middle East. So far as China was concerned, the first of the European sailors to visit that land in the early sixteenth century found that the country had turned in on itself. Compared to this, the Ottoman Empire, which was then in the middle stages of its expansion and was situated nearby, posed a much more serious challenge to Christendom. Indeed it was Islamic expansionism in a larger geographical space that mattered to the Europeans more in the affairs of the world during the sixteenth century. While the Ottoman Turks were pushing westward, the Safavid dynasty in Persia was witnessing a resurgence of power, prosperity, and high culture, especially in the reigns of Ismail I (1500–1524) and Abbas I (1587–1629).

In the west and central Asia a chain of strong Muslim chieftains continued to control the ancient silk route via Kashghar and Turfan to China. In the sixteenth century itself the Muslims overthrew the Hindu empire in Java and the king of Kabul, Babar, entered India and by defeating Ibrahim Lodhi established the Mughal Empire in 1526. Initially this Mughal hold was shaky but during the reign of Babar's grandson, Akbar (1556–1605), it was triumphantly consolidated. Akbar's empire stretched from Baluchistan in the west to Bengal in the east. Throughout the seventeenth century, his successors pushed farther south against the Marathas and other principalities. When all these developments were taking place then from the fringes the Dutch, British and French were entering the Indian peninsula from the sea, though not in a substantial form. The Portuguese were already there on the scene as we have noted.

These, however, were initial European entries into India and the latter was yet to be incorporated into the capitalist world economy, which was to take place much later. But the ground was in the making. Despite the huge size of the Mughal Empire and the military genius of some of its leaders, despite the brilliance of its courts and the craftsmanship of its architects, despite its sophisticated banking and credit networks, the system was weak at the grassroots. While there were considerable numbers of merchants and busy markets in the towns, while many Hindu business families sported an attitude toward manufacture, trade, and credit, and while apparently India seemed to be ready for economic takeoff the country became a victim of British imperialism. The factors that contributed to this development were the unending rivalries between various contending centers of power, superior European technology coupled with military adventurism and the many indigenous retarding factors in Indian life such as the hierarchical social order.[4]

The Second Phase

The second era of globalization, which built up further on the first era, took place in the 18th and 19th centuries. Starting from the mid-eighteenth century till 1830s the cotton yarn productivity in Britain had increased multifold due to mechanization. As a result, the British share in total world manufacturing rose dramatically to make it world's 'first industrial nation'. Other European nations and the United States followed suit and their shares too in the global trade rose steadily. But exactly the opposite seemed to happen in China and India. According to Kennedy, 'not only did their shares of total world manufacturing shrink relatively, simply because the West's output was rising so swiftly; but in some cases their economies declined absolutely, that is, they *de*-industrialized, because of the penetration of their traditional markets by the far cheaper and better products of the Lancashire textile factories.'[5]

Taking advantage of the steamship, the railways and the telegraph, the Europeans and the Americans opened up even larger areas (inland as well as coastal) of Africa, Americas, Asia and Australia to new or greatly expanded trade. A huge system of sea borne and overland commerce in goods, capital, and immigrant labour connected all the six continents. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, millions of Europeans moved to the Americas, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. Between 1846 and 1880, on an average 377,000 Europeans emigrated per annum. Between 1891 and 1910 the numbers reached 911,000 a year, so that between 1846 and 1930, over 50,000,000 people from Europe had left their homes to settle in another continent.[6] So far as Indians were concerned, a huge number of Indian workers migrated as indentured labour to Africa, Fiji, Mauritius, Southeast Asia, Sri Lanka, West Indies, and several other places to work in their coffee, rubber, sugar or tea plantations. It may be noted that although the dominant economic theory those days was *laissez faire,* this phase of globalization was promoted and protected primarily by the British who ruled one-fourth of the world and who had under their control all the seas.

The Third Phase

The third and the present era of globalization is said to have commenced after the collapse of the Soviet Union in early 1990s and emergence of America as the sole superpower.[7] To quote the *International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences:* 'It [America] serves as the new global hegemon, the successor to the Habsburg and the British Empires. Acclaimed as "the sole superpower," the "high-technology economy," and "the universal nation," the USA has vigorously and consistently supported this great transformation by systematically pressing to remove any national barriers to the free movement of capital, goods, and services. Its leadership is facilitated and legitimated by the three great international, now global economic institutions, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO).'[8]

But the above theory does not explain the emergence of the Soviet Union as the second superpower nor does it explain the phenomenon of Cold War, which dominated almost the entire latter half of the 20th Century. Did not two sets of globalization, although a contradiction in terms, rule the roost in international politics? To find an explanation to this complex scenario one would have to delve deep into the unprecedented competition between the two superpowers for hegemony, the rise of the 'Euro Dollar' and its clever manipulation by the Chinese and the Soviets eventually forcing the United States to de-link its dollar from gold, and other related phenomena. What is, however, most interesting in the whole story is that even the Communist Bloc willy-nilly prepared itself for a globalized world to arrive. The end of the Cold War of course sealed the process.[9]

Leaving the debate as it is, it may still be agreed that the present phase is the most complex of all the phases because in spite of the awful military prowess of the leader of the process, that is the United States, multiple tensions are ever present at the inter-state and intrastate levels coupled with the presence of weapons of mass destruction and globally networked phenomenon of terrorism. A simple example of this contention is that never during the earlier phases the centre was directly hit by the periphery, but in the events of Nine Eleven this golden rule has been broken. The security of 'fortress America' has been directly challenged by an enemy, the 'International Islam,' which neither has any defined territory nor does it have any defined alternative to the present global order that it tries to destroy.

A Caveat

Before we end this part, let us enter a caveat into the idea that so far only three phases of globalization have been noticed. The central focus in this periodisation has been the economic parameter. But the question is: Is it necessary that only economic factors play the primary role in causing globalization, or can there be cultural factors too? For example, the unparalleled expansion of Islam during the millennium after the establishment of Islam was achieved not by economic means or for economic reasons but reasons of religious commitment and military adventurism. It is also true that this process helped the Muslim traders in their global networking, although Arabs had been great traders even prior to Islam. For example, in the context of Islamization of Indonesia it has been argued that though some scholars believe that in the propagation of Islam in Indonesia the strongest incentive was provided by the appearance of Portuguese in the Indian Ocean in 1497, the process actually had started much earlier.

> The close coherence of the Muslim powers ... found expression in their annual meeting at Mecca, and through this medium rumours of the Christian struggle against Islam in the Iberian Peninsula reached Indonesia ahead of the Portuguese. Hence by the time of their arrival the Muslim powers were already pressing on to extend

> Islam's influence as widely as possible. When Malacca fell in 1511 to the Portuguese, and became a strategic centre for their attack upon Islam and the Islamic trade in the vast island world of South-East Asia, the Crescent was already a move or two ahead of the Cross. It never lost its lead.[10]

According to Arnold Toynbee, even the early Portuguese and Spanish maritime expansion was a by-product of their success in the eviction of Muslims from the Iberian Peninsula. 'The scholars of Muslim Spain contributed unintentionally to the philosophical edifice erected by the medieval Western Christian schoolmen, and some of the works of the Hellenic philosopher Aristotle first reached the Western Christian World through Arabic translations. It is also true that many "Oriental" influences on Western culture which have been attributed to infiltration through the Crusaders' principalities in Syria really came from Muslim Iberia.'[11]

II

INDIA'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

There is an inherent problem here. Conventional International Relations theories presuppose defined national boundaries and relations with nations beyond those boundaries. During the period of our analysis we have to confront with several boundaries of India. It was something during the Mughal period, something else during the British period, and still something else during the post-independence period. And even during each of these phases the boundaries have changed, sometimes in *de-facto* sense while at other in the *de-jure* sense. For example, in the present phase, one-third of Kashmir is under Pakistani control and vast tracts of land in Aksaichin are under Chinese control. This is the de-facto situation. So far as the de-jure change is concerned, Sikkim was not a part of India at independence; it became so in 1974. The existence of hundreds of enclaves in the territories of Bangladesh and India belonging to each other and the un-demarcated maritime boundaries between the two countries in the Bay of Bengal further confuse the situation. To simplify the situation, for the purposes of this part, we would view India's international relations from the standpoints of three central authorities, namely, the Mughal, the British Indian government, and the post-independent Government of India with full awareness in mind that it ignores the political realities of the multiple centres of power during the last days of the Mughal empire as well as the peripheral regions like the northeast which had to work out its relations with such neighbours as Burma quite independent of the Mughals and, later, the British.

The Mughal Period

As the period covered in this paper is the 18th Century through the 20th Century, let us first see what Mughal India looked like at the beginning of the 18th Century. At that time the Mughal Empire encompassed an area larger than British India without Burma. Aurangzeb's (1618–1707) fiat was honoured from Madras (Tamil Nadu) in the south, to Bengal in the east, and to Kabul and Badakshan in the northwest. And all this was achieved without the aid of telegraph, railways and supplies from abroad, which the British later had the advantage of.

How did this Mughal India deal with the British who had by then expanded their commercial activities? We have noted above that in 1618 Sir Thomas Roe had entered into an agreement with Jehangir to have trade rights in India. One of the important features of the agreement was to provide protection to Muslim pilgrim traffic to Mecca from the Portuguese banditry on the seas. In this way the British emerged as a maritime auxiliary of the Mughals, who had mastered the art of warfare on land but not in the waters. For example, in 1694 Aurangzeb's biggest ship, *Ganj-i sawai*, fell an easy prey to a much smaller British ship, that too with much less arms and ammunitions, even without being able to engage it in a proper combat. Aurangzeb had toyed with the idea of building an imperial fleet with European expertise.[12] Thus, by 1700, the British had their factories in Bombay, Calcutta and Madras and good political understanding with the Mughals. From this situation to leap into a more adventurist forward policy was a matter of time depending upon favourable ground realities, which meant loosening of the hold of the Mughal rulers on their empire.

The decline of the Mughals set in after the death of Aurangzeb in 1707, or, to be more precise, after the death of his successor Bahadur Shah I in 1712. Although in name the empire survived till the 1750s, rival centres of power emerged and taking advantage of the weakness of the central administration invaders from both inside and outside preyed on it. In 1738 the Marathas plundered the outskirts of Delhi and controlled Malwa thus dividing the empire virtually into two halves. In the next year the Persian King Nadir Shah invaded India and his huge booty included the famous Peacock Thorne. Kabul was also lost to him. A decade later there were Afghan incursions, which were of course repelled. By the time Robert Clive defeated Nawab Siraj-ud Daula of Bengal in 1757 the Mughal Empire had virtually disintegrated. Kabul, Punjab, Sind, Gujarat and Awadh were all gone. Bengal continued to pay the tribute but it was virtually independent.

During this phase there were six actors in fray competing for power and influence, besides of course the decadent Mughal Empire. They were, the Marathas, the Afghans, the Nizam of Hyderabad, Hyder Ali and his son Tipu Sultan of Mysore, the French and the British. By 1750, the Marathas spread right across central India, occupied Orissa and attacked Bengal. To quote Percival Spear:

> The event which turned the Maratha power from the status of an empire *in* India to that of a competitor for the empire *of* India was the cession of Malwa by the Mughals in 1738. Through the gap thus created between Delhi and Hyderabad they poured eastward to the sea at Orissa and threatened Bengal. To the north they began the harrying of the perennially brave but tradition-bound Rajputs. By 1750 they were ready to move to north should Delhi collapse.[13]

The Maratha dream, however, did not materialize though Delhi did collapse. Another power centre had emerged in the mean time in the form of an independent Afghan state under Ahmad Shah Abdali. He secured the Punjab and then took and sacked Delhi in 1756–57. The frightened Mughals sought the help of the Marathas. Thus, from now on the triangular rivalry between the Mughals, Marathas, and Afghans became one between the Marathas and Afghans. A showdown took place in the Battle of Panipat on 13 January 1761 in which the Marathas were defeated. The seat of Delhi was almost within the reach of Abdali now, but an internal revolt within his army came in the way. As a result, he and his successors never got farther than Lahore, and Punjab gradually slipped from their control. The Marathas did recover, but not completely. The Peshwa-controlled Maratha confederacy was replaced by five virtually independent dynastic rules, namely, the Peshwas of Poona controlling Maharashtra, the Gaekwars of Baroda controlling most of Gujarat, the Bhonslas of Nagpur controlling parts of central India, the Holkars of Indore, and the Scindias of Gwalior.

Beyond Bengal, where the Ahoms were well entrenched in northeast, particularly in Assam, the Mughals could not effectively penetrate although its governor in Bengal, Mir Jumlah, made several efforts. Maximum that he could extract from the Ahom king Jayadhvaj Singh, through a treaty signed on 9 January 1663, was the king's daughter for the imperial harem, the country west of the Bharali river on the north bank of Brahmaputra and to the Kallang on the south, and some elephants, gold and silver. During the reign of Gadadhar Singh (1681–96) the Muslims were pushed out of Gauhati and chased up to Monas. Henceforward Monas was accepted by both sides as the boundary.[14] In short, in Assam the Ahom rule continued uninterrupted, from 1228 to 1819, when Burmese replaced them, who the British replaced in 1824.

We would conclude this section with an interesting speculative paragraph from Percival Spear, which would be relevant for our discussion in the following section:

> Thus the aftermath of Panipat left India like a swirling sea at high tide, angry and tumultuous but divided and lacking direction. The *idea* of unity and imperial authority persisted but its Mughal embodiment had all but vanished. It is interesting to speculate as to what might have happened if the great anarchy of forty years had been prolonged indefinitely without foreign intervention. The period threw up some remarkable leaders who in other circumstances might each have founded an empire and dynasty. As it was, however, they tended to cancel each other out and thus leave the way for a third party with special advantages from another world. In the north we may hazard that a Maratha dominion under Scindia controlling Delhi, Rajasthan, and much of central India would have been faced by a determined Sikh power in the Punjab. Oudh and Bengal might have continued under the Muslim rule to fall victims to the winner of the former struggle. Those areas showed little sign of energy or revival in this period. In the south the brilliant Mysorean adventurer Hyder Ali and his almost equally able son Tipu would have had no British wars to hinder them. They might well have built up a Muslim Vijayanagar empire and absorbed the ex-Mughal state of Hyderabad.

> By a complete reversal of the earlier struggle they would then have faced the Maratha Peshwa in central and western India. It is difficult to see an end to the wars which would have ensued or to measure the poverty and misery which would have accompanied them, because it is difficult to envisage any one of the leaders triumphing over the rest. In the absence of a definite decision western intervention must have come in some form in the nineteenth century, because India was too valuable an economic prize to be left to herself in a rapidly shrinking world.[15]

The British Period

In this section a historical sketch of India's international relations during the British period is provided so as to understand some of the present patterns of India's external relations. India's colonial experience in terms of its foreign policy can be divided into two phases—first, the Company era from 1757 to 1857, and then, the British era, when the British Government replaced the Company, from 1857 to 1947. During the first phase, the conflicts were largely confined to military rivalries among the various centres of political power against the background of the declining role of the central authority on the one hand and the Company's efforts to establish its paramountcy vis-á-vis these centres of power and the central authority on the other.

If we analyse the growth of British power in India the one point that stands out is that the success of the British was largely due to the bickering and rivalry among the Indian kingdoms themselves. The British policy of divide and rule, which the nationalist historians of India talk so much about, was not something that the British invented. It was available to them at hand in the circumstances of India. Even their first battle at Plassey was won through the treachery of none other than that of the commander-in-chief of Nawab Siraj-ud-Daula's army, Meer Jafar. As he had promised, he, together with his forces, switched his loyalty to Robert Clive in the battlefield itself. The result could not have been anything but a total rout of the loyalist segment of Nawab's army. The Company's victory at Plassey was consolidated at the Battle of Buxor (1764), in which the forces of Shuja-ud-Daula, the ruler of Awadh and the nawab-wazir of Shah Alam, the titular Mughal emperor, were crushed by Major

Hector Munro. Subsequently, Awadh was restored to Shuja-ud-Daula but in Bengal the Company's authority became unquestionable. Through a special agreement with the emperor Shah Alam, the Company was granted the *diwani*, or right to collect and administer the revenues of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, in return for a promise to pay the emperor an annual tribute of Rs. 2,600,000. Behind the decision to restore Awadh to its ruler was the desire to make it a buffer state to protect the Company's possessions from Maratha attacks.

The subsequent history of Company's march to becoming the paramount power in India was marked by a combination of diplomacy, military efforts, legal and extra-legal shams, or, outright purchases. Whether it was Warren Hastings' policy of entering into subsidiary alliances with Indian rulers whereby the latter were made to subsidise British forces in return for protection; or Lord Wellesley's militaristic designs; or Lord Dalhousie's 'Doctrine of Lapse' by which tributary or dependent Hindu states whose rulers had died without a natural successor or without having previously adopted an heir with the sanction of the British, were annexed to the paramount power, the motto was the same—how to enlarge the domain of British influence. In the peripheral regions British policy was dictated by imperial interests or by the requirements of security from external threats, be they from a globally ambitious France or a regionally formidable Russia.

Relations with Nepal

In Nepal the Gorkhas posed a threat. Ever since the ascendancy of Prithvi Narayan Shah to the throne of the Kingdom of Gorkha in 1742 a sense of nationalism was in the making in Nepal. The Kingdom of Gorkha was a member of the League of Twenty-Four Kingdoms. By 1814, the rulers of the dynasty, through conquests, diplomacy and matrimonial alliances, annexed to the Kingdom of Gorkha not only the member-states of the League of Twenty-Four Kingdoms but also the kingdoms and tribal peoples of the southern flank of the Himalayas from Sikkim in the east to Kangra in the west. Through a complex structure of propriety, ritual and ancestral authority the Gorkha kings proclaimed their sovereignty within their kingdom, which eventually, in the 20th Century, gave rise to the nation state of Nepal.[16]

The British did not approve of this growing assertiveness of Nepal and eventually a war broke out between them in 1814. British subdued the Nepalis after a prolonged military campaign that lasted from November 1814 to March 1816. By the treaty of Segauli signed on 15 November 1816 the Gorkhas were forced to cede Garhwal and Kumaun together with most of the Terai. They also agreed to withdraw from Sikkim and to accept a British resident at Kathmandu. What was most important was that the British extracted from the Nepal king an agreement, which recognized a demarcated border, a concept heretofore practically unknown to the Nepali kings.[17]

The British interest in Nepal, like their interests in other Himalayan states, was primarily strategic. By the end of the 19th Century, when British imperial interest in India was threatened by Russia and to some extent by China, the British Indian government considered it necessary to insulate India from external threats to its security. The concept of buffer states in the Himalayan region was developed and Nepal was designated as one of them. Actually the British strategic doctrine had conceived three lines of defence. The first line, or the inner line, was represented by the border where the British administration ended, meaning thereby the border with North-West Frontier Province (NWFP, now in Pakistan); Kashmir; the Punjab Hill States; Nepal; Sikkim; Bhutan and North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA, the present Arunachal Pradesh). The second line was represented by the Durand Line in NWFP; the northern borders of Kashmir, Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, and the McMahon Line in NEFA.[18] The third, or the outermost line, was represented by the border of Tibet and Afghanistan with China and Russia. This way, Nepal, like other two Himalayan states—Bhutan and Sikkim—became a buffer state between India and another buffer state, Tibet. The British recognized Nepal's autonomy in internal affairs but extracted from the Nepal government recognition of British suzerainty and, as noted above, permission to station British Resident in Kathmandu. In 1923 another treaty was signed according to which Nepal's independence was recognized but it was stipulated that consultations would be held on foreign and defence matters.

During the Indian freedom struggle, the Ranas of Nepal, a prime-ministerial dynasty, which had been ruling the country since the mid-nineteenth century, like their counterparts in other princely states, were concerned about their future once the British left India.

They tried to hedge their bets by maintaining ties with both the British and some elements in the Indian national movement. This, however, did not succeed. When the British government sought to create a 'third force' in Indian politics by propping up a bloc consisting of the rulers of the Indian 'native states' in support of the British, the Indian National Congress retaliated by extending its activities to the 'native states' including Nepal. The process culminated in the creation of the Nepal State Congress (known subsequently as Nepali Congress) in 1946, which consisted of democratic forces opposed to the Rana regime.

Relations with Sikkim

The British wanted to keep Sikkim within their orbit as they wanted with other Himalayan kingdoms. The original inhabitants of Sikkim were Lepchas who were mostly animists. Later, Tibetan immigrants settled there who brought with them their Buddhsit faith. The Lepchas adopted the faith and also many of the Tibetan social practices. It was against this background that in the middle of the seventeenth century that Namgyal dynasty was established in Sikkim. The king was called Chogyal. The demographic composition of the country, however, started changing in the 19th Century with Nepali immigration. According to Nari Rustomji:

> The flow came mainly from the Darjeeling district of India to the south of Sikkim and from the eastern regions of Nepal contiguous to Sikkim's western frontier. Darjeeling, originally part of Sikkim, had been ceded to the British in 1835 for the establishing of a sanatorium, since when it had become a refuge for Nepal's surplus population. The eastern regions of Nepal, which also originally formed part of Sikkim but were later taken over by Nepal after their wars with Sikkim, comprised tribal groups which were distinct in culture and language from the Rajputs, the forerunners of the present ruling dynasty of Nepal. Unlike the Tibetans, the Nepalis were hungry for land, and, unlike the Tibetan again, they came in numbers and being polygamous, quickly multiplied [Tibetans were polyandrous and as such contributed less to the population growth].[19]

The fact that the ruling class was Tibetan and had close cultural links with Tibet while a large section of the masses belonged to the

Nepalese community which had closer cultural affinity with India as they were Hindus caused political tensions in due course. It would be wrong to conclude that the British had engineered the Nepali migration to Sikkim but it was a fact that the first British Political Officer resident in Sikkim, Claude White, was openly supportive of the process. It did not serve British strategic interest if the rulers of Sikkim were subservient to Tibetan authorities and to the Chinese Amban (representative in Lhasa). As the Sikkim rulers refused to sever their links with Tibet, undercurrents of tension between the two continued till over the question of restitution of slaves and extradition of criminals war broke out between them. In 1861 a treaty was signed which registered the subservience of Sikkim to the British authorities. When all this was happening the demographic composition of Sikkim was fast changing in favour of the Nepalese. The process of incorporation of Sikkim into the Indian Union in 1974 with the support of the Nepalese lobby there had thus started much earlier in the British period when Nepaḷi migrations were encouraged. It is an example of how demographic engineering can promote a nation's strategic interest.

Relations with Bhutan

Having settled matters with Nepal in 1816, British went for similar strategy in Bhutan too. Relations between the British and Bhutan were formalized on 11 November 1865 when the two parties signed the Sinchula Treaty. The treaty ended the state of conflict in which the two were engaged ever since 1837. It obliged Britain to underwrite the independence of Bhutan and pay it an annual allowance of Rs. 50,000 provided the country abstained from fresh breaches of peace. In exchange, Bhutan ceded the pass areas at the foot of the hills to the British, released its prisoners and established free trade between the two countries.

The Sinchula Treaty marked the erosion of Chinese influence and its replacement by that of the British, a development which was replicating itself in other parts of the region as well. Nepal, Sikkim and Tibet were all gradually slipping away from Chinese influence and giving in to that of the British. It was against this background that the British sent the Younghusband Expedition to Tibet (1903–5) to evaluate the strategic importance of the Himalayan states.

Shortly thereafter, in 1907, the hereditary monarchy was established in Bhutan and Ugyen Dorji, the king, was obliged to respect the British interests in the region. In 1910, the Treaty of Punakha was signed which introduced significant amendments to the Sinchula Treaty. According to the new arrangement, Articles IV and VIII of the Sinchula Treaty were amended by which the annual allowance of the King of Bhutan was raised from Rs. 50,000 to Rs. 100,000 and he was obliged to agree to arbitration by the British in all disputes between Bhutan and the Maharajas of Sikkim and Cooch Behar and to abide by the decision of the British Government. It was further decided that Bhutan would enjoy internal autonomy but its external affairs would be guided by the 'advice of the British Government.' Indeed, it was merely the *de jure* recognition of the *de facto* situation.

From 1910 till the lapse of the British paramountcy in India in 1947 there was no major development in Indo-Bhutanese relations. The British did not question Bhutan's internal autonomy and did not even press for the establishment of a Residency in Bhutan such as they had in Nepal and Sikkim. They accredited their Political Officer in Gangtok (Sikkim) to Bhutan, an act, which the latter never actually recognized. The said officer was occasionally allowed to tour Bhutan but was never allowed to exert his influence in the affairs of the state.

After the end of the World War II, as the independence of India became imminent, Bhutan began to have reservations about its future equation with New Delhi. Unlike the Ranas of Nepal, who along with their links with the British government had simultaneously kept contact with some elements in the Indian national movement, the Bhutanese royal house did not nurture any contact worth the name with the nationalists. So, as India became independent in August 1947 Bhutan was uncertain as to how the Indian government would treat the Dragon Kingdom. Actually the same question also disturbed the other two Himalayan kingdoms—Nepal and Sikkim. As for the Indian government, it had already realized the necessity of building up 'fifth columns' in these states to deal with any contingency that might arise if their rulers decided to be recalcitrant. This goal was to be achieved through the expedience of Congress parties in those states. In pursuance of this policy, the Nepal State Congress Party was founded in 1946, the Sikkim State Congress Party in 1947, and the Bhutan State Congress Party in 1948 all of which had links with the Congress Party of India.

Strategy in the North East

We have noted above that the Mughals did not have any effective control over the northeast and the Ahom kings continued to have their sway in Assam with occasional pinpricks from the Mughal governor stationed in Bengal. In the beginning of the nineteenth century, however, tensions cropped up between the Ahom kingdom and Burma as some ambitious forces amongst the Ahoms wanted to befriend the Burmese to oust the reigning king. The result was an eventual Burmese take-over of power from the Ahoms, which continued from 1819 to 1824. After securing Assam, the Burman ruling dynasty, which had developed a tradition of aggressive expansionism ever since its establishment in 1752, committed wanton acts of incursion, not only along the northern frontier of Bengal, but also on the borders of Chittagong and Sylhet. When British remonstrations failed they resorted to arms.

After sporadic wars that continued from 1824 to 1826 the treaty of Yandabu was thrust upon the Burmese. According to its terms the latter agreed to accept a British resident, pay an indemnity of 1,000,000 pound sterling, surrender Assam, Arakan and the coastal strip of Tenasserim and abstain from all interference in Cachar, Jaintia and Manipur. Eventually, in 1886 Burma was annexed to the British Indian empire ostensibly as a response to the build-up of French influence in Indo China.

Strategy in the North West

In the northwestern region the British policy was one of warding off the penetrative tendencies of the Russians. Soon after the arrival of Lord Auckland as the Governor General in 1836, the British became alarmed at the growth of Russian influence in Persia (Iran). At that time the British sphere of influence in the region was limited up to the Sutlej river. Between British India and Afghanistan lay the independent kingdoms of the Punjab under its Sikh ruler, Ranjit Singh, while Sind was ruled by the Talpur amirs. Following the ouster of the Sadozai ruler Shah Shuja of Afghanistan (with whom the British had concluded a treaty), and his expulsion from the state (he took refuge in the British territory), Afghanistan became a divided nation. Kabul, Ghazni and Jalalabad were ruled by Dost Mohammad Barakzai, Kandahar was ruled by Dost Mohammad's brothers, and Herat by a Sadozai, Kamaran Mirza. Since they already exerted considerable influence in the Persian court, the Russians were keen to enlarge their sphere of influence into Afghanistan by prodding the Shah of Persia to penetrate into the region.

The Shah laid siege to Herat, which led to the first Anglo-Afghan war. Although the Shah soon abandoned the siege, the British had already spoilt up their relations with Dost Mohammad by failing to agree to his demand for Peshawar then under the domain of Ranjit Singh. In the war the British troops were massacred. Although the British managed to retrieve some prestige through the campaigns of Generals George Pollock and William Nott, the war had been an avoidable adventure. It was a melancholy piece of folly, which left a legacy of hatred and poisoned Anglo-Afghan relations for many years.

The British soon realised that to deal strategically with Afghanistan it was necessary to control Sind and Punjab. In 1843, Sind was annexed after successful battles of Miani and Dabo. In the Punjab, following the death of Ranjit Singh in 1839 and the ensuing disorder, the British declared war upon it in 1845. The Sikhs were defeated and they were made to surrender all territory on the British side of the Sutlej together with the Jullundur Doab; to pay an indemnity and to limit the strength of their armed forces. In 1846 Gulab Singh, a Dogra king, was placed in possession of all the hill country between the Indus and the Ravi, including Kashmir, Laddakh, Gilgit and Chamba. The administration of Punjab was entrusted to a regency council presided over by Sir Henry Lawrence. The Sikhs, however, could not reconcile themselves to these arrangements, which eventually led to the second Anglo-Sikh war soon after Dalhousie's arrival as the governor general in 1848. The Sikhs were decisively defeated and their territory was annexed to the British Empire. With this victory, after about a century of incessant warfare, British political and geographical frontiers became coterminous.

During the viceroyalty of Lord George Nathaniel Curzon (1899–1905), particular attention was paid to thwart Russian influence in the north-west of India by establishing firm control over the tribals there. With this idea in mind he established the North West Frontier Province. His foreign policy aimed at the exclusion of Russian influence prompted him to establish British supremacy in the Persian Gulf and assertion of authority over Tibet. The Younghusband expedition to Tibet that he sent was, however, vainglorious. The expedition resulted in 700 deaths of badly trained Tibetans and served questionable purpose. His policy of partitioning Bengal (1905) was also a failure. It is ironical that the same British who stood for expansion of their empire in India at the cost of independence of several local monarchs and chieftains sowed the seeds of dismemberment of India and saw to it that the legatees of the empire became sworn enemies.

Question of Labour Export to Sri Lanka

Since Sri Lanka was a 'crown colony,' and not part of the British Raj, we would not discuss British Indian policy to the island.[20] There is, however, one element in Sri Lankan life that concerned the British Indian government and it was the question of indentured Indian labour for Sri Lanka's cash crops, first coffee and then tea. Indeed, this was not an isolated phenomenon. During the 19th Century the British followed the policy of massive labour export from India to many parts of the world where it had its empire. The abolition of East India Company's trade monopoly in 1813 resulted in spectacular rise in the import of cotton fabrics into India, from 1 million yards in 1814 to 51 million in 1830 and then to 995 million yards in 1870. This drove out many of the traditional domestic producers, which coupled with the large rise in populations of China, India, and other poor countries led to their further impoverishment.[21] The abolition of slavery in the 1830s resulted in free flow of labour from India and later from China, Japan and Korea. Although these migrations were often temporary in nature, a sizeable proportion of them was permanent. It is estimated that, between 1834 and 1937, of the 30,000,000 Indians who emigrated, about 24,000,000 returned home. Still, 6,000,000 permanently emigrated.

In the case of Sri Lanka, during the so-called 'coffee era' of 1820–1880, the British encouraged large-scale migration of cheap Tamil and other South Indian labourers to work in that country's coffee plantations. In the 1880s when the coffee plantations were destroyed by disease, tea gardens emerged as substitutes and the demand for labour increased. Tamil immigration became a family phenomenon: from 10,000 in 1827, the number of Tamil immigrants rose to 603,000 in 1941 and to 758,264 in 1949. By this time the Sinhala-Tamil cleavage had become an important political issue. The other conflict of interest between the Sinhalas and the Indian Tamils centred primarily around the politics related to development and redistribution of 'Crown Lands'. As 'non-Ceylonese' the Indian Tamils were debarred from the advantages of those land development and settlement schemes. By the time Sri Lanka became independent in 1948, the controversy was whether the Indian Tamils, like the so-called American 'hyphenates', were bona fide Sri Lankans or of doubtful bona fides with extra-territorial loyalty towards India.

The status of Indian Tamils was a matter of controversy between the colonial rulers of India and Sri Lanka, even though it was British in both cases. In June 1939, the Government of India took serious exception to the decision of the Government of Sri Lanka to dismiss as many as 2,518 (out of a total of 6,624) Indian daily wage labourers in government service in pursuance of a drive to 'Ceylonize' the country's labour force. The latter also wanted the retrenched labourers to be repatriated to India. In retaliation the Government of India imposed a ban on emigration of unskilled labourers from India to Sri Lanka with effect from 1 August 1939. During World War II when Sri Lanka sent a request for more Indian labourers to work in its rubber plantations, India said it would be acceded only if the Indian emigrants were granted 'all rights of citizenship now accruing to persons possessing a Ceylon domicile of origin'. Ceylon did not accept the condition and India then modified its position somewhat: 'All questions regarding the status of these labourers in Ceylon should be left for determination as part of the general negotiations regarding the immigration and status of all Indians, which must take place after the war.' Ultimately the discussions were shelved as the Government of Sri Lanka said 'they hoped to obtain sufficient labour locally to achieve the maximum output of rubber.'[22]

With the appointment of the Soulbury Commission in 1944 to discuss proposals for constitutional reforms in Sri Lanka the question of citizenship of people of Indian origin again surfaced. The Commission, being aware of the disaffection that enfranchisement of Indians would cause among the Sinhalas, left the matter to be decided by future legislature. On the basis of the recommendations of the Commission Sri Lanka attained her dominion status in February 1948. In the meantime, however, in December 1947, a meeting was held in New Delhi between Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime Minister of India, and D.S. Senanayake, the Prime Minister of Ceylon, to resolve the problem. There were two basic issues: (a) who among the Indian labourers resident in Sri Lanka should be considered eligible for the Sri Lankan citizenship, and (b) how they should be admitted to such citizenship. There were differences between the leaders over such questions as the period of residence qualifying the Indians to become Sri Lankan citizens; whether the question of residence should apply uniformly for married and single applicants; to what extent customary law should be replaced by civil law once a person became citizen; and so on. As these differences were being debated the entire process was overtaken by two Sri Lankan enactments: Ceylon Citizenship Act, No. 18 of 1948 and the Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act, No.3 of 1949.

Independent India's External Relations

Unlike the British Indian government in the case of which we discussed India's relations with the contiguous regions, in the case of independent India we will have to have a somewhat broader view of the country's relations with external actors keeping in mind the thrust of this paper. As such, we will first discuss India's strategic doctrine against the background of the Cold War and then deal with its relations with two important neighbours, namely, Pakistan and China. Both for paucity of space as well as their relatively less salience for the purposes here we will not discuss India's relations with Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar, Nepal and Sri Lanka.

The Strategic Doctrine

While discussing British India's strategic outlook we have discussed how they had conceived India's defence perimeter in a three-line formation. To recall, the first line, or the inner line, meant the border where the British administration ended, meaning thereby the border with North-West Frontier Province (NWFP); Kashmir;

the Punjab Hill States; Nepal; Sikkim; Bhutan and the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA). The second line was the Durand Line in NWFP; the northern borders of Kashmir, Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, and the McMahon Line in NEFA. The third, or the outermost line, was the border of Tibet and Afghanistan with China and Russia. Independent India's strategic doctrine followed more or less the same pattern with modifications necessitated by the changing geopolitical realities. India's strategic doctrine conceives the country's defence perimeter not at the borders of the country but at the outer boundaries of its regional neighbours. This was demonstrated in respect of Nepal in the fifties and in respect of Sri Lanka in the eighties. Indeed, all the states in the region for understandable reasons have reconciled themselves to this reality with the notable exception of Pakistan. It was this defiance on the part of the latter that India meant to curb when it defeated and dismembered Pakistan in 1971.

To this one may add now its nuclear doctrine. In May 1998 both India and Pakistan went nuclear. Still, it took a few years for India to articulate its nuclear doctrine. Spelt out in early January 2003, India made it clear that although it was committed to its 'no-first-use' posture, it warned its potential adversaries that the 'nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage'. The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), which announced the doctrine, however, entered a caveat in its 'no-first-use' commitment. It said that India's nuclear arsenal would not only aim to deter threats from other nuclear weapon states but also those emanating from the use of chemical and biological weapons. 'In the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons,' the CCS said.[23]

Relations with Pakistan

So much has been written on India-Pakistan relations that to write yet another subsection on the theme would amount to reinventing the wheel. Yet, the subject cannot be ignored. To cut the story short, we would refer to just three elements in the relationship, which are at the core of India-Pakistan problem. These three elements are, one, the religious factor in India's and Pakistan's politics, two, the issue of refugees in both the countries, and three, the Kashmir tangle. One may add yet another dimension, that is, the nuclearization of both countries, but that can be seen more as a consequence than as a factor contributing to their mutual rivalry.

The Religious Factor: Following India's independence and Pakistan's creation the challenge of nation building haunted both the ruling establishments. Given the tortuous process of the freedom struggle and the Hindu-Muslim conflict that came to occupy the centrestage of that struggle towards the end, it was clear to both nations that religion and ethnicity which had played such an important role in nation building in Europe in the previous centuries should not be employed in the Indian subcontinent for they were inherently divisive, which pluralistic India and Pakistan could ill afford. To operationalise the idea in political terms was, however, extremely difficult, particularly for Pakistan. Given the different trajectories that the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League had followed during the nationalist movement it was not easy for Pakistan to endorse the concept of separation of state and religion and treat all its citizens equally.

In tune with the ethos of the Indian National Congress India chose to go for secularism as the state policy with emphasis on the theory of separation of religion and state as well as equality of all citizens before the law. Minority rights were legally protected and even no impediment was put on their holding the highest offices of political authority. But for Pakistan to do so, which it actually tried to do to start with, was rather anachronistic because of historical reasons. The entire Pakistan movement was based on the two nation theory and the idea that was popularized amongst those Muslims who were to later constitute the Pakistani nation was that Islam was the only binding force amongst them and that it was not possible for Indian Muslims to co-exist with the Hindus. Against this background it was quite expected that in spite of all the lofty sentiments expressed by Qaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah that the state in Pakistan would be secular, the Islamic forces would eventually overpower the secularist forces. The former declared the state as Islamic and made it constitutionally impossible for a non-Muslim to become the head of state, which in any case was most unlikely.

During the Ayub Khan regime (1958–69) some efforts were made to secularize the state but they did not succeed. For example, his 1962 constitution, in spite of its Islamic clauses, had declared

Pakistan a 'Republic' and not an 'Islamic Republic'. But within a year he was forced by Islamic forces to agree to restore its original name of 'Islamic Republic' with even greater thrust on the use of Islamic ideology for the purposes of governance. Like Ayub Khan, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1972–77) too started with the promise of secularizing Pakistan polity but relented before long.

In General Zia-ul-Haq, who ruled the country from 1977 to 1988, the Islamic ideology of Pakistan found its staunchest champion. Immediately after he captured power on 5 July 1977 through a military coup he declared: 'Pakistan, which was created in the name of Islam, will continue to survive only if it sticks to Islam. That is why I consider the introduction of Islamic system as an essential prerequisite for the country.' Within a few days, Martial Law was declared and several Quranic punishments were introduced.

From the beginning the tenor of Pakistan politics was such that any modernist approach to politics, which even remotely advocated separation of religion and state, became an anathema for the political class. In its extreme form the latter considered only that person as the true Pakistani who was a Sunni and, preferably, also a Punjabi, or, at least a Sunni Pathan. Ahmediyas were not considered as Muslims and the Shias who formed a minority were often on the receiving end as frequent anti-Shia violence indicated. In this climate it is no wonder that the present Pakistani state is countenancing a serious challenge from the so-called jihad 'industry'. Although under strong US pressure in the aftermath of the Nine Eleven the present regime of Pervez Musharraf is trying its best to cope with the problem but it is a Herculean task. Musharraf has banned several extremist groups and has tried to exhort his people about the true concept of Jihad as war against poverty and social evils but probably it is too late for him to extricate Pakistan from the Frankenstein of religious politics.

The Islam-based nation building strategy of Pakistan has completely cast aside the minorities from the process as if they do not exist at all. Non-Muslim minority groups are very small in number. According to the last census conducted in 1981, the Hindus are 1.5 per cent of the population, the Christians 1.6 per cent and the Ahmediyas 0.1 per cent.[24] Hindus are not only small in number they are socially and politically marginalized. Most of them live at, or below, the poverty line. According to a decade-old report published in the Karachi-based journal, *The Herald*: 'Since Hindus are not "people of the book," most Muslims consider them to be inferior. Even today as the twentieth century comes to a close, most Muslims will not eat or drink with Hindus, nor will they touch Hindus' eating utensils. This intense discrimination is manifested at all levels and in all forms. Thus, Hindus form one of the poorest and most exploited communities in the country.'[25]

Insofar as India was concerned, its constitutional commitment to the separation of religion and state notwithstanding, it could not get rid of the fact that it was a Hindu majority state. Its politics, therefore, continued to be influenced by this reality and correspondingly the minority question remained acrimonious. After Nehru's death in 1963 India's secular commitment gradually got diluted resulting in a free for all situation in which every one started brandishing one's communal political card. Indira Gandhi was certainly not communal (but so was not Jinnah), but the way she started handling her politics, for example, in the Jammu and Kashmir assembly elections of 1982, it tended to justify the use of communal card. Hindu nationalists who were waiting in the wings to make their bid to political power did not miss the opportunity. Of course there were several factors that contributed to their rise, which need not be gone into here for I have discussed them at length elsewhere.[26] It would suffice here to mention that now on it was not merely communal consciousness or a policy of equi-proximity to both Hinduism and Islam, which we noticed during the Nehruvian era, but it was a politics of negativism—the so-called hate politics, or, an aggressive majoritarianism. A deliberate and concerted effort was made to denigrate the Muslims, and sometimes also the Christians, to score a point or two in favour of Hindu nationalism. And it was not to be done locally but on the national scene.[27] Consequently, there were growing evidences of intolerance among certain sections of the Hindus, which militated against the popular belief in India that Hindus, unlike others, Muslims in particular, were tolerant. Of course, conservative Muslim postures sometimes contributed to this development. Some such examples were the controversy over the movie *Bombay*, the banning of allegedly objectionable books from time to time, rowdy attacks against beauty pageants, Valentine Day celebrations, prohibiting beef eating in the country, etc. All these developments had their fallout on the India-Pakistan relations.

The refugee syndrome: Large-scale migrations of Hindus from Pakistan in the wake of the partition influenced the Hindu nationalistic politics of India. The birth of the Hindu chauvinistic Bharatiya Jana Sangh in 1951 was directly attributable to the post-independence communal strife. The linkage of the Jana Sangh (forerunner of the present BJP) with the Hindu nationalistic Hindu Mahasabha and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) is too well known to be recapitulated here. The founder of the Jana Sangh, Shyama Prasad Mookerji, constantly emphasised the refugee factor as one of the most important compulsions behind the launching of his party. No wonder that the initial base of the party was in these refugee settlements, particularly in Delhi.

Likewise, the large-scale migration of Muslims to Pakistan, who are known as Mohajirs, influenced the politics of that state. In pre-Bangladesh Pakistan these Mohajirs (which also included the East Punjabis) constituted about 10 per cent (20 per cent after the secession of Bangladesh) of Pakistan's population. The circumstances under which Pakistan was created and the nature of pre-partition Muslim politics had earned for them a unique status and purpose which is otherwise denied to any immigrant community, the most notable exception being the immigrant Jews of Israel. Comprising relatively better-educated people, members of the Indian Civil Service and the Indian Army, noted businessmen, and, most importantly, leaders and sympathisers of the Muslim League, which spearheaded the Pakistan movement, the Mohajirs constituted a political force to reckon with. About three-quarters of the so-called 'twenty-two families,' which once controlled Pakistan's economy were from this community.[28] Besides, as the Mohajirs contributed to the rapid urbanisation of Pakistan, which was one of the fastest in the developing world, their influence in politics became all the more visible.[29]

The Mohajirs, who had left their original homes in India in search of security and a better future in Pakistan, had naturally a larger stake in the viability of the state. This explains their insistence on strengthening the forces that were supposed to help build Pakistan's unity, namely, Islam, Urdu, and a strong central government. The Muslim League, both on account of its Mohajir leadership as well as the large following that it had in the community, represented these theories of nation building. Another party, which also strongly represented these ideas, was the *Jamaat-i-Islami*, a party having a large following among the Mohajirs. With the relative decline of the Muslim League it was this party that attracted the disillusioned Muslim Leaguers the most.[30] The anti-Indianism of these groups was inherent in their circumstances.

The Kashmir Issue: Essentially the problem of Kashmir has two closely inter-related causes. They are: one, the legal status of Kashmir as was to be determined according to the instrument of Transfer of Power, and two, the political question of governing Kashmir through normal politico-administrative procedures or through some special constitutional device. Closely related to the first was the issue whether the problem could be settled through negotiations between India and Pakistan alone or through the involvement of the United Nations, or, what has been happening of late through the involvement of the United States.

It is said that Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, the Minister of States, to whom goes largely the credit of incorporating the princely states into the Indian Union, most notably Hyderabad and Junagarh, had virtually written off Kashmir following the logic of the partition. It was Nehru who had some kind of a 'pathological' passion for Kashmir to which reference was made by Lord Mountbatten in one of his official reports.[31] A.G. Noorani tells us:

> Patel's ministry of states had published White Papers on the states in July 1948 and February 1950. Official maps were attached to both. The 1948 map did not even extend the yellow colour wash to the entire state of J&K. In 1948 and 1950, Kashmir's northern and eastern boundaries—as also the stretching from Kashmir to Nepal—were explicitly shown as 'undefined', in contrast to the clear depiction of the McMahon Line in the east.[32]

There was indeed a strategic dimension too in Nehru's calculations, which he as a foreign policy expert must not have overlooked. Just prior to his acceptance of the accession of Kashmir he had sent a telegram to the British Prime Minister Clement Attlee, which read:

> We have received urgent appeal of assistance from Kashmir Government. We would be disposed to give favourable consideration to such request from any friendly State. Kashmir's Northern frontiers, as you are aware, run in common with those of three countries, Afghanistan, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and China. Security of Kashmir, which must depend upon control of internal tranquility and existence of stable Government, is vital to security of India especially

> since part of Southern boundary of Kashmir and India are common. Helping Kashmir, therefore, is an obligation of national interest to India. We are giving urgent consideration to question as to what assistance we can give to the State to defend it.
>
> It should be made clear that question of aiding Kashmir in this emergency is not designed in any way to influence the State to accede to India. Our view which we have repeatedly made public is that the question of accession in any disputed territory or State must be decided in accordance with wishes of people and we adhere to this view. It is quite clear, however, that no free expression of will of people of Kashmir is possible if external aggression succeeds in imperiling integrity of its territory.[33]

It is generally believed in India that behind India's Kashmir policy there is the broad rationale of India's nation-building ideal of 'one nation' upon which the entire freedom movement was built. On the same ground its conflict with Pakistan, a state based on the Muslim League's two-nation theory, is explained. As an extension of the argument it is alleged that Pakistan's quest for nationhood would remain incomplete so long as it failed to incorporate Kashmir in its territory for the existence of a Muslim-majority province in India makes a mockery of its two-nation theory. The argument is of doubtful validity for then the very creation of Pakistan should have been objected to and should have been actually prevented at any political cost, which Mahatma Gandhi had suggested. He went to the extent of pleading for the name of Mohammad Ali Jinnah as the prime minister of the undivided India just to avoid partition of the country. The nation-building logic is the post-facto explanation of an essentially legal dispute.[34]

But the legal question was overtaken when Pakistan committed the first illegal act by violating the instrument of Transfer of Power. It invaded Kashmir to incite an internal Muslim rebellion against the Hindu Maharaja probably on the line of the Indian action in Hyderabad. India contributed to this illegality of Pakistan by agreeing to hold a plebiscite to decide about the political fate of Kashmir although the Maharaja had signed the instrument of accession on 26 October 1947 in favour of India. For reasons easily explainable but otherwise politically short-sighted (the popularity of Sheikh Abdullah in the state and his pro-India posture) both Lord Mountbatten and Jawaharlal Nehru unsuccessfully converted that legally complete accession into a conditional one. In his letter to the Maharaja dated 27 October 1947 Mountbatten wrote that 'my Government have decided to accept the accession of Kashmir State to the Dominion of India. Consistently with their policy that in the case of any State *where the issue of accession has been the subject of dispute*, the question of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State, it is my Government's wish that as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the invader the question of the *State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people*.'[35] On the same day Nehru sent a telegram to Liaquat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, stating, *inter alia*, that 'our view which we have repeatedly made public is that *the question of accession in any disputed territory or State* must be decided in accordance with the wishes of people and we adhere to this view.'[36] The italicized phrases above show that these expressions were neither Pakistan's nor UN's creation but they were India's own creation.

Following this it was once again Pakistan's turn to contribute to the intractable character of the conflict. It failed to grab the opportunity and settle the problem once and for all by not adhering to the UN resolutions. The Resolution 47 (21 April 1948), which provided for the plebiscite, expected from Pakistan a total withdrawal of all Pakistanis from Kashmir. 'When it is established to the satisfaction of the [UN] Commission ... that the tribesmen [from Pakistan] are withdrawing and that arrangements for the cessation of the fighting have become effective, [India should] put into operation in consultation with the Commission a plan for withdrawing their own forces from Jammu and Kashmir and reducing them progressively to the minimum strength required for the support of the civil power in the maintenance of law and order.'[37] The primary responsibility, therefore, rested with Pakistan to withdraw its troops but it did not oblige. Naturally, the UN resolutions could not be implemented nor the plebiscite held. A decade later, Gunnar Jarring, the UN Representative opined that the passage of time and the changing circumstances had rendered the UN resolutions obsolete.[38]

India followed a different logic to underscore the irrelevance of the plebiscite formula. On 27 October 1950, the General Council of the National Conference adopted a resolution recommending the convening of a Constituent Assembly for the purpose of determining the 'future shape and affiliations of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.' The Constituent Assembly consisting of 75 members was elected in 1950 by a universal adult franchise and the constitution that was adopted declared the State of Jammu and Kashmir to be 'an integral part of India.' It may, however, be noted that in the election, all the nominations filed by the opposition were rejected.[39] Whatever be the case, the Government of India expressed the view that as the democratic process followed for the election of the legislative assembly of the state proved that the people had accepted to remain within the Union of India the UN resolutions on plebiscite 'had become obsolete and were no longer binding on India.'[40] It was forgotten that the disputed territory was entire J&K while the Constituent Assembly and the Legislative Assembly in question were elected only by the people of India-controlled part and not those in the Pakistan-controlled part. It is obvious that from the very beginning India had reconciled itself to the reality of a divided J&K.

The Indo-Pak war of 1965, which Pakistan initiated to capture Kashmir once again underlined its lack of respect for the UN resolutions. In 1972, the UN resolutions got superseded when both India and Pakistan signed the Simla Agreement, which laid down that the problem of Kashmir would be solved bilaterally through peaceful means and the Line of Control (LOC) would be the de-facto boundary between the two countries.[41] It must, however, be understood here that the Simla Agreement did not address itself to the legal question of sovereign right over Kashmir; it merely eliminated the role of external powers in the controversy.[42]

The very fact that the LOC was accepted as the de-facto boundary till the fate of Kashmir—both the Indian as well as the Pakistani parts—was finally decided through negotiations ipso facto acknowledged the legal controversy over title in respect of the state although India continued to claim that the accession was complete and as such irrevocable. Otherwise how could one explain that India, that too a victor in the war of 1971, should have agreed to a situation in which a part of its sovereign territory could continue to remain in the indefinite occupation of an 'enemy' nation.[43] Remember that all Indian maps show the entire J&K as part of India and the Government of India does not use, whenever there is any reference to Kashmir, any other phrase than that the state is an integral part of India which is just not negotiable. Did not the

Government of India agree to negotiate the subject? The fact of the matter, therefore, is that the legal question of title over Kashmir is still open and as such is very much negotiable and should, therefore, remain so on the Indo-Pak agenda.

The Kashmir problem, however, took a new turn towards the middle of the 1980s when Pakistan's covert involvement in the affairs of the state started. It was directly linked to the political turmoil and violence that the Indian state of Punjab then was witnessing. Following the Operation Blue Star at the Golden Temple of Amritsar in 1984 there was large-scale disaffection among the Sikhs, which often resulted in indiscriminate arrest of Sikh youths by the Punjab police for interrogation and other kinds of unauthorized torture. Pakistan took advantage of the situation and made room for the reception of these disaffected youth on its soil for their training in armed rebellion against the Indian state. These trainings became part of a wider operation run by Pakistan's intelligence agency, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), primarily meant for the training of the Afghan *mujahedeens* (freedom fighters).

It was almost during the same time that Kashmir politics witnessed tremors of sorts. The National Conference (NC) of Kashmir and the Congress at the centre for their narrow political interests and on wrong political calculations did not allow the Muslim United Front (MUF) to have their rightful share of seats in the state assembly by rigging the elections that were held in 1987. Having lost faith in the democratic system many of the members of the MUF gradually were lured to extra-constitutional means to express their grievances. It was against this background that international Islam also started playing its role in a bigger way. Large-scale contributions poured in from Saudi Arabia and other Islam conscious countries like Iran to both Sunni and Shia religious organizations and political parties such as the Jamaat-i-Islami for opening up schools to teach children Arabic, Persian and Urdu and train them in Islamic values. By 1990 there were more than hundred such schools, which had produced about 150,000 students trained in orthodox Islamic values. The two trends in Kashmir, namely, political disaffection of the Kashmiri youth with the system, and a growing involvement of international Islam in the socio-political life of the state, got intricately mixed. As a result, the political movement in Kashmir assumed an Islamic character. The temptation for Pakistan to settle its score with India for the latter's role in the creation of Bangladesh became irresistible.

Increasingly, terrorism in Kashmir got internationalized which was evident from the sophistication of the operations, the undrying source of their funding and the actual arrest of terrorists belonging to other nationalities by the Indian security forces. The U.S.-based human rights organization, Human Rights Watch, which was ever critical of the Indian state for its human rights record in Kashmir, noted in its 1995 report that 'kidnappings, indiscriminate use of explosives, including car and letter bombs, in which the civilians were the principal victims, appeared to be the work of Islamic groups whose leadership included Afghans and other non-Kashmiris....[44] Even some Chechnian rebels were killed in encounters.[45] Following the Taliban's victory in Kabul there was clear evidence of the involvement of Afghan Islamists in Kashmir. An expatriate Pakistani journalist put it aptly: 'In Kashmir we originally had a freedom movement against Indian occupation. This struggle for self-determination was hijacked by Islamists who turned it into a Jihad. Al-Qaeda and the Taliban have many faces: organizations such as Lashkar-e-Tayba, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Jaish-e-Muhmmad, Sepah-e-Sahaba etc. These groups disappear only to appear in another form and under a new name. Pakistani Islamists are convinced that Al-Qaeda will reemerge in Kashmir.'[46] Incidentally, the Valley observed a strike in the last week of September 2001 in support of Osama bin Laden although the APHC had just passed a resolution supporting Pervez Musharraf's stand against Al Qaeda.[47]

Nuclearisation and the Kargil crisis: In May 1998, both India and Pakistan conducted several nuclear tests and in effect formally declared themselves as nuclear powers. For Kashmir issue per se this development had little meaning but it shook the world community according to which Kashmir being the flash point the danger was now of a nuclear showdown. The process of dialogue between India and Pakistan continued and it seemed that India was in a conciliatory mood. Informally it agreed to prioritize the agenda, the so-called '2+6'. The two issues were: (1) peace and security, including confidence building measures, and (2) Jammu and Kashmir. The other six issues were: (1) Siachin, (2) Wullar barrage project and Tulbul navigation project, (3) Sir Creek, (4) terrorism and drug trafficking, (5) economic and commercial cooperation, and (6) promotion of friendly exchanges at various fields. The Lahore Declaration of 21

February 1999 underwrote this mechanism. But even before the ink of the declaration could dry Pakistan unleashed its Kargil adventure in May 1999 resulting in an armed confrontation between the two countries.

It is difficult to explain why Pakistan went for this adventure when things were improving beyond imagination. Did Nawaz Sharif know about the Kargil plan when he met Vajpayee? Or, is it that the army kept him in dark about the adventure to torpedo the peace process which was not going to help the army any way? It is true that the armed forces were kept off the peace process. In a way, therefore, the Kargil adventure was essentially a part of the power struggle between Sharif and the army. For India the writings on the wall were clear—so long as the army called the shots in Pakistan's politics there could not be a negotiated settlement of the Kashmir issue. The raison d'etre of the Pakistan army was Pakistan's enmity with India at the core of which was Kashmir. As such, any solution of the problem would rob it of its preeminence in the country's life.

Relations with China

Following the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the Sino-Indian relations witnessed a progressive deterioration in the decade of the 1950s, which primarily concerned disagreements over their common border. Diplomatic efforts were made to resolve the issue but they did not succeed. By the late 50s mutual accusations of trespassing into each other's sovereign territory became frequent. In March 1959, the Dalai Lama, the spiritual and political head of Tibet, following a failed revolution against Chinese rule fled to India seeking asylum. Along with him came 100,000 refugees. Much to the annoyance of China, they were warmly received in India where the Tibetan movement enjoyed a great deal of public support. The ensuing Tibetan crisis proved to be the catalyst that brought the already simmering relations between the two countries to a boil. In the next three years, these tensions continued to mount as Indian and Chinese leaders parlayed, even meeting in New Delhi in April 1960, to find a peaceful solution to what was fast translating into a major border disagreement. In India's eyes such efforts were an utter failure as China persisted with her 'encroachments' and military manoeuvres. On 9 September 1962, India finally took the decision to 'evict' the Chinese from certain sectors. Then, on the night of 19–20 October the Chinese launched a massive attack in several sectors, which took the Indians by surprise. Battle was joined on several fronts by both sides along the border. By the middle of November, the Chinese controlled the Aksai Chin region in the northern area of Ladakh in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, and also crossed south across the McMahon Line in NEFA. As the Indian army continued to suffer reverses, the Chinese, without prior notice, announced a unilateral ceasefire effective from midnight of 21–22 November. They withdrew all their forces behind the McMahon Line in NEFA, but continued to hold on to Aksai Chin.

In India the military humiliation and lesson in *realpolitik* prompted major military spending and a re-evaluation of Nehru's idealist approach to foreign policy. The Indians felt deeply aggrieved and deceived by what they classified as China's duplicitous behaviour. Since the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, India had vigorously sought to work towards Asian unity. In Nehru's idealist and non-aligned vision he regarded India and China as the leaders of the emerging Third World. According to him such a central place in the global order was predicated on their historical greatness and past standing in the world as founts of civilization. Hence, Nehru and the Indian foreign policy establishment, which he dominated, went out of their way to welcome and support the newly formed PRC: India was one of the first states to formally recognize the PRC in 1949.[48] In 1954, the two countries had signed the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, one of whose main points was that all bilateral disputes would be peacefully solved.[49] Hence, the Indians felt deceived and betrayed by China's attack.

The Chinese view of things was, understandably, different—otherwise things would not have led to war. The Chinese, much like their Indian counterparts, were emerging from several years of foreign—Western—domination. As a result, they too were actively constructing or reconstructing their national project. They were also attempting to situate their country vis-a-vis the superpowers and, needless to say, ideology and communism played their roles in this process. They justified their expansion into Tibet by calling it 'liberation,' claiming that Tibet was subordinate to China. The Chinese welcomed Indian friendship in the early years and stated the hope of resolving all outstanding border issues through diplomacy. Yet, the question of differing perceptions of where the border lay remained. They claimed that the ensuing friction magnified to the point where they were left with no choice but to militarily deal with Indian aggression and interference in their domestic affairs.[50]

As a result of the war, diplomatic ties between the two nations virtually broke down and it was not until the late 1980s that prime-ministerial visits were re-initiated. Since then relations have progressively improved. Yet, tensions and a level of distrust still persist with each alleging the other of entertaining ambitions of dominating the entire Southeast Asian region.[51] Although of late there are indications of a thaw, reflected particularly in their mutual decision not to allow the border dispute to come in the way of normalization of relations, on macro terms there is a possibility that the undercurrents of suspicion will continue.[52] China's nuclear doctrine commits itself to a no-first-use of nuclear weapon state or in any nuclear free zone. Still, strategic experts in India argue that any nuclear state which has declared no first use policy especially as in the case of China which has rationalized the possibility of local war in her periphery may well be compelled to use theater nuclear weapons in tactical battles once she is under adverse conditions. Chinese nuclear capability deeply concerns India. Now that both India and Pakistan have gone nuclear the problem has become even more complex.

In terms of a larger perspective, it is clear that China has global ambitions and would like to be designated as a great power while India still has only regional ambitions in spite of its nuclearisation. Three developments have gone in favour of China, namely, its possession of nuclear weapons at an appropriate time and becoming a member of the 5-member nuclear club, its permanent place in the UN Security Council, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The last has helped China to divert its resources, engaged earlier in maintaining its military preparedness on the Sino-Soviet borders, to other modernization programmes. At present there is doubtful evidence to show that China is coming in the way of India's ambitions, yet the potential to do so remains. Factors indicating the above are China's strategic partnership with Pakistan and its help to Pakistan's nuclear and missile programmes. It opposed India's nuclear tests conducted in May 1998, and so also Pakistan's, on the ground that they would lead to nuclear rivalry in the region endangering regional security. Although the disapproval is equally valid for India and Pakistan, the nuclear programme of the latter anyway is dependent upon China and this relationship can be snapped if China so desires. To Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka China has been supplying military hardware. After the withdrawal of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) from Sri Lanka in 1990 it has supplied the Sri Lankan armed forces with specialized equipment to fight LTTE insurgency, besides selling aircrafts, ground force equipment and naval vessels on commercial terms. China has also helped Myanmar to develop her strategic bases.

If the Sino-Indian strategic balance tilts in favour of China, Indo-Pak strategic balance tilts in favour of India. This results in a vicious circle in which one's sense of security becomes the other's sense of insecurity, causing what Stephen Cohen characterized decades ago as an 'insecurity syndrome.' It is against this background that India's security doctrine assumes serious relevance for other nations. This doctrine has evolved over the years from a passive defence posture (1947–62) to a pro-active defence posture (1971 onwards). The last is indicated by India's role in the Bangladesh war followed by Indian Army's involvement in the Sri Lankan and Maldivian affairs. The Indian defence policy has gone through a period of maturity between 1962 and the present in which from a position of humiliation it has projected strength to acquire partial regional hegemony. The way the international community thwarted the Pakistani adventurism in Kargil in May-July 1999 seems to suggest that it accepted India's regional status.

III
GLOBALISM VERSUS LOCALISM

Technological Imperative

We have seen above how during the last five centuries three kinds of globalization processes have dominated international relations. Two common factors have run through all the phases, first, the use of advanced technology to control and dominate the weaker, and second, the emergence of one or a few dominant nations monopolizing the economic, technological and military power to expand their dominance over the rest, more particularly those with abundance of natural and/or human resources. In the first phase it was Portugal and Spain, in the second it was primarily Britain and to some extent France, and in the third it was primarily the United States but also, in a reasonable sense, the European Union. Japan and Russia could not effectively be in the league because they were deficient by one critical component each. Japan was an economic giant but had no military prowess. Russia was a massive military power together with strong nuclear teeth but it was economically weak.

But the common technology factor notwithstanding the technological advances during the present phase of globalization puts it apart from the previous experiences. In the previous phases of globalization, technology was monopolized by the states, which could put it in use to perpetuate their dominance without any threat to their pernicious motives. But in the present phase of globalization technology is broad-based and barring the very sophisticated ones meant primarily for military, space and other strategic research meant even to predict or influence climatic and ecological changes, it is available across the board, including the non-state actors. This critical difference between the present and the earlier phases is noticeable in the two different sets of opposition to globalization. During the second phase the nationalist movements were nation centric and they had no communication with one another except in a very limited fashion when the Indian National Congress had encouraged similar movements in Bhutan, Nepal, and Sikkim. But in the present phase we have a combined global denunciation of globalization in the form of the World Social Forum. It is the voice of the marginalised people, who do not see any future of theirs in the present package of growth. An even better example is the capacity of International Islam to threaten and cause unacceptable damage to the most powerful nations of the world.

Against this broad conceptualization it would be seen how the three globalizations have influenced the ideological positions of the relevant actors, how have they contributed to national or ethnic identity formations, and, lastly, how the combination of these two variables have led to inter-state and intra-state conflicts.

Hegemony and its Discontents

According to International Relations theory, besides the use of superior military power, one of the ways to defeat or outmanoeuvre enemies or opponents, or to bring potential detractors to one's own fold, is to convince them of one's own ideas and ideologies, which may include even religious ideology. Ideologies can, according to the theory, 'serve as a means for expansionist goals and ... they can help infiltration, destruction and terrorism directed against a target state. They may even provide the means to weaken its resistance, to bring about "peaceful" take-over of the government or to kindle guerilla wars and revolutions. This is at least possible, if a large segment of the population can be turned into adherents of the new creed.' To dilate the theory further, 'the more limited the group of potential followers of a belief system, the more restricted is its use for imperialistic expansion. The Jewish religion traditionally only spoke of the Jews as the chosen people. Its appeal is, therefore, limited to a small group of humanity and can only be used for limited nationalistic expansion. The messages of Christianity, Buddhism and Islam, on the other hand, are directed to all human beings and can thus create much broader support. The same is true for the belief systems of freedom, rule of law and democracy.' [53]

Without going into the entire period of our discussion to see the efficacy of the theory for it would be too vast a subject to handle here, we would concentrate on one significant component of the British political ideology figuring in the above theory, that is, 'the belief systems of freedom, rule of law and democracy.' At the core of this ideology was the concept of secular liberal education. Against the background of the Bengal renaissance in the first quarter of the nineteenth century in the forefront of which was Raja Ram Mohun Roy, the British declared in 1835 'that the great objects of the British government ought to be the promotion of European literature and science' and that available funds should 'be henceforth employed in imparting to the Native population knowledge of English literature and science through the medium of the English language (the so-called Minutes of Macaulay).' Gradually, English replaced Persian as the court language and soon the Indian Penal Code was introduced (1861) which brought in English legal procedures. In the field of science the establishment of the Calcutta

Medical College introduced Western medicinal system. Alongside, the British also introduced a modern administrative system.

On the whole the British ideology of good governance, a catch phrase these days, helped the colonial rulers to earn habitual obedience from Indians at large. Till the arrival of Gandhi on the Indian political scene in 1915 and till the time he took the nationalist movement to the masses and made them aware of the importance of independence for any self-respecting nation, a large number of Indians had found in the British rule a superior commitment to law and governance. Barring the Rebellion of 1857 and the local and sporadic revolts by disaffected groups in some parts of India, which the subaltern historians have highlighted, there was no organized nation-wide protest against the British rule till then.

But how did Gandhi achieve this? Let us once again draw from some theories of International Relations. If ideology helps the rulers to rule, the contradictions in that ideology—gaps between the professed position and actual happenings—can land them up in a trap. The opponents can rouse the masses by referring to these double talks. Let us elicit the theory:

> If some of the 'truths' of the belief system become ... doubtful because experience seems to show that they contradict reality, then the ideology or religion may become a much less powerful instrument of foreign and even of domestic policy. For instance, if the plentiful supply of goods expected by communism does not materialize even after more than sixty years of socialism have passed, if people are exploited more rigorously by socialist functionaries and bureaucrats than formerly by capitalists and if the state is found to be oppressive and hostile to all liberties instead of withering away, then people have a hard time believing Marxist ideology against their own experiences. It is, therefore, not surprising that Marxism seems to have been discredited now for a broad majority of people in Eastern Europe and in Russia who have had a long and intimate experience with this kind of socialism. Still, communist ideology can nevertheless be used in Western industrialized and in underdeveloped countries as a tool of foreign policy by a pragmatic Soviet leadership, since most people in these countries lack the immediate experience with real communism as practiced in Eastern Europe and Russia.[54]

It was the British ideology of democracy, which Mahatma Gandhi took maximum advantage of by beating them with their own sticks. On the one hand he tried to create a moral dilemma amongst the British intellectuals about their rule in India—democracy at home but imperialism abroad—and on the other exhibited to the Indian masses the double standards being followed by the British. Whether it was the Salt Satyagraha, the Non-Cooperation Movement, the Civil Disobedience Movement, the Chauri Chaura incident, the Quit India Movement, and so on, Gandhi exploited the British ideological predicament. In short, the use of democratic ideology as an advertisement of British success boomeranged on them.

Nationalism versus Subnationalism

In his study on the origin of the idea of nationalism Benedict Anderson has discussed the importance of communication technology in the growth of community consciousness, which is at the core of nation formation. He particularly referred to the expansion of printing technology to build his thesis.[55] Taking cue from Anderson's theory we may argue that in the growth of Indian national consciousness the second phase of globalization played the most significant role for in this period not only liberal education was introduced in India but, alongside, railways and telegraph also made their entry into Indian life. Whatever may be the imperial considerations behind these innovations their impact on Indian social and political lives was enormous and positive. The birth of the Indian National Congress in 1885 and its growth thereafter could not have been possible otherwise. Of course, at that time Indian nationalism was confined to an elite class, a shortcoming, which Mahatma Gandhi rectified after his entry into Indian politics in 1915. In his concept of nationalism all communities and castes were necessarily parts.

It is, however, strange, but true, that nationalism invariably breeds divisions in the society if it is plural in character. To be sure, there is an inherent contradiction between nationalism and ethnicity. No democracy in a plural society has found a foolproof answer to this dichotomy. Since nationalism and democracy are structurally majoritarian, it is a constant challenge for both of them as to how to reconcile themselves to the existence of minorities and to their assertions for rights as equal citizens in the eyes of law. There is an umbilical connection between ethnicity and nationalism and empirically speaking the latter is the culmination of the former. But the problem is that once an ethnic group acquires the status of a nation it is potentially intolerant of the other ethnic groups, forgetting the fact that it itself was in a similar situation in the past.

At the root of the Hindu-Muslim cleavage this was the theory that was at play. Muslims thought that in a democratic India where the Hindus would be in majority, they as a minority would be marginalized. But once Pakistan was created the same Muslims did not show any hesitation to reduce the minority Hindus there to the status of an insignificant minority both in numerical and constitutional terms. One should not, therefore, find anything permanent about the majority-minority dichotomy nor is there any moral superiority to be attached to any particular ethnic group. Each is the product of its circumstances and behaves in predictable terms. As such, there is nothing like minority rights and interests alone; there are majority rights and interests as well. That is the essential contradiction between ethnicity and nationalism, which we mentioned above and which India has witnessed in various forms. In this regard the first decade of the 20th century was particularly interesting. In 1905, the Guru Singh Sabha achieved a major victory when it succeeded in removing all Hindu images from the Golden Temple in Amritsar. In 1906, the Muslim League was brought into being in Calcutta. In 1907, the Hindu Sabha was established in the Punjab, which culminated in the formation of the Hindu Maha Sabha in 1922. One may see in these developments both the forces of minorityism and majoritarianism flourishing simultaneously at each other's success.

Intra-ethnic conflicts were not confined to religious communities, they were noticeable amongst all kinds of tribal and provincial groups who felt threatened by the possibility of mantle changing hands from the British to the Indian rulers, which in the background of the Hindu-Muslim cleavage appeared to many as merely Hindu rulers. Whether it was the Sikhs in Punjab or the tribals in the northeast a general apprehension of their marginalization in the democratic politics of India ran high. It goes to the credit of the Indian state that much of these apprehensions have been absorbed by larger doses of democracy by granting more powers to the states, by creating new states, by introducing Panchayati Raj, or by establishing autonomous district councils.[56] Experience, however, suggests that these identity formations too have their limits and ultimately developmental questions take the front seats. For example, one may argue that of late the identity question in India's northeast is seemingly on its reverse gear. There was a time when almost all tribal conglomerates wanted states of their own, and the process is still on. As a result Assam was divided into several states. But what also happened is that most of the states realized that they were too small to make their presence felt in larger Indian political and societal contexts. As a result, they started talking about their northeastern identity. What exactly is that identity no body probably can define but for the purposes of extracting grants from a guilt conscious Indian state that seems to deliver the dividends. Already there is the North Eastern Council (NEC). Of late we have been hearing of North Eastern Book Fair, North East Film Festival, North East Forum consisting of Parliamentarians belonging to the region, etc.

IV

CONCLUSION

Globalization and localism are mutually exclusive. They are closely intertwined. Globlaisation is the highest form of nationalism of the bold and the powerful. If the meek and the weak are also chanting the mantra it is not because of their ignorance of the reality but because of their efforts to make the best of a bad deal. It is both tactical and futuristic keeping in mind the breakneck speed with which technology is moving. India's strategy is no exception.

We have noted that the collapse and dismemberment of the Soviet Union and the resultant emergence of the United States as the sole superpower heralded the beginning of the third and the present phase of globalization. For India the problem of adjusting to this new scenario entailed both economic and strategic reorientation of its policies. It was not too difficult a job as the process of finding alternatives to its heretofore held policies were already on the cards ever since the second phase of Indira Gandhi's premiership, and more particularly during the reign of Rajiv Gandhi. At Cancun (1982), President Ronald Reagan and Indira Gandhi had expressed satisfaction at mutually appreciating each other's global approaches and during the rule of Rajiv Gandhi economic liberalization was one of the important items on the agenda of his government. All these led to massive doses of economic reforms to adjust the Indian economy to global economy in the early nineties when Manmohan Singh as the Finance Minister in the Narasimha Rao government presented his model of economic development of the country. All successive governments have built upon that structure.

In the strategic sphere, this policy of adjusting to globalization found expression in improving relations with the United States, which included even joint military exercises. Again, as in the economic sphere, this improvement in the Indo-U.S. strategic relations also was in the making for some time. Ever since U.S. Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci's visit to New Delhi in April 1988 efforts were underway to build cooperation in these fields but they remained primarily confined to technological agreements for manufacturing a light-combat aircraft (LCA). After the Gulf War new vistas were opened marking an end of New Delhi's isolationism. General Claude Kickleighter, chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, paid a visit to New Delhi in April 1991 and held discussions with the Indian officials about defence cooperation between the two countries. The visit was pregnant with political implications for India but the matter was hardly debated during the parliamentary elections that were held only a month later. Indeed there was an emerging consensus among the political parties on the advisability of developing some kind of a security relationship with the United States. It is noteworthy that both the Indian Communist parties were also silent. The Pakistan factor—both in conjunction with China, as well as, as a vocal partner in the global Islamic reassertion against the background of a defunct Indo-Soviet treaty—must have been in the back of the mind of all concerned.[57]

To conclude, let us ask the question: Is India a nation state, a civilizational state, or a universal state? I think if the historic process of India is taken into consideration and the fact that America is now called a universal state, this is the fifth phase of India's being a universal state, the first was the Mauryan empire, the second the Gupta empire, third the Mughal empire, fourth the British empire, and fifth is the present Indian Union. As a universal state India is obliged to rise to the occasion to deal with all the forces now in play in the world simultaneously—globalization, hegemony and conflict.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Manfred B. Steger, *Globalization: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford, OUP, 2003), pp. 9–13.
2. Prasenjit Duara argues that globalization commenced in the early twentieth century when 'societies the world over re-fashioned themselves as nation-states.' Along with this started a fierce competition amongst the nation-states for power and influence. Thus, 'both in terms of its origins and ultimate frame of reference, nationalism was closely bound to globalization. At a fundamental level, nationalism represented a form of globalization.' The interesting point that Duara makes is: 'All over the world, territorial nationalism being re-drawn thus joining regions and communities capable of countering actual and perceived threats with greater resources and collective action. Hence, we hear of Greater China and Hindu nationalism connecting national majorities with diasporic communities to enhance global competitiveness. Such contemporary nationalism, shorn of the language of solidarity that characterized the movement for decolonization, in some ways resembles the social Darwinist rhetoric of a century ago.' Prasenjit Duara, 'Crossing between Old and New Nations,' *IIAS Newsletter* (Leiden), No. 32, November 2003, pp. 1–3. Deepak Nayyar, however, argues that globalization commenced in the seventies of the 19th Century when Pax-Britannica started dominating the world scene with Pound-Sterling being accepted as the international money. See Deepak Nayyar, 'Globalization Once More,' *Biblio* (New Delhi), Special Issue, March-April 2002.
3. Ahsan Jan Qaisar, *The Indian Response to European Technology and Culture (AD 1498–1707)* (Delhi: OUP, 1998), p. 14.
4. According to Dharma Kumar: 'Unfortunately, economic historians themselves have barely touched upon the actual history of traditional economic institutions: the role of caste in restricting supplies of entrepreneurship or labour to modern industry has been analysed to a certain extent but the working of caste in the rural sector itself has hardly been treated historically, except in the case of agricultural labour. Walter Neale has shown that Polanyi's concepts of non-market models—"reciprocity" and "redistribution"—are relevant to village India, but his own attempt to analyse the working of these modes in the U.P. from 1800 to 1955 is not very successful, partly for lack of sufficient facts.' Dharma Kumar, 'The Economic History of India, 1757–1870,' in R.S. Sharma, ed., *Survey of Research in Economic and Social History of India: A Project Sponsored by the Indian Council of Social Science Research* (New Delhi: Ajanta, 1986). If that is so for a much later period, the data source for the 17th Century would obviously be more problematic.
5. Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York: Random House, 1987), p. 148.

6. Paul Kennedy, *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Random House, 1993), p. 42.
7. It was probably in 1992 that R. Robertson first used the term 'globalization' in its present context. See R. Robertson, *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture* (London: Sage, 1992).
8. J. Kurth, 'Globalization: Political Aspects,' in Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. Baltes, eds., *International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences* (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2001), Vol. 9, p. 6285.
9. See Abhay Kumar Dubey, 'Globalizations: In the History Workshop,' *Economic and Political Weekly* (Mumbai), 39(1), 3 January 2004, pp. 59–63.
10. D.G.E. Hall, *A History of South-East Asia* (London: Macmillan, 1994), p. 231.
11. Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History (Abridgement of Volumes I-VI by D.C. Somervell)* (New York: OUP, 1946), p. 160.
12. Qaisar, *The Indian Response*, pp. 44–5.
13. Percival Spear, *A History of India* (New Delhi: Penguin, 1990), vol. II, p. 74.
14. For details, see Sir Edward Gait, *A History of Assam* (Guwahati: Lawyer's Book Stall, 1992), Fifth Edition, pp. 100–184.
15. Spear, *A History of India*, pp. 76–7.
16. For a political and anthropological analysis of the inter-relationship between these various sources of sovereignty, see Richard Burghart, 'The Formation of the Concept of Nation-State in Nepal,' *Journal of Asian Studies* (Chicago), 44(1), November 1981, pp. 101–25.
17. On how the Nepalese concept of boundary vis-ë-vis sovereignty differed from that of the British, see ibid, pp. 114–16.
18. "The frontier between Tibet and Assam in British India, negotiated between Tibet and Great Britain at the end of the Simla Conference (October 1913-July 1914) and named after the chief British negotiator, Sir Henry McMahon..." Delegates of the newly formed Chinese Republican Government were also present at the conference but refused to acknowledge or sign the treaty claiming that Tibet was a part of China and had no independent power to discuss its borders with another country. (Encyclopedia Britannica Online, accessed 19 December 2002). The Indian state of Assam is in the northeast of India, where it shared borders with China and Myanmar. NEFA was renamed Arunachal Pradesh by a constitutional amendment in 1986.
19. Nari Rustomji, *Sikkim: A Himalayan Tragedy* (Ahmedabad: Allied Publishers, 1987), p. 9.
20. Interested reader can refer to K. M. de Silva, *A History of Sri Lanka* (New Delhi: OUP, 1981).
21. Kennedy, *Rise and Fall*, p. 148. It may, however, be noted that migration for a greener pasture was not only from the poorer countries. It was true of Europe as much as we have noted above. See Note 6.
22. For details, see Haraprasad Chattopadhyaya, *Indians in Sri Lanka: A Historical Study* (Calcutta: O.P.S. Publishers, 1979).

23. *The Hindu* (New Delhi), 5 January 2003.
24. It may be noted that the population of Hindus has gone down significantly over the years. According to the 1951 census they constituted 12.7 per cent of the population. See Ervin Birnbaum, 'Some Theoretical and Practical Aspects of the Islamic State of Pakistan', Memoir No.1, Pakistan Historical Society, Karachi, 1956, p.6.
25. *The Herald Annual* (Karachi), January 1993, p. 87.
26. Partha S. Ghosh, *BJP and the Evolution of Hindu Nationalism: From Periphery to Centre* (New Delhi: Manohar, 1999).
27. During the Nehruvian period also the Congress had played its Hindu card but it was localized. It has been argued that it was for this reason that the Bharatiya Jana Sangh, the forerunner of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), could not make any dent in the Congress base. See B.D. Graham, *Hindu Nationalism and Indian Politics: The Origins and Development of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 256.
28. Theodore P. Wright, Jr., 'Indian Muslim Refugees in the Politics of Pakistan,' *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* (London), 12, 1975, pp. 189–205. See also, Arif Azad, 'MQM and Growth of Ethnic Movements in Pakistan,' *Economic and Political Weekly* (Bombay), 4 May 1996, pp. 1061–62. The economic consequences of the partition in which the problem of refugees formed an integral part has been analysed in C. N. Vakil, *Economic Consequences of Divided India: A Study of the Economy of India and Pakistan* (Bombay: Vora and Co., 1950), pp. 69–87, 527–9.
29. Shahid Javed Burki, 'Migration, Urbanisation, and Politics in Pakistan,' in William Howard Wriggins and James F. Guyot, eds., *Population, Politics, and the Future of Southern Asia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), pp. 148, 152, 162–7.
30. It may be noted that the Jamaat-i-Islami was originally opposed to the idea of division of India on religious grounds like some of the orthodox *ulema* (theologians), but once Pakistan was created it accepted the reality and moved its headquarters from India to Pakistan. It became the most vociferous champion of Islam, opposed all modernist ideas of statecraft and supported the Pakistani establishment in the eastern wing of Pakistan against what they regarded as the Hindu-tainted force of Bengali separatism. Wright, 'Indian Muslim Refugees,' p. 198. See also Kingsley Davis, 'India and Pakistan: The Demography of Partition,' *Pacific Affairs* (Vancouver), 22, 1949, pp. 262–3. For an analysis of the failure of Pakistan in national integration, see Rounaq Jahan, *Pakistan: Failure in National Integration* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972).
31. M.J. Akbar, *Kashmir: Behind the Vale* (New Delhi: Viking/Penguin, 1991), p. 95.
32. A.G. Noorani, 'Border on Denial,' *The Hindu* (New Delhi), 29 October 2002.

33. Dhirendra Sharma, ed., *India's Commitment to Kashmir (Political Analysis with Documents)* (New Delhi: Philosophy and Social Action Publication, 1994), p. 35.
34. For a critical evaluation of Nehru's Kashmir policy in all its dimensions, see Subrata K. Mitra, 'Nehru's Policy towards Kashmir: Bringing Politics Back Again,' in Justus Richter and Christian Wagner, eds., *Regional Security, Ethnicity and Governance: The Challenges for South Asia* (New Delhi: Manohar, 1998), pp. 32–48.
35. For the text of the letter, see Sharma, *India's Commitment to Kashmir,* pp. 35–36. Emphasis added. According to a recent study, the British did not want the entire J&K to go to India. The partition of the state between India and Pakistan was what it wanted. C. Dasgupta, *War and Diplomacy in Kashmir* (New Delhi: Sage, 2002).
36. Excerpts of the telegram in ibid., p. 36. Emphasis added. This pledge was reiterated by Nehru in his telegram to Liaquat Ali Khan on 3 November 1947.
37. Resolution 47 (1948) on the India-Pakistan question submitted jointly by the Representatives for Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia, the United Kingdom and the United States of America and adopted by the Security Council at its 286th meeting held on 21 April 1948. (Document No. S/726, dated 21ST April 1948.) Text in ibid., pp. 4–8.
38. See B.G. Verghese, 'Kashmir: Freedom and Its Discontents,' *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), 24 June 2000.
39. Arun Joshi, 'A Long History of Rigged Elections,' *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), 19 May 2002.
40. Report of the Security Council, 16 July 1963–15 July 1964. G.A.O.R.: XIX Session, Supplement No. 2 (A/5802), p. 88.
41. Clause 4(ii) of the Simla Agreement read: 'In Jammu and Kashmir the line of control resulting from the cease-fire of 17 December 1971 shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognised position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both sides further undertake to refrain from the threat or the use of force in violation of this line.' For the full text of the Agreement, see D.D. Khanna and Kishore Kumar, *Dialogue of the Deaf: The India-Pakistan Divide* (New Delhi: Konark, 1992), pp. 194–95.
42. This, however, has been the Indian interpretation. Pakistan never subscribed to this. During the ratification debate in the Pakistan National Assembly immediately after the signing of the Agreement Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto categorically stated that Pakistan's Kashmir policy was not at all compromised; on the contrary, he had reactivated the Kashmir question. He clarified that Pakistan was not debarred from raising the issue at the UN for the UN Charter took precedence over any bilateral agreement. See V.P. Dutt, *India's Foreign Policy* (New Delhi: Vani, 1984), p. 159. It may be relevant here to note that there are evidences of India

too trying to register the support of external powers on Kashmir related matters. In February 1992, when the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) planned to send thousands of its volunteers to cross over the LOC (Pakistan did not permit it) the Government of India took into confidence the five permanent members of the UN Security Council through their respective ambassadors in New Delhi in way of seeking their good offices to defuse the crisis. For details, see Partha S. Ghosh, 'Playing with Brinkmanship,' *Financial Express* (New Delhi), 16 February 1992.

43. It is argued that under superpower pressure the borders of West Pakistan (including POK) could not be altered. Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador to the United States for 20 years, however, writes that it was India itself, which refrained from attacking West Pakistan during the Bangladesh war. This was communicated to the United States by the Soviets to considerable relief of the former. See Anatoly Dobrynin, *In Confidence* (New York: Times Book, 1995), pp. 142–43.
44. Quoted by O.N. Dhar, 'No Longer a Kashmiri Insurgency,' *The Hindu*, 18 January 1996.
45. *Asian Age*, 8 June 1996.
46. Tashbih Sayyed, 'The Kashmir Dilemma,' made available to the members of the 'Friends of Asiapeace' in February 2002. <*asiapeace@yahoogroups.com*> Sayyed was head of Pakistan TV until forced to flee the country. Now a U.S. citizen, he is editor of the weekly *Pakistan Today* published from California.
47. Prabhu Ghate, 'Kashmir: The Dirty War,' *Economic and Political Weekly* (Mumbai), 26 January 2002, p. 318.
48. The popular phrase "Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai," translated roughly as "Indian and Chinese are brothers" may have amused the Chinese, but also highlighted the lengths to which the Indian establishment and elites adopted this idea and posture.
49. Popularly known as the *Panchsheel* Agreement. The word "Panchsheel" (also spelled as "pancasila") denoted "Five Taboos" in the ancient Buddhist scriptures governing the personal behavior of Indian (later Chinese and other foreign) monks. India's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, picked the term to be applicable to international behaviors of the modern states. When Nehru proposed to make panchsheel enshrine the first India-China agreement on May 15th 1954 as the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, the Chinese Premier, Zhou Enlai, readily agreed. They five principles are:

    (1) Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty;
    (2) Mutual non-aggression;
    (3) Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs;
    (4) Equality and mutual benefit, and
    (5) Peaceful coexistence

From *http://ignca.nic.in/ks_41062.htm*, accessed on April 14, 2003 and *http://www.rediff.com/news/chtime.htm* accessed on April 14, 2003.

50. For details, see Arunabh Ghosh, 'A New Leaf for an Old Book: Traditions of Strategic Thinking and the Sino-Indian War of 1962,' Senior History Thesis. *thesis.haverford.edu/archive/ 0000049/01/2003 GhoshA.doc.pdf* -
51. Indian leaders, notably Defence Minister George Fernandes, claimed that India's nuclear tests in May 1998 were conducted with China in mind, not Pakistan.
52. In the aftermath of the Kargil conflict some tensions developed between the two countries because of Chinese troop movements on the Sikkim border. As an Indian field commander said: 'The Chinese use these thrust-and-withdraw tactics very effectively. They come in, create a sense of panic and pull back as suddenly as they came in.' *Outlook* (New Delhi), 23 August 1999, p. 26.
53. Peter Bernholz, *The International Game of Power: Past, Present and Future* (Berlin: Mouton, 1985), p. 143–44. Probably, Hinduism falls in the Jewish category although Hindus are in much large numbers compared to the Jews.
54. Bernholz, *The International Game of Power,* pp. 147–48.
55. Benedict R. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).
56. For details, see Partha S. Ghosh, 'Ethnic Conflict and Conflict Management: The Indian Case,' *ICES Pamphlet* (International Centre for Ethnic Studies, Kandy, Sri Lanka), No. 2, 1996.
57. See Partha S. Ghosh, 'Foreign Policy and Electoral Politics in India: Inconsequential Connection,' *Asian Survey* (Berkeley), 34(9), September 1994, pp. 807–17.

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Beyond Human Freedom: Rational Ecology and Rights of Nature

Most critiques of science and modernity point towards traditional methods that were less drastic and thus more congenial for conservation processes. Two key notions of rational ecology as proposed here are 'maximum diversity' and 'minimum interference'. Plurality and diversity require freedom as envisioned by the libertarian principles. Most ecological arguments are anthropocentric. A rational ecology is based on an extended notion of freedom which is not doctrinaire but conforms to traditional ways of respecting nature and least interference or violence against it. The epistemological conquest of modern science and technology seems to ignore that attitude and leads to the devastation of nature to a perilous degree. It is argued here that only a rational ecology based on the two principles of 'maximum diversity' and 'minimum interference' can justify why destruction of nature is wrong.

It is possible to formulate an account of rational ecology which is in tune with the basic tenet of individual freedom in general and can argue that all ecological theories are more or less anthropocentric and thus cannot provide a good reason why we should preserve nature, for all kinds of development-related technological projects often need different degrees of natural devastation. So we need some rational principles that are not anthropocentric and include nature in general under the purview of individual freedom. The principles of rational ecology do not require all traditions to be equal but at the same time discourage mindless destruction of nature no matter who the main beneficiaries are. Before going into that, let us have a quick look at the epistemic traditions of India and how local knowledge played an important role in solving various ecological problems.

Unlike the traditional use of nature, the modern commercial exploitation of nature expedites denudation in a degree of destruction disproportionate in comparison with the degree of regeneration and growth. Some local beliefs/superstitions also help conservation if we compare them with the objective knowledge of modern science and technology. Many 'little traditions' in India solve various problems by indigenous ways that need minimum interference with nature. Examples abound in the literature[1] of traditional forms of knowledge aiding both perpetuation of human life and conservation of natural resources.

In pre-industrial time man was closer to nature in the sense of accepting it as such and interacting in a more direct way with no aggressive attitude towards it. In other words, there was a give and take relation with nature without more demands from it than the basic necessities. This attitude was prevalent in traditional India which was predominantly an agricultural society based on village communities and various mores rooted firmly on traditional values. The strong bonds of family and clan sentiment led to respect nature in its diverse forms: rivers, mountains, plants and animals with reverence and love. This attitude is regarded by intellectuals in the West as animistic. Given the long history of habitation in the Indian sub-continent the variety and the number of wild life animals are still reasonable despite mindless poaching and destruction for either as a game or for the motive of monetary gain. In comparison with that wolves were totally extinct in mid-nineteenth century England. In America wild buffaloes now belong to a rare species. R. Sukumar[2] argues that despite conflicts and confrontations between humans and wild life, people in the sub-continent have dealt with wild animals such as 'rogue' elephants and man-eater tigers and other ferocious animals through the ages in a reasonably effective but tolerant way. Otherwise these animals would not simply have survived to this day.[3] Especially if we consider the long history of settlement in our country and the large human population directly and indirectly dependent on forest for sustenance, it is evident that the problem of wild life has been satisfactorily tackled. Elsewhere people have solved their problem by simply wiping out an offending species.

As said before, during the nineteenth century wolf a predator on sheep in Great Britain was completely exterminated. In the past, religious or other taboos helped conservation in a more tolerant way than now. But we know that large mammals like elephants and tigers play an important role in an ecosystem by virtue of their large bio-mass or position at the summit of an intricate food web. Disappearance or depletion of such key species could lead to the disruption of ecosystem functioning, perhaps leading to the extinction of other species as well.

Thus the symbiotic relation in which nature and man lived together for millenniums have been snapped by the onslaught of western science and colonialism in less than three hundred years. In this short period nature has been destroyed, depleted and exploited to an unprecedented degree which our five thousand year old civilization has never witnessed before. The worst part of such conquest is that only a minority privileged class is benefitted by it and the fruits of such exploitation never reach those who live nearest to nature and have drawn sustenance from nature for thousands of years.

Apart from the specific account of exploitation of nature by the colonial power and now the various governmental and non-governmental agencies, this kind of exploitation of nature in the name of industrial development, many ecologists think, is not only wrong but also myopic about its disastrous effect and future consequences. An ecologically rational man–nature system is one in which human and other natural components stand in a symbiotic relationship. Besides this the rationale of the basic norm of "live and let live" corresponds to the norms of traditional philosophy, to a norm of 'maximum fulfilment of life potentials' as J.S. Dryzeck[4] puts it. This norm implies norms of diversity, complexity (between man and nature thus of structure and function) and of maximum symbiosis as mentioned before, that is arrangement of life forms and life styles with minimum negative interference with each other.

Another point we have to note is that the so-called natural classification also is socially determined, why for example, water hyacinth is to be destroyed while corn and sugarcane are protected? The reason is obvious that whatever is suitable for human consumption and at least enjoyment (a rose or sandalwood for example) is to be preserved and the rest is to be destroyed or at least minimised to make room for human need fulfillment. The broken balance between man and nature thus creates an uneven and paradoxical picture.

Mukherjee[5] maintains in a similar vein with the modern trend of rational ecological principles that, 'each community cannot appropriate more than its due place in the general ordering of life from which nothing can be obtained without influencing everything else. Working symbiotically, they represent interwoven threads of a complex web of life'. No threads can be snapped or removed "without the whole garments of the life and nature and human society being disfigured". The ecological knowledge and awareness of the new millennium echo the old-fashioned metaphors used by him almost seventy years ago to describe a hypothetical state of affairs which we face to-day.[6]

In traditional Indian agricultural system after each cultivation, for example, lands were not tilled for a long period, sometimes as long as a whole year. Unlike this custom, in modern scientific agriculture, multi-crop system gradually robs the natural fertility of the soil leading to various problems including excessive use of chemical fertilisers which again causes or at least can cause harm to human and animal life.

Similarly cows were not milked for at least some months after a calf is born, unlike modern scientific dairy system where this kind of consideration is absent to make room for large scale production of milk and other dairy and poultry produces. Many herbal and other natural ingredients also were used as aphrodisiac and contraceptives without the hazard of harmful side effects. These are but very few examples just to show the kind of way traditional knowledge operates. Some of this knowledge is merely part of the tradition handed down from customs and local knowledge, but there are many others which are not merely part of the tradition but can be related to some philosophical or ontological theories. The latter type of knowledge can therefore be called scientific because it is consistent with and follows from a general view of the universe.

An idea can be in principle related to some theory or other. The ancient way of sun worshipping for example, led eventually to the heliocentric theory of the universe. The sacralisation of nature in a similar way is a primitive way of respecting nature. Rational/liberal paradigm is clearly in favour of change since it is based on reason and reason only. On the other hand traditions are many and diverse, and as these are based only on practices, traditions seem to be insular and anti-change. We also witnessed the history of intolerance (often violent) of one tradition (usually more powerful) with another (usually weaker) tradition. So diversity is not typically encouraged in traditional cultures which resent change at the beginning and only slowly accept it. The other basic principle the green philosophy is based on is minimal interference with nature. This is again a modest attitude of traditional cultures because of the ignorance of effects. The assumption behind this principle is that natural phenomena are very complex containing so many variable factors that it is difficult to say what factors will bring what kind of change. Many ecologists prefer to keep interference with nature to the least for we are not quite sure about the future effects. For example "one cubic foot of good soil contains hundreds of species of organisms, each represented through hundreds, millions or even billions of specimens. They interact with non-organic ingredients in a more complex way than can be grasped in detail. But details, or specialized complex functions, are often decisive for the function of the whole as 'good soil'.[7]

What is applicable to a possible interference in nature is also equally applicable to non-industrial cultures. Many of the 'developmental' projects are nothing but benevolent interference in these traditional non-industrial cultures. These would be paternalistic measures in their freedom, and big dams, factories or other such 'gifts' would not only be unwanted and unnecessary for their life forms but may also have disastrous effects on their culture. Feyerabend envisaged a free society with possible sub-cultures within industrial society where unfortunately any kind of sadist community can exist. But Mill's one single principle of liberty can forbid that because of its rider, 'a person is free so long as he does not bring any harm to anybody'. So tolerance with others is a basic principle, but it has its limits.

Least interference and tolerance therefore can be extended to the protection of animal lives and animal societies in addition to the protection of human lives against undue interference. This is however complex and needs a lot of normative analysis whether protection of one animal society (say the sheep) from another (say the tiger) would be paternalistic interference or not. More so when one party is not domesticated but a 'natural' prey to carnivores. Because carnivores and antelopes for example are traditionally related as predator–prey order, so the 'minimal interference' principle requires that humans do not destabilize the natural order.

The Bacon–Descartes ideal of cognitive superiority seems to justify interference in the name of better understanding. But respect and dignity for others encourage non-interference or least interference either in the case of an individual or a community as a whole.[8]

TOLERANCE AND FREEDOM

It seems from the two principles stated above that both of them together advocate the basic norm of tolerance or 'live and let live' maxim. In this connection the libertarian account of freedom and reason may be taken into consideration. For Mill and many others freedom and reason vary directly. Indeed it may be questioned as Feyerabend did, why what would be rational is to be decided by the so-called experts and not by popular consensus? Be that as it may, the moot point is: are the limits placed upon tolerance and freedom by Mill defensible or freedom and tolerance should be unrestricted to avoid any misuse? Feyerabend especially in his *Science in a Free Society* proposes the latter kind of unbridled tolerance. To him a society based on rationality is not entirely free; 'one has to play the game of the intellectuals'. In brief, he thinks the tradition of Western Rationalism/Science is inimical to a free society because the experts of a given tradition wrongly perceive its own tradition as situated outside all other traditions as an Archimedean point of reference. As a result the tradition of science being the most powerful tradition its 'experts' use chauvinistic and paternalistic tactics to suppress liberty of people and run society. This attitude also promotes a kind of Western imperialism over other cultures. It imposes a rationalist despotism and demands a conformity, which denies the basic tenet of freedom. For objective knowledge, he thinks, in quite Popperian way, a variety of opinions are necessary. And indeed 'a method that encourages variety is the only method that is compatible with a humanitarian outlook'.

TOLERANCE AND PATERNALISM

Tolerance in principle is opposed to any form of paternalism. The latter is again an offshoot of a monolithic conception of truth and rationality. Feyerabend and a large number of eco-philosophers now distinguish between the participants in a tradition and outsiders. The important point to be noted is that members of a tradition have a right to run their lives as they see fit. A tradition with strange beliefs and even false beliefs should be tolerated. This is not to encourage the right to have wrong beliefs or espouse anarchy but to recognize diversity and the principle of least interference. Is intolerance then admissible if the way of a society is violence and not tolerance for example? Mill's harm principle as we see will take care of the problem because like the limits of tolerance there is the limit of 'no-harm' to others. But Feyerabend's free society would allow violence as a way of life so long as it is restricted to that society. It is not clear whether that kind of society is available now except in remote tribal habitats, for communication revolution already made different cultures closer to each other than before. Moreover people from different kinds of tradition often have to interact with each other, for example the government or non-government workers and the forest dwellers need a lot of interaction. It seems either there would be confrontation or persuasion which is bound to be somewhat paternalistic. The only move would be to follow the path of least interference, i.e., traditions or ways of life should not be disturbed as much as possible or unless the reason for change is overwhelmingly greater. But this is the Millean way and it falls back upon the concept of 'reason' and finally to some decision-making process outside the tradition. This move is far from the Feyerabendian concept of free society and smacks of an irreducible element of paternalism.

FREEDOM AND HAPPINESS

Most green philosophers would accept the Feyerabendian motto of freedom, tolerance and happiness rather than truth, rationality and knowledge as of intrinsic value. In other words knowledge and truth should serve humanitarian interests and not the other way. Human happiness is the primary principle and truth and knowledge are only secondary or instrumental to it. A free society is 'a society in which all traditions have equal rights and equal access to the centres of power' and traditions are also inescapable, so all traditions need to be supported to allow individuals within them more freedom.

This picture of tolerance of all traditions however seems to be acceptable only superficially. First of all although all eco-philosophical theories seem to accept that every tradition should be respected and therefore tolerated, the picture is both Utopian and simplistic, Utopian because the picture of peaceful co-existence of different traditions is unrealistic. Real life traditions seem to differ from one another and very well be clashing with each other. Moreover scientific/technological advances or at least changes are bound to have an impact not only on these societies but also on the individuals within a particular tradition. The picture is simplistic because we assume that all these traditions can be equally respected and tolerated. It overlooks that many traditions themselves inbreed despotism, tyranny over the weak and encourage violence. For example, if one of the hypothetical traditions believes that 'kill all the members of the other traditions' or 'rob the outsiders of all their property'—do we still stick to the principle of tolerance and non-interference? Secondly the concept of human happiness is very complex and sometimes theoretically loaded.

As already taken up by the utilitarians, it is difficult to measure the index of happiness. If traditions were tolerated as such then the criteria of happiness would be different in different societies except in some basic areas of human nature. Moreover 'desired' and 'desirable' should be distinguished in a wider moral context. If a person (circumscribed by her place in a tradition) is happy with her position that does not imply that it is morally desirable. For example if a twig-gatherer in a village near a forest spends her whole day in walking a long distance and has a frugal meal in the evening only after the whole family is fed, with no education and amusements but is quite happy, should we say that it is a desirable life? She may be happy because there are no ways for her to know or desire for a different kind of life, a better life. So 'happiness' would be an empty concept (unless all of us aim at spiritual happiness or nirvana) if the concept of standard of living/quality of life were not recognized as an important parameter of happiness.[9]

But despite these internal difficulties we can nevertheless appreciate the spirit of a free society. Feyerabend does not say that a free society will have no enforced standards. All he says is that the standards will not be epistemological and should be democratically arrived, not imposed by one tradition (usually the more powerful one in a society) on every other. The conception of a minimal state such as Nozick's or the notion of participatory democracy can bear out the basic tenets of Feyerabendian free society in moderate terms. But the kind of Protagorean relativism this view preaches and the role of intellectuals it perceives is not acceptable. If this kind of relativism 'is reasonable because it pays attention to the plurality of traditions and values' and 'is civilized' because it does not assume 'that one's own village and the strange customs it contains are the navels of the world'—then we need to change the notion of 'reasonable' and 'civilized'. If plurality of tradition is to be recognized then it has to be done from a meta-level. And use of 'civilized' (what is wrong with 'rational'?) again is complicated—for no traditions as such regard other traditions as equally plausible unless we talk of a super-tradition from above or at least outside the traditions which are under review.

But the recognition of such a super-tradition is exactly what Feyerabend and hordes of relativists would not allow. About the role of intellectuals it is simply given the status of 'just one tradition'. Their views are of no special interest or value. Neither are they capable of solving any problems nor is there any need of abstract ideas or philosophy to guide us to the solution of problems. It is true that it is not easy to get rid of the experts and intellectuals in a society, but one thing we should have in mind that by 'intellectuals we usually mean the people who can transcend their particular traditions and have the capacity to judge different traditions including the ones they belong to, theories that they hold onto, etc. from outside the traditions. Traditions indeed are judged by their own norms, but surely the norms themselves are not beyond scrutiny.

HUMAN FREEDOM AND NATURE

We have seen that recognition of different traditions is only necessary to understand the concept of freedom. But diversity of forms itself does not guarantee that they cannot be adjudicated or that freedom is restricted only to humanity. The awareness of animal rights and other ecological issues are gradually gaining ground to have a better understanding of the concept of freedom as we will see later. It seems that ecological arguments defending nature and natural habitat of people and animals usually exploit ideas like fundamental rights, respect to different cultures, obligation to posterity and so on. Most of the reasons are unfortunately anthropocentric—nature should be saved or different cultures tolerated for future human enjoyment or knowledge. Some species of creatures (or kind of culture) should be protected or preserved from commercial or other industrial type onslaught so that the future human generation is benefited—physically, spiritually or epistemically. Most ecological arguments use slight variations of this point. Tremendous amount of empirical findings, fieldwork etc. is supportive of a general anxiety about our future and human concerns. There is some occasional reference to animal rights but seldom do we find an argument that considers nature as such to be respected and left alone as we argue for other fellow beings. To discuss these issues we now turn to the various ecological arguments and accounts that are put forward.

THE IDEA OF ECOLOGICAL RATIONALITY

Ecology generally stands for 'the man–nature ratio as a whole'. It is also felt generally that the symbiotic relation between man and nature is now at peril because of mindless exploitation of nature in various ways. There are two strands of any philosophical analysis of the environment:

(i) Exploitation of nature as such, (ii) effective planning of nature. The first one divides it into different specific components like biotic, abiotic, their interrelations etc. The second one consists of the politicization of the environmental debate, scientific and technological progress that is perceived as the reason for the destruction of environment. Both these aspects can be defended by the principles of maximum diversity and minimal interference with nature. The second is a milder form than the first but nevertheless not defendable in most cases. Management is a better word than destruction but still involves interference in every possible way.

RATIONAL ECOLOGY OR PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE

An inevitable question for a philosophy of nature to address would be why should we respect earth's natural system and follow the principle of least interference and maximum diversity? This is a normative issue and should therefore refer to the value of nature as a whole system.[10]

Even a non-specialist knows that nature gives us life-giving oxygen while plants absorb poisonous carbondioxide which other creatures and we exhale. Earth's natural system is valuable for various reasons. It is first of all renewable, a regenerative process without any external or exogenous interference. Nature is also the genetic resource for human productive activity. It treats and recycles human waste products by gas exchanges as said in the beginning, responsible for the supply of nutrients, recycling water supply and purification and temperature control. The environment stabilizes ambient air and water quality. Many parts of the environment have pure amenity value inasmuch as they yield human enjoyment. Some people regard ecology as a source of values such as diversity, homeostasis and adaptability[11] or of a thoroughly non-hierarchical view of the world.[12]

The latter is very significant for the 'hierarchies' in nature the ecologists speak of. It is entirely different from hierarchy in the sense of domination of one population by another, which cannot exist in the ecosystem. There is hierarchy only in the sense of levels of organizations—from the genes to the eco-sphere, from unicellular organisms to highly complex systems such as human body, from ordinary grass to Himalayan perennials.[13]

Self- regulation also is regarded as a value of nature,[14] the rationality of an eco-system is manifest in its quality of self-regulation, namely in its resistance to adverse conditions and resilience, i.e., its gradual adaptability[15] to survive or overcome in changed conditions. These in brief are some of the reasons to value an ecosystem as such.

NATURE AND MAN

As mentioned before, in pre-industrial time man was closer to nature in the sense of accepting it as such, interacting in a more direct way with no aggressive attitude towards it. In other words, there was a give and take relation with no more demands on it than the basic requirements. Nature in its diverse forms, mountains, river, sea, plants and other animals were regarded with respect (sometimes fear) and affection, this attitude is regarded by intellectuals as animistic, i.e. attributing spirit or mind to inanimate objects. As mentioned earlier it was common practice in India not to milk a cow for quite a while after the calf is born, or not to tear leaves or fruits from trees when they are supposed to 'sleep'. All these attitudes are changed by the so-called epistemological conquering of nature by science, which claimed to 'know' and dominate nature so that the latter can serve human beings better, by its enormous resource potentials. Thus the symbiotic relation in which nature and man lived for millenniums have been snapped by the onslaught of western science only for about less than three hundred years. And in this short period nature has been destroyed, depleted, exploited to such a degree that our five thousand year or more old civilization could not think of. Most people feel, the worst part of such conquest is that the majority is not benefited by it. Only a minority privileged class became more prosperous and beneficiary to the various modern facilities while the people who lived for thousands of years drawing sustenance from nature if not happily but at least in peace were made suddenly to accept the fact (by government officials) that they do not have any right to use nature—forest, river some land because these are not their property[16] .

The story of such exploitation of nature is similar all over the world but it is more poignant in the colonized countries which were rich in natural resources because the resources were ruthlessly exploited to make the colonial powers enjoy the fruits while the indigenous people were pushed to more poverty and indignity.

Apart from the specific account of exploitation of nature by the colonial powers, many ecologists think that the exploitation in the name of industrial development, is not only wrong but utterly myopic about its disastrous future consequences. In other words, any sensible mind will question the rationality of such 'developmental' work that overlooks the adverse effects of such projects. So we need some principle of ecological rationality. If the principle has to ensure rationality then even if it requires a degree of intervention (interference) in natural systems, it should discourage extreme ecological engineering. Man can make use of rather than seek to supplant the spontaneous self-organizing and self-regulating qualities of natural system.[17]

An ecologically rational man–nature system is one in which human and natural components stand in a symbiotic relationship. We cannot restore everything that is lost but at least the awareness, the active and sincere attempts to make up and pledge to minimum interference in future and protect maximum eco-diversity would be rational. This requirement as a principle is abstract, but various eco-movements to save nature have blueprints for the actual implementation of such a principle of rational ecology. The implementation is necessary because after all man cannot exist without a supportive nature but nature can exist without man despite some improvements undertaken by human beings for self-interest. In the long run only species that positively affect their environment can survive.

Besides this, the rationale of the basic norm of 'live and let live' corresponds in terms of traditional philosophy, to a norm of 'maximum fulfillment of life potentials'. This norm implies norms of diversity, complexity (of structure and function) and of maximum symbiosis (as mentioned before) that is arrangement of life forms and life styles with minimum negative interference with each other. An interaction counts as negative (as hinted in the final sentence of the last paragraph) if it decreases the potentialities of life fulfilment of the participants.

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND NATURE

Nature and social practices: an ecological perspective

As mentioned before hierarchy in nature is only organizational, that hierarchy is not domination of one species by another. Symbiotic relation means diversity. It complements various species to an overall supportive system. But after the nomadic days of hunting and gathering, different social practices are going on slowly but steadily altering the environmental conditions. Tilling, forest clearing, indiscriminate stock grazing and intensive farming took place later to such an extent that a large number of plants and animals failed to survive the onslaught. Again man has by various means improved, augmented yield and variety of crops, plants and his daily nutrients. In brief, the frontiers of natural produce and cultivation have been extended. But these augmentation and extension processes are not required by nature, nor the latter is 'enriched' by the factory-produced chemicals or tools.

The different social practices classify and evaluate different natural things as precious or not. Nature does not have any standard to do that. For example the so-called natural classification is also socially determined, why for example water hyacinth or weeds have to be destroyed while corns and sugar cane protected? The reason is obvious that whatever is suitable for human consumption and at least enjoyment (e.g. rose) is to be preserved while the rest should be destroyed or at least minimized to make room for human need fulfillment. The broken balance between man and nature thus creates an uneven and paradoxical picture. Certain species of creatures[18] started breeding in such conditions than in wild nature. For example in the crop fields insects, pests, parasites grow through the unlimited supply of food. It is often difficult to exterminate these species that destroy crops or field produces. Most ecologists due to their humanitarian outlook seem to forget that human beings are part of nature as much as animals and plant communities. Ecological theories are generally concerned with biotic factors with the effects of any natural things upon man only. Indeed sometimes there are oblique reference to animals and plants but that is also with human concern in the end. An 'undue importance has been given in history and economics to these purely human influences'. Like other social deterministic theories most social ecological discourse seems to ignore that if we talk about a symbiotic relation with nature then each community there should follow similar rules that maintain a balance and rhythm of growth for all. Mukherjee[19] maintains in similar vein that 'each community cannot appropriate more than its due place in the general ordering of life from which nothing can be obtained without influencing everything else. Working symbiotically, they represent interwoven threads of a complex web of life'. No threads can be snapped or removed "without the whole garments of the life and nature and human society being disfigured"[20].

The old-fashioned metaphors used by him to describe a hypothetical state of affairs more than seventy years ago seem to be a realistic description to-day.

NATURE AND HUMAN SOCIETY, SOME EXPERIENCE OF CONFLICTS

Man Nature conflicts

Although this kind of conflict can assume many forms and history of human civilization is a story of such constant conflict, compromise, defeat and conquest—we shall restrict ourselves only to some empirical accounts to understand some basic points about this relationship and how it has changed over the years.

I have already mentioned earlier that in India with the advent of British rule the prudent indigenous practices of maintaining stability in natural resources and human need–fulfillment relationship were upset and so was the Indian society. The British imposed highly demanding claims on natural resources of the country to supply the rich in quality but cheap in price raw materials for their economy both here and elsewhere in the Empire.[21]

The standard method of this practice was to declare vast resources (land, water resource, etc.) which were used and owned communally till then as government property. Instead of poor villagers and forest dwellers using the resources these were commercially exploited on a large scale. This tradition not only continued after the British left, but the trend of rapidly depleting natural resources commercially has accelerated over the last five decades since independence. This has led to considerable impoverishment, and often complete collapse of the natural resource base sustaining many components of the Indian society".[22]

The prudence of the earlier traditions[23] were evident in many practices such as regarding some place, trees or animals as 'sacred' or forbidding plucking, tilling, or harvesting in some period of the year which helped preservation and stopped excessive exploitation of nature. Modernization and government take-over destroyed the traditional practices with no rational alternative to conservation principle.[24] Adaptability or resilience as a principle discussed earlier is thus being lost by the commercialization of natural resources in India.

Various field reports and research have supported the view that it is a misconception to hold that marginal farmers and forest dwellers are responsible for the depletion of natural resources. Even those who depend on forest and other natural resources (like river, lake, etc.) take very little compared to the huge amount of commercial exploitation. Moreover their need is very small and inexpensive while the commercial depletion is rapid, drastic and difficult to be regenerated. An analogical misconception is that the poorer countries are responsible for global pollution. The fact is that the so-called highly industrialized countries contribute more to pollution in the form of physical and chemical waste of their industries, automobiles, war equipments and their experiments and actual uses etc. than the less industrialized ones. For the gradual tightening of the pollution control laws, however, in these countries, a new strategy is evolved to shift the polluting industries to the third world countries in the name of globalization. For the somewhat non-rigid laws and implementation practices in these countries, aided with a prospect of new job opportunities, the wastes of these countries are shifted to the third world while the profit and prosperity remain there. Even the actual wars are taking place in non-western countries although the principal players and the weapons belong to western nations.

To come back to our original point of man–nature relation, due to the changing government policies the native dwellers and users were pushed to utter poverty while the commercial exploitation made a minority class very rich. As mentioned before the native users of natural resources were never very harsh with nature since they live with it in a symbiotic relation for generations. The commercial users however are outsiders and mercenaries, so their treatment is purely professional and drastic. The management and control of forests created a chasm between man and nature. The so-called 'reservation' of huge area of forest created an alienation of humans from nature and the latter became associated with the government and thus perceived as an adversary.

The peasant movements against commercial forestry, large dams, mining are consequences of such alienation from nature. For forest-based communities the 'reservation' meant an effective loss of control over their natural habitat. A fundamental change has taken place in the agrarian relations induced by (social) scientific forestry. Through the mechanisms of the forest acts, the state preferred to deal directly with individual households (rationing their requirement) rather than with village communities which is a greater threat to commercial forestry. The loss of community ownership leads to and have broken the link between humans and the forest. The practice of having limited tracts of forests, the so-called 'village' or 'third class forest' for public is to encourage preservation of trees by people. All these different policies and practices gradually lead to the erosion of social bonds and Guha thinks, as a result the alienation of humans from nature would be complete. These kinds of conflicts can assume many forms and history of human civilization is witness to many such accounts. Forest reservation had similar 'melancholy effect' on the tribal communities of Central India[25] for taking away the forest they regarded as 'their own property'. In Europe too the takeover of woodland for hunting or for timber production was deeply resented by the peasantry. Sometimes extensive forest-fire by peasants show their hatred for the forests and their oppressors.[26] In its extreme form alienation occasionally forced peasants to degrade the surroundings with which they once lived in symbiosis. It is an irony that villagers in part of Garhwal look upon the reserved forest as their main enemy with the wild animals that destroy their crop.[27]

Alienation thus leads to dehumanization and distorts the basic human qualities. The alienation and the growing animosity of the peasantry were also not unknown to our colonial officials. To contain the resentment the natives felt to be deprived of their freedom, the British foresters allowed peasant access to restricted areas not deemed commercially profitable while completely forbidding them to enter areas (with strong punitive measures for intruders) under commercial working. As I mentioned before, there is no hierarchy in nature in the sense of more or less 'powerful', more or less 'precious' and so on. But a classification of natural products is being done on the basis of their commercial value, with no reference to their ecological function to the environment or relevance of the species to the forest people's need. Even human users were redefined as possible source of injury or as 'enemy of the forests' (who are the friends? the forest merchants?) in the same category as natural hazards and wild animals. Recent research by Indian ecologists find a chasm between the ideology of scientific forestry and the actual operations of timber harvesting and a conflict is also noticeable between the imperatives of scientific forestry and the economic and cultural values of the hill peasantry.

MAN–WILD LIFE RELATION: CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE

The most difficult aspect of ecological balance and recognition of natural right are the question of such right to wild animals. Forest and its human dwellers (even if some of them are ferocious tribes) do not pose such difficulties as wild life does. We know indiscriminate poaching and unnecessary hunting games and commercial hunting (e.g. elephants for their tasks, whales for their oil, mink, angora etc. for their expensive furs) led to near extinction of many species. Moreover as natural inhabitants of forest (unless they intrude and destroy people and their property including domestic animals) why should not they have a prima facie right to live freely? Apart from this moral question, the empirical issue is also important, namely how best to adhere to the principle of conservation of wild life to maintain the eco-balance of nature?

In the case of India traditionally the moral and the empirical questions are solved in an integrated approach of conflict and compromise. In other words, unnecessary killing or confrontation was kept to the minimum (adding to the symbiosis with nature) the only exception being the assault or offensive attack upon their life or property. That means the two principles of diversity and non-interference are followed in the case of wild life as well as inanimate nature.

It is well known now that receding forests and depletion of natural smaller herbivores make carnivores and big herbivores (who feed on trees and plants) like elephants invade villages only because they do not get sufficient food in the forests. As a result wild life and peasant/villagers' conflict is an inevitable phenomenon, but the indiscriminate exploitation of the forest is indirectly responsible for such confrontations. In an alarming way killing of honey and wood gatherers in Sunderbans in Bengal by tigers is increasing every year. The animosity of the poor inhabitants of this region thus is increasing but still they need the forest for their living.

Despite these stories of conflicts and confrontations between humans and wild life, people in the Indian subcontinent have dealt with wild animals such as 'rogue' elephants or man-eater tigers through the ages in a reasonably effective and tolerant way. Otherwise these animals would not simply have survived to this day given the long history of settlement in the subcontinent and the large human population. Elsewhere people have often solved their problem by simply wiping out an offending species. During the nineteenth century for example, wolf, a predator on sheep in Great Britain was completely exterminated. In the past, religious taboos no doubt played a role in this tolerance towards other creatures. However in the present context of a rapidly changing society such traditional attitudes to nature are unlikely to sustain the conservation ethos for long. For it is unjust to expect only a certain section of society, the marginal farmers and tribals to bear the entire burden of conserving wild animals. 'Project Tiger' would be meaningless to a poor honey gatherer in Sunderban whose family is killed or near-killed by tigers unless some viable scheme is proposed to gain acceptance among people who interact directly or indirectly with wild life in their daily lives.

From the perspective of this man–wildlife relation of confrontation the question is inevitable as we raised in the beginning of this section: why conserve wild life? The primary argument as already mentioned is fourfold. (1) Ethical: living creatures have an intrinsic right to exist irrespective of their utility or otherwise to human beings. (2) Ecological: large mammals such as the elephants or tigers play a dominant role in an ecosystem by virtue of their large bio-mass or position at the summit of an intricate food web. The disappearance or depletion of such key species could lead to the disruption of ecosystem functioning, perhaps resulting in the extinction of other species. (3) Economic: the direct value of wild animal's returns from wildlife oriented tourism and so on. (4) Aesthetic/entertaining/educative: wildlife is a source of considerable pleasure for many people thereby having a therapeutic value in promoting human well-being.

These arguments are quite convincing to justify the conservation of wild life although as mentioned before, unless a viable strategy is evolved, the marginal farmers, forest-dwellers who have to deal with them in their everyday life would not so readily accept the rationale.

However reasonable these grounds are, except the first one, all these arguments are instrumental. I call them instrumental because these are put forward only as a means to achieve some goal for human beings. Wildlife is used instrumentally for fulfilling some human need, not for wildlife as such. Only the first one is treating wildlife as an end in itself by asserting its natural right to live as any other living being. But the problem is: then bacteria or poisonous plants/ferocious animals also should have that right at par with man and all other living things. One single rider can be proposed for such problem: every living thing has the right to live (in their natural habitat) so long as it does not override some other's similar right. It is clear that except this ethical argument for conservation all other arguments are anthropocentric, i.e. giving human being more value than others on the earth. But it is not clear why in an ecosystem human being would be in a more privileged position than other natural species.

THE CONCEPT OF ECO-SOCIETY: A POSITIVE APPROACH

Although all ecological discussions go around the original man–nature equilibrium, the general attitude is one of despondency and frustration. The reason behind this negative approach (with few positive suggestions) lies in the fact that big power and big money are involved in industrialization and the so-called development projects that are the main actors in this destruction drama. Although the peasants and villagers are now united to some extent to rise against such power, traditionally their use of forest was minimal and attitude towards forest was for so long one of intimacy and tolerance.

The concept of eco-society[28] based on the principles of tolerance and non-violence is envisaged by many. These kinds of societies are usually more or less self-reliant, utopian to a great extent. In India such communities are not new, 'ashramas' are not necessarily only religious places. Gandhi's experiments are living examples of a way of life as whole, united with the rest of nature in a harmonious way which modern industrialization has robbed us of. This is not a place to discuss how far Gandhi was actually successful in such experiments or the pros and cons of such eco-society that would deny the impact of heavy industrialization on people. But the basic tenet of such experiment is laudable, namely an ideal society is one where the essential bond between man and nature is respected and not interfered with as much as possible. This kind of hypothetical society is based upon the two fundamental principles of maximum diversity and minimal interference.

One can also argue for such rationale in the following way. Although man has subjugated nature in various ways and invented various implements which made our lives easier in many ways, people still are happier to see a natural wonder than a man-made tool. That means despite being a part of a fast industrialized world, human beings still search for peace and respite in nature at least for a brief period to come back rejuvenated to face again a demanding modern life.

There are communities or eco-societies, which have actually thrived amidst nature and have been quite happy. Hart's account is based on the arguments that happiness is a harmonious equilibrium between man and nature. Deeply influenced by Gandhi and also by the principle of non-violence of Buddhism the author founded a co-operative community on 40 acres of farmland and woodland in Shropshire Hills, England in 1982. He believes in self-sufficiency by agro-forestry—a system for supplying all basic human material needs from trees and other perennials grown in symbiotic association with each other. Citing examples of many societies that thrive in a similar way, he thinks this kind of eco-society can be a viable alternative to consumerist societies of modern industrial civilization.

This kind of society undoubtedly is a moderate type of solution to indiscriminate misuse of nature to cater to the huge demand of industrial development. But science and technology at present have reached such a state that it is impossible and unrealistic to completely deny its impact upon our modern life and culture. Isolated cases of such societies with consenting people cannot solve the basic problem of tyranny of 'development' over nature and people close to it. The best way is to evolve ways to keep the onslaught to the minimum and respect the rights of nature in a wide sense in a way as we wish our rights to be.

Most ecologists realize this and arguments can be given to show that it is more rational to regard nature with tolerance and least interference than not. The quantity and quality of diversity of bio-mass within any village eco-system are necessary to meet the diverse household needs of fuel, fodder, building materials etc. and artisan requirements. These are particularly relevant in the Indian context and other poor countries, where most people still depend for their living on the whims of nature. In periods of emergency, such as flood or drought (and a resulting crop failure) which are regular phenomena—various roots, leaves, even some wild animals became alternative sources of nutrition. In countries like India where most people still live in traditional ways, the combination of trees, grasses, crops, animals and ponds which we found in almost every village was an unique interactive and resilient system in natural emergencies.[29]

The example discussed in the footnote below shows it is not enough to preserve biological diversity just in those areas where the flora and fauna are genetically rich and diverse by setting up biosphere reserves and national parks: we should ensure that biological diversity is preserved and/or recreated in every village eco-system. Social forestry programme or any such project would not succeed unless villagers are assured of security about their farming lands and livestock. Easy availability of bio-mass can bring desirable social change. An example[30] can be given of Kerala which is regarded as economically backward, but easy availability of bio-mass in that area free women from many hard and time-consuming chores. The highest literacy rate in Kerala shows that women also find time to go to literacy classes while villages in Rajasthan, Gujarat are backward in literacy, especially women literacy as they spend much more strenuous time in fetching water, firewood etc.

SOCIAL AND THE NATURAL

One way of understanding the interrelationship between society and nature is as we have seen to follow the principle of 'live and let live'. This is anti-paternalistic and based on the concept of basic freedom to live in one's natural habitat. The other way is to allow some kind of social engineering so that the eco-balance is ideal and the underprivileged is protected. The latter is paternalistic and it involves active intervention so that ecological crises (primarily the human problems) are solved or avoided. This view is advocated by Marx in his early writings and since followed by the 'green' social theory which perceives ecological movement as a protest movement of the peasants/forest dwellers against the profiteers of capitalism. For 'green' theory, there is no purely ecological approach, explanations are couched almost wholly in terms of the activities of institutions such as multinational companies with their large wings around the world or with national and transnational governments. All these institutions, governmental or private, are becoming increasingly distanced from people's everyday lives and demands.

Environmental issues tend to be seen, within this paradigm as an integral part of a fundamentally exploitative, unjust and undemocratic form of society. "Natural resources are systematically depleted in the accumulation drive by both private multinational capital and the state. The costs of development are expressed not only in terms of class conflict and economic exploitation, but also in the reduction of the natural resource base on which the poor depend for their livelihood".[31]

The multinational business, in this view is the prime culprits in wrecking society's resources as a result of indiscriminate forms of exploitation and production. This perspective certainly contains many powerful insights but it is linked to distinctive political programme. In countries like India particularly, governmental institutions are equally if not more responsible for devastating nature with a short-sighted policy of solving immediate economic problems without a long-term vision or thought in foreseeing more serious problems. Moreover socialization of the means of production as the programme suggests also cannot help much as we just said. It is also felt from within the movement that for environmental issues new forms of political programming are necessary although it is to be noted that the cause of environmental crisis is firmly anchored in the global industrial order.[32] Social change of a drastic nature is difficult to bring about while the ecological crisis calls for at least some immediate remedy if not complete solution.

The relationship between people's behaviour and their physical environment can be perceived more openly as done by the supporters of economic and political individualism (which concentrates more on the individual decision-maker rather than taking 'people' as a whole). It gives more importance to the individual and the household. As part of this, it[33] draws attention to genetically based forms of behaviour and to the psychological dimension of environmentalism.

Some neo-liberals also draw attention to the uncertainty of knowledge surrounding environmental issues.[34] These are helpful suggestions but encourage possibility of complacency. How can individuals plus the market force guarantee that once people's economic conditions are better off and the market force ensures that natural degradation be stopped, there shall not be environmental crisis, at least not for the people who have to depend on their surroundings for their living and sustenance? But the point is if there is really no need for public intervention, how can the exploitation of the 'common' resources be stopped or at least minimized? Moreover the 'man–environment' relationship is a very complex problem, while organisms are creative and make their environments in such a way as to become virtually part of it themselves, at the same time environments (nature and other people) are active in the making of organisms. In many respects organisms and environment, both the elements, form part of one another. It seems we need some new framework, an unified approach to overcome this dichotomy. That needs[35] a new set of epistemological concepts and value perception.

There are problems in either accepting that the exploitation of nature qua-people dependent on it is due to only capitalist economy (the problem is much more complex than a single cause) or conceding to the view that no social intervention is necessary, market economy will cure the malady and that the problem of exploitation of nature and the imminent doom is overstated. The first one is simplistic and the latter utopian. Nobody can deny the impact of industrialization on pollution and purely economic solution is not the total answer to environmental problems. It requires more than that. One very important point however is to note that in Hayek's account we find an argument for regarding man as something special and different from the rest of the nature. In the so-called green theory there is no special reason given why environmental problem is basically a social problem involving human being. Hayek's view that man has a special position in nature may be contestable, but he realized the need of a theory to explain why we should consider man having a unique position in environmental issues. The view is contestable because one may argue that man's role in nature is not unquestionable for the balance of it is more tilted towards destruction than preservation. But one important difference between human being and other natural species is that human being can become a different kind of person by freedom whereas no other species can become a better kind by utilizing their freedom except their natural health.

As I mentioned before science and technology have made many mistakes. Popper echoes that view by admitting the mistakes but at the same time he says, "But to attack science and technology as a whole, when they alone permit the necessary corrections to be made, is not only stupid but sensation-seeking and completely irresponsible".[36] Popper's worry against too much legislation against technology is based on his concept of free enterprise which would be threatened by this policy. Although he admits that many problems such as air pollution may require special legislation. Thus he is opposing 'ideological worshippers of the so-called free market' who regard any kind of legislation limiting market freedom 'is a dangerous step towards serfdom'.[37] This attitude again is an ideological nonsense to him. It shows as I mentioned before that Mill's single requirement of 'harm principle'—which requires freedom so long as it is not detrimental to others' similar freedom and does not cause any harm—can adequately handle the problem of freedom vis-á-vis development. Popper was very vocal about the imminent danger of loss of freedom in the ideology of Green movement so much so that he declares that "Better to be Free than Green"[38] and does not seem to realize that the single rider of harm principle which is enshrined in the two principles of rational ecology can handle that problem.

These are the principles of maximum diversity and minimum interference which can very well preserve individual freedom in an extended sense and at the same time are not detrimental to all technological development and progress. In other words one does not have to oppose all scientific and technological projects to thwart natural devastation and atmospheric pollution at least in principle. Man's social nature prevails over nature and that brings us to the final section of this discussion namely the question of right of nature with or without man.

FREEDOM OF NATURE AND RIGHTS OF MAN

The relationship of man with nature is such that as we observed before, nature can survive without man but man cannot survive without a supportive nature or 'biosphere' as it is called now. Therefore by protecting nature, man is still first and foremost protecting himself. The environment is endowed with no intrinsic value here, the action stems rather from an awareness that by destroying his surroundings man may be endangering his own existence or at the very least, depriving himself of the conditions for a good life on this earth. Thus nature is taken only indirectly based on a position that may be called 'humanist' or rather 'anthropocentrist'. Here nature is thus only human environment—the periphery and not the centre. As such therefore nature cannot have any legal right as it does not possess any intrinsic value.

Another way is to attribute moral significance to certain non-human beings. This move can be supported from a somewhat utilitarian principle according to which one must not only look out for man's best interests—but more generally try to both diminish the total suffering in the world as much as possible and increase the quantity of well-being. This point of view goes beyond the concept of human freedom and is the basis of animal liberation. All beings capable of feeling pain and pleasure must be considered legal subjects and treated as such. It avoids anthropocentrism to some extent by including animals within the sphere of moral consideration.[39]

Against the humanist anthropocentrism in ecology a more radical alternative is to extend this notion of moral and legal rights of nature in itself including its vegetable and mineral forms. It has become a dominant movement in Germany and the United States and questions the issue of humanism in radical terms. In this approach the old 'social contract' devised by philosophers should give way to a 'natural contract' in which the entire universe becomes a subject of law. As I proposed in the beginning, most ecologists (leftist, rightist or centrist) argue from the standpoint of human self-interests as ubiquitous from even the terminology they use. But only if the problems are perceived from a deeper and transcendent standpoint we have a better understanding of the relation of man in nature and not man and nature, for man is just one part of nature and we should not overstate his position.[40]

The concept of freedom that goes beyond human being may be termed 'eco-centric' or 'bio-centric' in contrast to the standard anthropocentric view popularly associated with green theory or other social theory of environment. A coherent doctrine of nature as a new legal and moral subject can be constructed from this perspective. But all the three levels of the issue have at least one thing in common namely their anti-modernity, i.e., arguments against the impact of technology and consumerist attitude created by Western scientism.

One possible aspect or difficulty of regarding human being only as natural is that although man is biologically and socially determined by a body and a physical situation and live within a social milieu, a culture and language—he is nevertheless a free being, not an object. He can become a very different kind of person by that freedom while the rest of the nature does not have equal capability of utilizing their right to develop into variety of beings. It is a very deep question and it is not possible to discuss here the different gamuts of this question fully (that requires a full-length discussion).We shall instead turn to the legitimacy of the anti-anthropomorphic view of nature and its rights.

Historically the perfect model of anthropocentrism is found in Cartesianism which grants all rights to men and none to nature including animals. Not only nature is not 'animated' but it also contains no occult power or invisible reality. And animals are no exception because they do not speak. Indeed they sometimes function better than men do, but so does well-oiled machines! They do not have any rights because they do not feel pain. Descartes nevertheless made a distinction between animals as creatures of God and machines fabricated by ordinary men. Animals still are automata; internal organs intended for different functions just as a machine (say a watch) have internal parts for functions.

The central argument[41] for animal rights is clear; the specific differences ordinarily invoked to place value on human instead of animals (reason, language, culture etc. along with many others) are irrelevant. Clearly no greater rights are granted to an intelligent/cultured person over an idiot. The only significant moral criteria should be the capacity to experience pleasure and pain (which Descartes denied of animals, to him even the cry of an animal from an injury is like the ticking of a clock).

The argument for animal rights is basically one prescription in a democratic framework. The idea that no greater rights are granted to a wise person than to an idiot is the heart of a democratic worldview. So with or without a utilitarian thought, namely, the goal of moral and political activity is the maximization of the happiness of the world (of not man alone) and not primarily freedom, we can still hold that the democratic framework basically requires us to protect interests of whoever the subjects are. It is therefore just as wrong to bring suffering to an animal as to a human being. Peter Singer seems to go for the latter, but I think just the Tocquevellian requirement of increasing equalization of conditions in democracy is sufficient to argue for protection of animal rights. Singer considers animal to be worthy of respect in and of itself. He takes animal to be a 'moral subject', endowed with intrinsic dignity and makes[42] a difference between the sentients and the non-sentients to include only the former under the privilege of having rights excluding the rest of nature like trees, vegetables, mountains and rivers from the boundary of rights. So this kind of account[43] is only half way towards understanding the obligation of all sentient creatures to their biosphere without which they could not have survived.

The ascription of right only to humans first, then to animals is associated with the notion of freedom vis-á-vis nature. This means natural objects are not free, therefore not legal subjects. Rights assume freedom. More freedom means more rights. If this is a correct view then the destruction of forest, river, mountain, atmosphere cannot be legally (and morally) wrong because these objects are not legal subjects, nor free and therefore these are not somebody's property. Indiscriminate exploitation or misuse of nature then can never be wrong. It is clear that this kind of logical consequence from either anthropocentric or sentient-centric ecology will not be acceptable to anyone including the ecologists themselves mentioned above. The oddity of such consequence will be clear if we take the example of a hypothetical society where the exploitation of nature is rampant, but it is not undertaken by the capitalist consumerist big powers, but by the ordinary people. Moreover the benefit and the yield go ideally to the people who are closest to the nature—marginal farmers and the forest dwellers only. It changes their life bringing definite improvements in their life styles including the women's living conditions, their livestock and also the wild life. In that kind of case the leftist, the feminists, the animal right activists would all be happy including the moderate liberals, the latter because the living standard and quality of life have definitely been improved.

Undoubtedly this is a case where all the standard arguments based on contingent state of affairs are not applicable but even then it is not easy to say that this type of exploitation/devastation of nature is justifiable. To establish that we need a more comprehensive concept of freedom and right which is not doctrinaire, and on the contrary quite satisfactorily applicable and consistent with the basic principles of ecology that we mentioned earlier, namely, maximum diversity and minimum interference. To do that I shall refer to two cases of insensate objects and controversy regarding their rights. The first case is an extraordinary trial[44] similar to the medieval trials we mentioned. On the basis of this trial the question arises immediately that "we give legal rights to forests, oceans rivers and other so-called natural objects in the environment—indeed to the natural environment as a whole".[45]

The other case is an article entitled 'Duties concerning Islands' by Mary Midgley. In this essay[46] the author (a philosopher with several works on ecology) proposes a rewriting of Robinson Crusoe where he is set upon devastating his island in a delirious mood. Robinson's anecdote, according to the author demonstrates the existence of duties toward entities other than men. And not just towards islands, there exist moral obligation toward "the dead, posterity, children, the insane, embryos, human ... sentient and non-sentient animals, plants of all kinds ... ecosystems ... the biosphere, oneself and God!"

I am not so sure about Midgley's sweeping effort to put everything in heaven and earth within the range of our moral obligation, but it at least shows the way ecological theories should go, we cannot stop half-way if we consider the symbiotic relation in which everything in nature is interactive. We cannot take a part there and ascribe it freedom without affecting the rest. If there is an obligation to man and other sentient beings then we have similar obligation to the rest of it. This deep ecological insight is necessary to understand the original natural environment man is part of. The social contractual understanding of man and nature is responsible for treating man as something different. The deep ecological principle is based on the two main principles of diversity and least interference, which are consistent with the democratic norm of equalization of right. It is not an abstract philosophical doctrine because many non-industrial traditions are based on it as indicated earlier in the discussion. Tolerance or 'live and let live' is the basic principle here. If we consider the meaning of the word 'eco' which came from 'Aeiko' that means 'home' or 'natural habitat', our principle would be more meaningful. Home is not just people but the entire surroundings including animate and inanimate objects. Ecology thus should be the 'study of home or natural habitat' as a whole. This theme also constitutes the ideological foundation of the Green peace movement which believes that 'Humanist value systems must be replaced by supra humanistic values that bring all plant and animal life into the sphere of legal and ethical considerations... force will eventually have to be brought to bear against those who would continue to desecrate the environment.''[47]

Ignoring the coercive part, the warning echoes the basic environment principle we should follow today. The general anti-science and coercive mode of green movement however is problematic in many ways. Excessive legislation or use of force are both detrimental to the notion of freedom. We find an advocate of both scientific achievement and minimum legislation in Karl Popper's vocal protest against both.

Popper in his anxiety to safeguard the world against too much legislation[48] which needs coercion, ignores the positive points of ecological movements, particularly the Green movement (for its advocacy of strict legislation) which are of grave concern to any one. The spectre of Nazism led Popper understandably to mistrust strong legislation against ecological disaster which might lead to possible loss of individual freedom. He realized the seriousness of the situation, but unlike most eco-philosophers thinks that there are built-in corrective measures within science and technological methods and by simply condemning modern science we cannot solve the problems.[49] This position requires that the problems can be identified and remedied from within the scientific tradition. Popper realized that some problems such as indiscriminate air pollution, or arms market need special legislation.

He also opposes the 'ideological worshippers of free market' who thinks any kind of legislation of market freedom is a dangerous step to serfdom. "I have already shown that a free market can exist only within a legal order created and guaranteed by the state" .He has done that long time ago in the first edition of *The Open Society and its Enemies.* It holds a critical rationalist position of freedom and rationality within the framework of a legal order. In similar tune with the harm principle (which ensures absolute freedom in thought and action so long as it does not do any harm to any one) Popper declares that "freedom should be restricted only where there are compelling reasons why it is necessary".[50]

It is obvious that there may not be agreement about what is necessary. Moreover as human beings, scientists also can make mistakes. All our actions have both intended and unintended consequences. For example, splitting of atom is a tremendous scientific feat although there were many unintended and undesirable consequences of this event which the scientists did not foresee. Some insecticides may exterminate harmful insects and bacteria but at the same time may kill others which are harmless. But the problem cannot be solved by legislation against all technological innovations but by more and more innovations to combat adverse effects of science and technology.

The principles of rational ecology proposed here are in tune with the harm principle which can give a satisfactory account of an environmental policy and at the same time can be justified within a legal system. This position is in agreement with the critical rationalist position on the question of freedom in general and is neither regressive nor a champion of mindless desecration.

NOTES

1. (a) Gadgil M., F. Berkes and C. Folke, "Indigenous Knowledge for Biodiversity Conservation", *Ambio*, vol. 22 (2–3), pp.151–156. 1993.
   (b) N.A. Long ed. *Battlefields of Knowledge. The Interlocking of Theory and Practice in Social Research and Development*, Routledge, London, 1992.
   (c) Sen, Geeti, ed., *Indigenous Vision*, Sage and Indian International Centre, New Delhi, 1992.
2. R. Sukumar,'Wildlife—Human Conflict in India', R.C. Guha, ed., *Social Ecology*.
3. R.C. Guha, ed. *Social Ecology* and *The Unquiet Woods* contain various accounts of such exploitation and resistance movements in India.
4. J.S. Dryzeck, *Rational Ecology*, p. 65.
5. Radhakamal Mukherjee, a pioneer in ecological research in India mentioned such examples of imbalance man brought into nature. He says, 'The plants which he (man) does not tolerate are called weeds'. See his 'An Ecological Approach to Sociology: Eco-contributions to Sociology', *The Sociological Review*, vol. xxii, No. 4 , Oct. 1930, reprinted in *Social Ecology*, ed., Ram Chandra Guha.
6. Radha Kamal Mukherjee, *Ibid.*, p. 26.
7. Arne Naesse, 'Paul Feyerabend—a Green Hero', Munver (edited) *Beyond Reason*, Kluwer, 1991.
8. In "Tyranny in Disguise?", *Facets of Humanism*, pp. 111–21, Patnaik et.al., ed. Decent Books, New Delhi, 2000. I have discussed how the non-Western traditions respect the dignity of human body in medical diagnosis by least interference while Western medical science undertakes all kinds of interference with the human body for diagnosis (and treatment) many of which are painful, expensive and not necessary.
9. Amartya Sen in various works gives prime importance to 'standard of living'/quality of life for any economic ethical norm.
10. Ecological problems concern discrepancies between ideal and actual conditions stemming from interactions between human systems and natural systems. Ecological problems are characterized by (i) complexity, (ii) non-reducibility, (iii) variability, (iv) uncertainty, (v) spontaneity and collectiveness. See, J.S. Dryzeck, *Rational Ecology*, Blackwell, London, 1987 for such an account.
11. J. Lemons, 'Cooperation and Stability as a Basis for Environmental Ethics' *Environmental Ethics*, 3, pp. 219–30.
12. Murray Bookchin, *Towards an Ecological Society*: The Ecology of Freedom: The Emergence and Dissolution.
13. See Ralston, 'Values in Nature', *Environmental Ethics*, 3, pp. 113–28 for a more extensive survey of reasons for valuing nature. See Ralston, 'Values in Nature', *Environmental Ethics*, 3, pp. 113–28 for a more extensive survey of reasons for valuing nature.

14. J.S. Dryzeck, *op cit.* The value of natural systems is critically analyzed also in. A. Leopold, *A Sand County Almanac*; M. Sagoff, 'On Preserving the Natural Environment', Yale Law Journal, 84, 1974; C.D. Stone, 'Should Trees Have Standing? Towards Legal Rights for Natural Objects', *Southern California Law Review*, 45, 1972; L.H. Tribe, 'Ways not to think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for Environmental Law', *Yale Law Journal* 83, 1974.
15. Dryzek, *op cit.*
16. In India the British foresters were specially used for implementing such imperialist policies and this started the confrontation between forest officials and peasants, mainly marginal farmers. Forest acts were enacted to deprive these forest-dependent people from the use of the forest that they survived on for years. See, R.C. Guha, ed., *Social Ecology* and R.C. Guha, *The Unquiet Woods: Ecological Change and Peasant Resistance in the Himalayas.*
17. Radhakamal Mukherjee, a pioneer in ecological research in India mentioned such examples of imbalance man brought in nature. He says, 'The plants which he (man) does not tolerate are called weeds'. See his 'An Ecological Approach to Sociology: Eco-contributions to Sociology', *The Sociological Review*, Vol. XXII, No.4, Oct. 1930 reprinted in *Social Ecology*, ed., Ram Chandra Guha.
18. Ibid, p. 29.
19. Radha Kamal Mukherjee, *Ibid.*, p. 26.
20. The valuable anthology *Social Ecology* Oxford 1994 edited by Ram Chandra Guha contains various informative accounts of such ecological problems in India raised by the modernization processes started by the British and followed thereafter. The modernization process (with its numerous 'forest laws') gradually depleted natural resources to a great extent and marginalized traditional forest dwellers and forest users.
21. M. Gadgil and K.C. Malhotra, 'The Ecological Significance of Caste', in Ram Chandra Guha, *Ibid.*, p. 37. The authors have argued that the collapse of the resource base, the change of barter to money system has destroyed the traditional relationship amongst the various castes in Indian society
22. It is a good sign that international agencies like UNCTAD, WHO, WIPO etc., are gradually taking notice of traditional modes of knowledge such as medicine, agriculture, conservation in different types of local knowledge. See, Nirmal Sengupta, "Traditional Value and Valuable Tradition", footnote 10, p 87, *Sandhan*, vol. III, No. 1, Jan-June 2003 pp. 69–88 for some of these conventions and working papers on local knowledge of handling many problem areas.
23. Some examples of such traditional prudence and their loss by modernization are to be found in Gadgil and Malhotra, *Ibid.*
24. See, Ram Chandra Guha, *The Unquiet Woods*, for an account of such

alienation between nature and man in the hills of Kumaon and Tehri Garhwal.

25. Verrier Elwin, *A Philosophy for NEFA*; E. Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen*; P.H. Gross, *Birth, Death and Migration in the Himalayas.* I owe the three references above to Ram Chandra Guha's *The Unquiet Woods.*
26. Gadgil and Prasad, 'Forest Management and Forest Policy in India', *Social Action*, vol. 27, no. 2, 1983.
27. For such arguments for conservation of wild life, see, 'Wildlife—Human Conflict in India: An Ecological and Social Perspective' by R. Sukumar in *Social Ecology, op cit.*, p. 304.
28. Accounts of some such society can be found in Robert A. De J Hart, *Eco Society; A Historical Study of Ecological Man*, Natraj Publishers, Dehradun, 1984.
29. Not only in emergencies, this unique interactive system is also valuable for its regular support to urban demands. An extraordinary example can be found in the neighbouring villages in the eastern fringe of Calcutta where an unique system of recycle and supply works. While a river there carries the sewage of the city the dumping ground of the city nearby grows vegetable, in lands rich with organic (compost) manure. Several large fisheries (water-bodies) in the vicinity were famous for their natural pisciculture. But for several years the fishponds are being filled up, the dumping ground minimized to make room for big housing development projects, government offices and industries. Before this development some tanneries were the only industries there. This change has two drastic repercussions with both economic and sociological impact: one, the villagers were deprived from the way they easily earned their living in that naturally rich area by supplying provisions to the nearby city and the neighbourhood. Now their land/ponds are overtaken somehow and thus turned them into labourers and domestic servants. Two, the city and the neighbourhood now are deprived of cheap and fresh provision as they used to get before.
30. Anil Agarwal, 'An Indian Environmentalists Credo', *in Social Ecology, op. cit.*, p. 375.
31. M. Redclift, *Development and the Environmental Crisis, Red or Green Alternatives?* p. 38.
32. R. Bahro holds that the old 'green' programme is not adequate to deal with ecological problems. See his *Socialism and Survival*, London, 1984, pp. 39–67.
33. The liberal economist Hayek argues that man is both biological and of human nature. Contemporary human beings are still well adapted to the life of small hunting and gathering groups. But they do have special capacities like learning from their actions, avoiding purely instinctive actions. They have also evolved some rules of human conduct, based on values like honesty, morality, privacy, sense of property rights etc. which have allowed the human species to have acquired their special

prominence in nature. Hayek thinks cultural relations of this kind now act as a constraint on human beings' genetic inheritance. The best kind of 'planning' would be carried out by intelligent individuals. The social and economic scenario is now so complex that any large-scale institutional planning (for the benefit of the people) cannot be done for lack of knowledge of the consequences. See, especially, *The Fatal Conceit,* Routledge, London, 1988, for such account.

34. Some neo-liberals basically following the Hayekian line are sceptical about the environmental doom prophesied mainly by the green philosophers because the 'scientific' evidences for such dismal future such as ozone layer depletion, greenhouse effects etc. are still scanty and inconclusive. It is also doubted whether there are indeed strong links between changes to the ozone layer and the use of chlorofluorocarbon. Variations may well, for example, be linked to variations in the solar cycle. Likewise the links between skin cancer and ultraviolet rays or the belief about rain forests and the disappearance of the species are not established. Nevertheless the fact that the problem of pollution is real has to be admitted by them while as a solution they refer to capitalist methods, the green theory blames capitalism for the environmental destruction. For such view, see, R. Whelan, *Mounting Greenery*, Educational Unit, Institute of Economic Affairs 1989 and *The Limits of International Cooperation*, 1990.
35. Peter Dickens criticizes established theoretical approaches and argues for a new 'green' social theory based on the early writing of Marx as an integrated approach. See *Society and Nature: Towards a Green Social Theory*, London, (1993) Chapter III onwards for such a view.
36. Karl Popper, 'Thoughts on History and Politics', *All Life is Problem solving*. p. 101.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 101.
38. Karl Popper,'Meglio liberi che verdi', in an interview by Sebastian Maffettone, GRANDI FILOSOFI/ POPPER GIUDCA LE UTOPIE CONTEMPORANEE, *Panorama*-16 LUIGLIO 1989.
39. Jeremy Bentham is one of the pioneers in recognizing animal rights and at present Peter Singer advocates it. Although Singer calls it 'animal liberation' rather than the question of right they agree on the essential point. See his *Animal Liberation*, 2nd edition.
40. Besides Singer there are Aldo Leopold (U.S.A.), Michele Serres (France) and Hans Jonas (Germany) who are defending natural rights against anthropocentrism in different ways. Leopold's *A Sand County Almanac*, 1949 is a pioneer work while Serres' Le *Contract Naturel*, Paris, 1990 and Jonas' *The Imperative of Responsibility*, 1979 support a crusade against humanist ecological arguments and argue to go beyond.
41. Originally proposed by Bentham this kind of arguments are however used in more or less the same way by Singer and many others.
42. "The capacity for suffering and enjoyment *is a prerequisite for having in-*

terests at all. A stone does not have interests because it cannot suffer... a mouse for example does have an interest... because it will suffer..." Singer, *op. cit.*, pp. 7–8.

43. Similar recognition of animal's legal right and obligation is found in some accounts of animal trial in the sixteenth century Europe where colony of weevils invaded some vineyards in France and also against beetles or others for similar legal offenses. The case of the insects was duly defended by lawyers appointed by the authority to which the villagers made petition for legal action against these tiny insects. After adequate hearing in some cases the culprits were punished (mostly banished from that place) if found guilty and if not, then it was victory for the insects after the Judge says that they have the same right to consume plant as humans. See, Luc Ferry, *The New Ecological Order*, (translated from French). Carol Volk.
44. The legal suit was filed by the powerful eco-association, Sierra Club alleging that the 'development' permit to Walt Disney Enterprise (a giant corporation) by the U.S. Forest service for the construction of hotel, amusement park etc. in a wild valley, Mineral King, situated in the Sierra Nevada will destroy the aesthetic and natural equilibrium of Mineral King. The suit was rejected on the plea that Sierra club has no 'interests' in Mineral king and American law in principle protects only 'interests' and not abstract value.
45. These words are from C.D. Stone, in an article "Should Trees have Standing? Towards Legal Rights for Natural Objects' in *Southern California Law Reviews*, 1972. He writes in the preface to his book (reprint of the article), "Perhaps the injury to the Sierra Club is tenuous, but the injury to Mineral King—the park itself was not. If I could get the courts thinking about the park itself as a 'Jural' person—the way corporations are 'persons'—the notion of nature having rights would have made a significant operational difference." Although the case was lost eventually by one vote Stone's argument nevertheless convinced three Judges to vote in favour of Sierra club.
46. "Duties concerning Islands', *Environmental Policy: A Collection of Readings*, University Park and London, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1983.
47. *Green Peace Chronicle*, Editorial, April ,1979 where the position is clearly stated.
48. Karl Popper, *All Life is Problem Solving*, p. 101.
49. "Better be Free than Green", *op. cit.*
50. *All Life is Problem Solving*, p. 102.

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Sanskrit Learning and Literature in the Tamil Country (14th–18th centuries AD)

The mighty Vijaynagara empire, which at its height extended over almost the whole of South India ushered in a glorious era in the annals of the history of India. The rulers of this dynasty rendered yeoman service in the field of culture including education, literature, religion, art and architecture. In the Tamil country over which they held sway starting from the 14th century AD, their contribution to the sphere of learning and literature has been remarkable.

Following in the footsteps of the Pallava, Çola and Pāṇḍya rulers (their predecessors in this part of their empire) the Vijayanagara kings strove to propagate learning in their land by honouring and encouraging scholars known for their educational accomplishments. Gifts of land, sometimes entire villages, called agrahārās were given to learned men, the income from which could be used by them to continue their academic pursuits and to pass on their profound scholarship to their students.

Poets of the Tamil country too were patronized by these kings. Some of them composed the royal documents of the rulers which were almost always in the form of beautiful poetry and which are seen to this day in the form of inscriptions.

Many of the eminent scholars of the Vijayanagara period who belonged to the Tamil country are well known even in the present times because of their outstanding works. However, there are many scholars and poets whose names and works are known only by the data supplied by the inscriptions. These inscriptions are of two types. Some are lithic records inscribed on the walls of temples and usually record benefactions made to these religious institutions. Others are copper-plate inscriptions, the majority of which register gifts of land to scholars. Both these types of inscriptions provide plentiful authentic data about the position of learning and literature during the Vijayanagara times. While scholars have analysed the Tamil inscriptions of this period in depth, the Sanskrit epigraphs of this age found in the Tamil country have not got their due.

The focus of this paper will be on the position of Sanskrit education and literature in the Tamil country during the Vijayanagara period as gleaned mainly from their Sanskrit inscriptions and also to a certain extent from some literary sources.

One of the earliest known Sanskrit works of the Vijayanagara age is the '*Madurāvijayam*' by a queen named Gangā Devī.[1] She was the consort of Kumāra Kampaṇṇa, son of Bukka I who led an army into the Tamil country and inflicted a crushing defeat on the Muslim ruler of Madurai in AD 1370, thus putting an end to the Sultanate of Madurai after forty years. This military excursion of Kumāra Kampaṇṇa was the subject of this beautiful Sanskrit poem called *Madurāvijayam* (conquest of Madura) also known as *Kamparāya Charitam* (deeds of Kamparāya).

This quasi-historical work, composed in elegant Sanskrit resembles the *Raghuvamśa* of the celebrated Sanskrit poet Kāḷidāsa in style. In it Gangā Devī mentions the names of Kāḷidāsa, Bhaṭṭa Bāṇa, Bhāravi, Daṇḍin, Bhavabhūti, Vyāsa and Vālmīki and in a single verse devoted to each, she brings out the special merit of the poet.[2] Gangā Devī's work reveals this royal lady to be a very gifted poetess among the galaxy of great poets of Sanskrit literature.

It was during the period of the early Vijayanagara rulers that the illustrious Śrī Vaiṣṇava scholar, Vedānta Deśika (AD 1268–1369) lived in the Tamil country. Vedānta Deśika who authored more than a hundred works in Sanskrit, Tamil, Prākṛt and Maṇipravāḷa lived for some years in the island of Śrīraṅgam (Tiruchirapalli district) on the river Kāverī famous for its Viṣṇu temple, dedicated to Lord Raṅganātha.

According to the Tamil literary works, the *Guruparampara-Prabhāvam* and the *Koil-oḷugu* (a chronicle of the Śrīrangam temple), the temple authorities removed the image of the Lord on the eve of the Muslim invasion and carried it away for safety to many places and finally to Tirupati, fearing desecration of the idol.[3] A Vijayanagara official named Gopaṇa Uḍaiyār who was the Governor of Ginji took this image from Tirupati to his capital. He defeated the Muslims with the help of a strong force and brought the image of Lord Ranganātha back to Śrīrangam. According to the *Guruparampara*, on this occasion, Gopaṇa Uḍaiyār was praised by Vedānta Deśika in a Sanskrit verse in which Gopaṇa's heroic activities are extolled.[4] An inscription dated AD 1371 containing this beautiful and moving Sanskrit verse is engraved on the walls of the Śrīrangam temple.[5]

Harihara II (AD 1377–1404) who succeeded Bukka I to the throne of Vijayanagara strove for the dissemination of Vedic learning in his empire. The Nallūr copper-plate grant of this ruler mentions that he gave to two Vedic scholars named Aubhala-Yajvan and Nṛsimha-Yajvan, a village named Śrīnallūr.[6] This inscription mentions a number of birudas (titles) of Harihara II, one of them being 'Vedabhāṣya-prakāśakaḥ' (the publisher of the commentaries on the Vedas).[7] This biruda clearly refers to the commentaries on the Vedas, which were published under the king's authority by Sāyaṇācārya, the famous Vedic scholar who was a minister of Harihara II.[8]

The fact that this king also encouraged the poets of his empire can be seen from this inscription which records that the composer of the verses of this charter (śāsana-śloka-karta) was Mallanārādhyavṛttika.[9] Evidently this king chose this talented poet to compose the stanzas for his inscription, thereby encouraging his talent.

Virūpākṣa, the son of Harihara II who was the viceroy of the Tamil country for some years and who ascended the throne at Vijayanagara for a brief period after the death of his father was a great scholar who composed two Sanskrit plays called *Nārāyaṇī-vilāsa* in five acts and the *Unmatarāghava* in one act describing Rāma's lamentations on the loss of Śītā.[10]

An inscription found in the Raṅganāthasvāmi temple, Śrīraṅgam consisting of two verses mentions the benefactions of this ruler to this temple.[11] The first of these stanzas is the opening verse of the *Nārāyaṇī-vilāsa* in which the sūtradhāra (stage-manager in the play) introduces king Virūpākṣa as the author of this play. As this verse is apparently copied from that drama it may be surmised that the king took keen interest in popularizing this composition.[12]

Many copper-plate grants of the reign of Virūpākṣa record that he gave gifts of land as agrahārās to scholars who were well versed in the Vedas.[13] These inscriptions consisting of a number of beautiful Sanskrit verses were also composed by one or more talented poets, but unfortunately their names have not been mentioned in these records.

Deva Rāya II (AD 1422–1446), who was a great scholar is believed to have been the author of the *Ratiratna-Dīpikā* and the *Brahmasūtravṛtti*, a gloss on the *Brahmasūtras* of *Bādarāyaṇa*, following the Advaita tradition of Śankara.[14] He patronized many eminent scholars at his court in Vijayanagara. In the Tamil part of his empire also, he encouraged many scholars. His Satyamangalam copper plates, found in Tamilnadu record the gift of a village which was renamed Devarāyapura after himself as an agrahāra along with presents (dakṣina) to eight excellent brāhmaṇās (dvijottama) who were masters of the Ṛk-śākha.[15] A lithic record of this ruler mentions another grant to a scholar well versed in the Vedas and Śāstrās.[16]

The fact that this king also encouraged poets is seen from a verse in his Śrīrangam copper-plate grant which mentions that this inscription was composed by a poet named Rājaśekhara.[17] A detailed study of this inscription clearly shows the literary skill of this poet who had composed these forty-eight verses in various metres and who was chosen by his king to compose this royal grant.

Vīra-Nṛsimha (AD 1503–1509) is also seen as a benefactor of scholars as revealed by many of his Sanskrit inscriptions. One of these states that he gave a village named Sadirimangalam, renamed after himself as Śrī-Vīra-Narasiṁhendrapuram to a scholar named Hastigiri Dīkḥita.[18]

This ruler also gave generously to the famous Kāmakoṭi maṭha at Kāñcīpuram, a famous centre of Advaita philosophy. A copper-plate grant of his reign dated AD 1506 records that this ruler gave two villages to the pontiff of this maṭha named Mahādeva Sarasvati, disciple of Sadāśiva Sarasvati, who is described in this record in glowing terms as a Paramahaṁsa-Parivrājakācārya, seeking liberation (mumukṣave), whose body is smeared with ashes (bhasmadhūḷita-gātrāya) and adorned with rudrākṣa garlands (rudrākṣavāḷi-dhāriṇe), who is a great person (matātmane), who has thoroughly studied all the Śāstrās (samasta-śāstra-pāthodhi pāragāya), a tapasvi, who has attained the eight yoga sādhanās, namely yama, niyama, etc. (aṣṭānga-yoga-yukttāya), who is full of compassion (dayāśīlāya), who is of bright intellect (dhīmate) and resembles Lord Śiva himself (Śivarupiṇe).[19] Another record of Vīra-Nṛsimha mentions that he gave a village named Kuḍiyāntaṇḍal to this teacher who is described in exactly the same glowing terms as in the previous record.[20]

Vīra-Nṛisimha's younger brother and successor, the illustrious emperor Kṛṣṇa Deva Rāya (AD 1509–1529) was a very great scholar and poet and author of works in Sanskrit and Telugu like *Madālasācaritra, Satyavadhūpreṇanam, Sakalakathāsāra_Sangraham, Suktinaipuni jñānacintāmaṇi, Rasamañjarī, Jāmbavatīkalyāṇam* and *Amuktamālyadā*[21] In his court flourished many scholars and poets. His inscriptions in the Tamil country reveal his patronage of the scholars in the southern portion of his large empire.

A copper-plate grant of this ruler from the Ranganāthasvāmi temple, Śrīrangam dated AD 1514 records that he gave a village named Eṇṇakuḍi, situated on the south bank of the river Kāverī, renaming it Kṛṣṇarāyapuram after himself to a scholar named Allāla-Bhaṭṭa who was a master of the six systems of philosophy (ṣaḍ-darśana), and the Śruta (Veda). This inscription, very poetically praises the donee as 'Goddess Sarasvatī in male form and being of good conduct and intelligence'[22] Several other copper-plate inscriptions of this ruler speak of his gifts to scholars in the Tamil country.

Kṛṣṇa Deva Rāya also encouraged many poets to compose verses for his copper-plate epigraphs as seen from the data provided by these records discovered in Tamilnadu. Two copper-plate inscriptions from Śrīrangam, as well as the Udayambākkam inscription of Kṛṣṇa Deva Rāya, composed wholly in Sanskrit mention at the end that a poet named Sabhāpati composed the document at the command of Kṛṣṇa Deva Rāya.[23]

The Kāñcīpuram inscription of this ruler which is also fully in Sanskrit mentions that it was composed by Urukavi.[24] According to the editors of this inscription, the name Urukavi perhaps means 'great poet', but a blank in the next line of the epigraph may well be filled in with the word Sabhāpati as the metre of that word requires it.[25] Sabhāpati was the famous rhymster of Kṛṣṇa Deva Rāya's court. Urukavi was probably another name of Sabhāpati or his title.[26]

Like his predecessor, Vīra-Nṛsimha, Kṛṣṇa Deva Rāya also gave gifts of land to the Advaita maṭha at Kāñcīpuram. A copper-plate record of this ruler dated AD 1521 mentions that this ruler gave to Candracūḍa Sarasvati, the disciple of Mahādeva Sarasvati, the pontiff of this maṭha, the villages of Poḍavūr (this name was converted to Kṛṣṇarāyapuram at the time of this grant) and Kāṭapaṭṭu. This grant praises this pontiff as a talented and high-souled saint, who was a disciple of Mahādeva Sarasvati (Mahādeva-Sarasvatyāḥ śiṣyaḥ), a devotee of Śiva (Śiva-cetase), the famous commentator on all the Śāstrās (vyākhyātākhila śāstrāya), an expert in māyavāda (māyāvādāmbudhiīndave) and who was a resident of Kāñcīpuram (Kāñcīpuranivāsāya).[27]

The inscriptions of Vīra-Nṛsimha and Kṛṣṇa Deva Rāya detailing their gifts to this maṭha at Kāñcīpuram show the reverence of these rulers towards the pontiffs of this maṭha who were very learned and holy men as these records themselves indicate. The benefactions of these kings must have gone a long way in helping the maintenance of the maṭha, especially the boarding and lodging of the disciples who came to imbibe the teachings of these scholars and to continue the tradition of the maṭha.

Acyuta Rāya (AD 1530–1542), the successor of Kṛṣṇa Deva Rāya was also a scholar who has been credited with the work *'Tāḷamahodadhi'*, which was commentated on by his contemporary Somanātha.[28] This ruler encouraged many Sanskrit scholars, one of whom was Rājanātha Diṇḍima, his court-poet who wrote the Sanskrit poem '*Acyutarāyābhyudayam*' during the lifetime of his patron and also composed the *Bhāgavata-Campu*, a work dedicated to his king.[29]

The inscriptions of this ruler found in Tamilnadu reveal the patronage extended by this king and his officials to scholars and poets. An inscription of this king engraved in the Sabhānāyaka shrine in the Ekāmranātha temple at Kāñcīpuram records an interesting story.[30] When Bhogarāja was the governor of Kāñcī, he summoned an assembly of learned scholars inside this temple to listen to four literary works in Sanskrit composed by a scholar named Śrīnivāsa Yajvan. One of these was the *Śivabhaktavilāsa*, a poem (kāvya), dealing with an account of the lives of the sixty-three devotees (Nāyaṇmārs) of Śiva and another was the *Caraṇādīstava* (called as *Pādādikeśastava* in the Tamil portion of this epigraph). The other two works were *Bhogāvaḷī* and *Nāmāvaḷī*. The theme of the Śivabhaktavilāsa is the same as that of the famous Tamil work '*Periyapurāṇam*' also known as *Tiruttoṇḍarpurāṇam* composed by Sekkiḷār in the first half of the 12th century AD.[31] The *Caraṇādīstava*, probably the same as the *Ekamranāthāsthava* as also the *Bhogāvaḷī* and the *Nāmāvaḷī* were compositions on Lord Ekāmranātha of Kāñcīpuram.[32]

This inscription also mentions the gifts this talented poet received for his compositions. The assembly (sabha) of Kāñcīpuram gave presents of ornaments and clothes to him and also gave him a house in Kāñcī for his permanent residence. He was also to receive a certain amount of rice and grains every month and this grant was to be enjoyed hereditarily. The members of the sabha were entrusted with the responsibility of seeing that this gift continued uninterruptedly. The gifts given to this poet clearly indicate the patronage that men of letters enjoyed during the Vijayanagara period and the esteem in which they were held by society.

The Sanskrit inscriptions of Acyuta Rāya such as the Kaḍalaḍi[33] and the Unamāñjeri[34] copper-plate grants were composed by Sabhāpati, the poet who wrote the verses for Kṛṣṇa Deva Rāya's inscriptions mentioned earlier. Obviously, when Acyuta Rāya ascended the throne, he continued to utilize the services of this experienced poet who had enjoyed the patronage of his predecessor.

A number of inscriptions of this ruler reveal that he too encouraged a number of Vedic scholars by giving them villages as agrahārās. The Unamāñjeri inscription mentioned above speaks of the gift of a village of Uhinai, which was also known as Acyutendra Mahārāyapuram by this king to forty-eight scholars learned in the Vedas and famous for their knowledge of the Śāstrās. Twenty-one of these donees were students of the Ṛg-Veda, eighteen were students of the Yajur-Veda and one was a student of the Sāma-Veda.

It is interesting to note that one of Acyuta Rāya's queens named Tirumalā Devī or Tirumalāmbā was a very talented poetess. She wrote the Sanskrit Campu-kāvya called '*Varadāmbikāpariṇayam*', the theme of this quasi-historical poem being the marriage of Acyuta Rāya with Varadāmbikā.[35] Some of the Sanskrit stanzas of immense beauty composed by this queen are found etched on the walls of some of the temples like the Ranganāthasvāmi temple at Śrīrangam. They record the numerous benefactions made by Acyuta Rāya to these shrines.

The successors of Acyuta Rāya like Sadāśiva Rāya and Rāmarāya (AD 1543–1564), Śrīranga Rāya (AD 1572–1585) and Venkaṭa II (AD 1586–1614) also continued in the footsteps of their predecessors as far as their patronage to scholars and poets was concerned although the mighty Vijayanagara empire was on the wane at this time.

The royal preceptor (guru) of Venkaṭa II was an eminent scholar called Eṭṭūr Kumāra Tirumala Tātācārya who officiated at the coronation ceremony of this king. This scholar was the author of a work on philosophy called *Sātvika Brahma_Vidyā Vilāsa.*[36] He also wrote the *Pāṇḍuranga Māhātmya* about the Viṣṇu temple at Pandharpur in Maharashtra.[37]

Tātācārya composed a beautiful poem in Sanskrit consisting of twenty verses called *Hanumad-vimśati* in praise of God Hanumān, consecrated by him in the temple on the banks of Tātasamudram, a tank near Kāñcī dug and named after him. These twenty verses on God Hanumān are engraved on the walls of this temple.[38] Incidentally, these verses are also found inscribed in the Varadarājasvāmi (Viṣṇu) temple at Kāñcīpuram to which this great scholar made numerous benefactions.

It was during the reign of Venkaṭa II, that the great Advaita scholar Appaya Dīkṣita flourished. He also enjoyed the patronage of Chinna Bomma Nāyaka, the viceroy at Velūr, during the reign of Venkaṭa II, who it is believed bathed Dīkṣita with gold coins (kanakābhiṣekha) in order to honour his scholarship.[39]

Appaya Dīkṣita, who wrote more than a hundred works, was largely a follower of Śrīkaṇtha's philosophy.[40] According to an epigraph found in the Śiva temple at Aḍayāpālam (North Arcot district), his native place, this scholar raised the *Śrīkaṇtha-bhāṣya* from obscurity to establish the superiority of Śiva.[41] He wrote his *Śivārkamaṇi-dīpikā* to teach the *Śrīkaṇṭha-bhāṣya* to five hundred students.[42] The catholic outlook of the Vijayanagara rulers can be seen from the fact that this scholar who was an Advaitin was encouraged by Venkaṭa II, a staunch Vaiṣṇava, and at whose behest the former composed the famous Sanskrit work in rhetoric called *Kuvalayānandā.*

Numerous inscriptions of Venkaṭa II found in the Tamil country record his gifts of villages to scholarly people. One of these, dated AD 1611 mentions that this ruler granted the village of Cittūru surnamed Raghupati-samudram to a scholar named Ammalācārya who was well-versed in the Ubhaya-Vedānta, Tarka, Mahābhāṣya and the eighteen Purāṇas.[43]

According to another similar grant dated AD 1608, Venkaṭa II gave a gift of a village named Kṛṣṇapura to Tūpiḷ Nārāyaṇācārya, who was a great devotee of Raghuvīra (Lord Rāma) and a scholar in the Śrīmad Rāmāyaṇa.[44]

Some Sanskrit poets also received encouragement from this king by way of making them compose his royal charters. His Dalavāy-agrahāram,[45] Padmaneri,[46] British Museum[47] and Vellānguḍi[48] copper-plate inscriptions were composed by Kṛṣṇakavi, a grandson of Sabhāpati. Another inscription of the reign of Venkaṭa II was composed by a poet named Cidambara-kavi.[49]

Venkaṭa III (AD 1630–1641), was also a patron of the learned. His Kuniyūr[50] and Nīlmangaḷa[51] copper-plate inscriptions mention that when he was anointed king, the learned (of his kingdom) were presented with plenty of gold. The former record also praises Venkaṭa III in the concluding portion as 'a moon to the lilies (which are) learned men' (sudhijana-kuvalaya-candraḥ).

In keeping with the tradition of his predecessors, he too gave away numerous grants of land to the scholars in the Tamil country as his inscriptions reveal. A royal poet patronized by Venkaṭa III was Rāmakavi, a grandson of Sabhāpati, who composed the Sanskrit verses for his Nīlmangaḷa and Kuniyūr copper-plate inscriptions.

The poet-composers of the copper-plate documents of these kings were very talented. The verses of these inscriptions are composed in various metres like Śārdūlavikṛḍita, Anuṣṭubh, Āryā, Śālinī, Mandākrāntā, Vasantatilakā, Upajāti and many others. Although they wrote only about the actual events which occurred during their times such as coronation ceremonies, wars and also the munificence of their rulers, yet these facts were couched in beautiful poetic language, making these records a delight to read. It is possible that the poets who wrote the inscriptions of the Vijayanagara kings also composed many poems (kāvyās) but unfortunately, none of these works have survived to the present day. It is only these copper-plate inscriptions which have withstood the test of time that provide the names of these scholar-poets who might otherwise never have been known.

The Nāyaka rulers, who were initially the feudatories of the Vijayanagara emperors in the Tamil country from the 16th century AD also encouraged the learned men of their kingdoms. The Nāyaka kings of Madurai and Tañjāvūr, in particular paid much attention to the dissemination of learning in their kingdoms.

NĀYAKS OF MADURAI

The rule of the Nāyaka kings of Madurai, which began in about AD 1529 and ended in *c.* AD 1736. witnessed a continuation of the trend of the Vijayanagara rulers in so far as their contribution to the sphere of education was concerned.

The patronage of scholars by the Nāyaks of Madurai is seen from the information provided by many of their inscriptions. The Kuniyūr plates mentioned above speak of Vīrappa Nāyaka (AD 1572–1595) as one who was 'the support of scholars' (budhānām ālambanam).[52] The Nāyaka kings also gave numerous grants of land to the learned as recorded in the epigraphs. The Dalavāy-agrahāram copper-plate grant of the Vijayanagara king, Veṅkaṭa II, dated AD 1596 records that at the request of the prince of Madurai named Vīra-Bhūpa (Vīrappa Nāyaka), son of Kṛṣṇappa Nāyaka I, king Veṅkaṭa granted to a number of brahmins, well-versed in the Vedas and Śāstrās, a village named Gaṅgavarapaṭṭi, together with a few other villages clubbed under the name Vīra-Bhūpa-samudram.[53]

Like the Vijayanagara kings, some of the Nāyaka rulers were themselves great scholars. The Vellāngudi copper-plate inscription mentions that Kṛṣṇa-mahīpati or Kṛṣṇappa Nāyaka II (AD 1595–1601), the son and successor of Vīrappa Nāyaka was well-versed in all the *Nīti-śāstrās.*[54]. Kṛṣṇappa Nāyaka, possibly on account of his great love of learning, was very favourably disposed towards scholars. The Vellāngudi epigraph adds that at the request of Kṛṣṇappa Nāyaka II, the son of Vīra-bhūpati and Tirumalāmbikā, king Veṅkaṭa II granted the village of Vellāngudi to a number of scholars.[55]

The names of the donees given in this inscription show that they were residents of the Telugu country who had already migrated into the Tamil country or had come down south at the invitation of the donor.[56] It appears that the Nāyaka kings of Madurai who were Telugus by birth, encouraged large numbers of Telugu brahmin scholars to settle down in the Madurai and Tirunelveli regions.[57]

The Padmaneri inscription, dated AD 1598, also belonging to the period of Veṅkaṭa II, speaks of a similar grant of a village to scholars by this king at the request of Kṛṣṇappa Nāyaka II.[58] This inscription praises this Nāyaka king as having founded numerous agrahārās for the exclusive use of brahmin scholars proficient in the śāstrās and bestowed villages on them in perpetuity.

The Kuniyūr copper-plate inscription of Venkaṭa III, dated AD 1634, states that the village of Kuniyūr was given by this king at the request of Tirumala Nāyaka (*c.* AD 1623–1659) to a number of scholars 'who were celebrated for their learning in the śāstrās and deeply versed in the Vedas'.[59]

NĀYAKAS OF TAÑJĀVUR

The rule of the Nāyaka kings of Tañjāvūr lasted for approximately a hundred and fifty years from the second quarter of the 16th century AD to the third quarter of the 17th century AD. Their inscriptions as well as the literary works of this period reveal that these kings too were patrons of scholars and strove to promote learning in their land. Sevappa Nāyaka (*c.* AD 1532–1580), the first Nāyaka ruler of Tañjāvūr who was closely related to Acyuta Rāya, the Vijayanagara emperor, is known to have made a grant of a village to the learned Madhva guru, Vijayīndra Tīrtha in AD 1577, who in turn distributed it among many scholars.[60] Sevappa's successors, Acyutappa Nāyaka (AD 1580–1614), Raghunātha Nāyaka (AD 1600–1634) and Vijayarāghava Nāyaka (AD 1633–1673), all continued to provide great impetus to the fields of learning and culture.

Acyutappa is known to have gifted an entire village called Melattūr (near Tañjāvūr) to five hundred and ten brahmin families to reside in to promote art and learning. It is believed that Telugu brahmin families from Kuchipuḍi (Krishna district, Andhra Pradesh), proficient in the Bhāgavata Meḷa tradition were invited by Acyutappa and settled down at Melattūr.[61] Many Vedic scholars and composers from the Krishna and Godavari regions also went to the Tañjāvūr area after the fall of the mighty Vijayanagara empire.[62]

A copper-plate inscription of Sadāśiva Rāya dated AD 1564 records the grant of a village called Muḍigoṇḍān Puttūr to a learned brahmin named Veṅṭārya. This record states that this gift was made at the request of Acyuta, the son of Sevappa Nāyaka.[63]

Raghunātha Nāyaka was himself a great scholar in sāhitya (literature) and saṅgīta (music). Raghunātha authored a number of works such as kāvyās, prabhandās and yakṣagānās like *Pārijāthāpaharaṇam, Vālmīkicaritram, Acyutendrābhyudayam, Gajendra-mokṣam, Naḷaca Ritram* and *Rukmiṇī-kṛṣṇa-vivāha_Yakṣagānam.*[64] He also wrote the famous treatise on music called '*Saṅgīta Sudha*'.[65]

A large number of scholars and poets like Govinda Dīkṣita, his two sons Yagñanārāyaṇa Dīkṣita and Veṅkaṭeśa (alias Veṅkaṭamakhi), Rāja Chūḍāmaṇi Dīkṣita, Bhāskara Dīkṣita, Kumāra Tātācārya, Rāmabhadrāmbā and Maduravāṇī flourished at his court.[66]

Rāmabhadrāmbā was a very gifted poetess, talented scholar and writer who bore many titles such as Śatalekhini (one who could write a hundred verses), Aṣṭabhāṣālekhini (one who could write in eight languages) and 'one who could ascend the seat of literary domain' (caturvida kavitānu praṇita sāhitya sāmrājya bhadra piṭārūḍā).[67] She authored the Sanskrit work '*Raghunāthabhyudayam*' dealing with the life of Raghunātha Nāyaka, her patron.

Raghunātha's successor, Vijayarāghava Nāyaka was also a scholar and wrote the Telugu drama '*Raghunāthābhyudayam*, celebrating the achievements of his father.[68] Being a great Telugu scholar, he patronized many Telugu poets at his court, but Sanskrit scholars and poets too, were honoured by him. The work '*Tañjāvūr Āndhra Vāṅgmayam* states that Vijayarāghava wore an anklet called Sāhitya Rāya on his left leg and had a banner containing the image of Śrī Śāradā as an indication of his patronage of learning.[69] He presented many agrahāras to Sanskrit scholars as attested to by many of his copper-plate inscriptions.[70]

One of the most outstanding personalities of the Nāyaka times was Govinda Dīkṣita who served as chief minister to Sevappa, Acyutappa and Raghunātha Nāyaka. He was a profound scholar and able administrator who also rendered great service to the sphere of religion and was well-known for his charitable disposition.

He authored the work *Sāhitya-Sudha.*[71] He also wrote commentaries on the Jaimini-sūtrās and the *Kaumārila Darśana* (a commentary on Kumarila Bhaṭṭa's darśana).[72] He was proficient in the six systems of philosophy (ṣaḍ-darśanās) and was a master of Advaita and was called Advaita Vidyācāra.[73] He was the elder contemporary of Appaya Dīkṣita and the latter held him in high esteem.[74] It was at the instance of Govinda Dīkṣita that the *Ṭiruvaiyaṟṟu Purāṇam* was translated from Sanskrit into Tamil in AD 1605 during the reign of Acyutappa Nāyaka.[75]

A Sanskrit inscription unfortunately much damaged, found in the Aruṇācaleśvara temple at Tiruvannamalai consisting of two verses is believed to have been composed by Govinda Dīkṣita.[76] These verses mention that the composer was Govinda Sūri who was a dependent of Sevappa Bhūpa (Sevappa Nāyaka) and expresses his gratitude for favours received by composing these verses in praise of his patron.

Two of Govinda Dīkṣita's sons were also great scholars. Yagñanārayaṇa Dīkṣita wrote the famous works *Sāhitya Ratnākara* (a Sanskrit poem dealing with the life and achievements of Raghunātha Nāyaka), *Raghunāthavilāsa Nāṭaka* and the *Alaṅkāra*

Ratnākara. He studied under his father as well as from Raghunātha Nāyaka who taught him all the Śāstrās including vyākaraṇa (grammar), tarka (logic), Mimāmsa and Vedānta.[77]

His brother, Veṅkaṭeśvara (also known as Veṅkaṭamakhi) wrote a number of commentaries as well as a treatise on Vedic trigonometry. He was also a well-known authority on music and wrote the *Sañgīta Sāmrājya* and the very famous work *Caturdaṇḍiprakāśika.*[78]

The lithic inscriptions of the period of the Tañjāvūr Nāyakas provide the names of a few scholars and poets. A bilingual inscription of Sevappa Nāyaka, found at the Aruṇācaleśvara temple at Tiruvannamalai, mentions that the four Sanskrit verses of this record were composed by Śrīnivāsa Dīkṣita of Śaktimaṅgalam.[79] Some interesting details about this poet and his family are available from this epigraph. He mentions his parents' names and that his son was Keśava Dīkṣita and that he had a title (biruda) 'Divāpradīpa'. This poet has been identified with Śrīnivāsa Dīkṣita of Satyamaṅgalam, a village in North Arcot district, who was much honoured in the court of the Tañjāvūr Nāyaka kings, especially by Raghunātha Nāyaka from whom he is said to have received the title 'Ratnakheṭadvani' as a reward for composing a particularly fine Sanskrit verse describing the beauty of the evening twilight.[80] The inscription adds that this poet had two more sons named Ardhanārīśvara Dīkṣita and Rājacūḍāmaṇi Dīkṣita, the latter having attained much success as an author.

LATER PĀṆḌYAN KINGS

The Later Pāṇḍyan kings who ruled from the 14th to the mid-18th century AD over a small area near Tirunelveli in south Tamilnadu were the descendants of the Imperial Pāṇḍyas. The Sultanate of Madurai had weakened the power of the Pāṇḍyas, but following the defeat of the Muslims in AD 1371 by Kumāra Kampaṇṇa as stated earlier, the Vijayanagara kings allowed the Pāṇḍyas to rule over their small area freely. The fact that the later Pāṇḍyan kings adopted the varāha or boar emblem which was the royal seal of the Vijayanagara rulers, in addition to their own emblem, reveals the subordination of the former by the latter.[81]

Some of the rulers of this dynasty too were scholars. Aḷagan Perumāḷ Ativīrarāma alias Śrīvallabha (AD 1563–1583) translated the

Sanskrit poem Naiṣadam into Tamil called Naiḍadham.[82] He also wrote the Kūrma Purāṇa and the Kāṣi Kāṇḍam in Tamil.

Although these rulers were politically weak, they were very involved in promoting education and founded a large number of agrahāras for the teaching of the Vedas and Purāṇas. Poets were also encouraged. Evidence of their patronage to the sphere of education and literature is seen from many of their copper-plate grants such as the Śrīvilliputtūr inscription of Abhirāma Pāṇḍya (AD 1552),[83] Dalavāy-agrahāram copper-plates of Varatungarāma Pāṇḍya (AD 1582),[84] Pudukoṭṭai copper-plate grant of Śrīvallabha and Varatungarāma Pāṇḍya (AD 1583),[85] Dalavāy-agrahāram plates of Varatungarāma Pāṇḍya (AD 1588)[86] and many others.

MARĀṬHAS OF TAÑJĀVŪR

Soon after the death of Vijayarāghava Nāyaka, the last illustrious ruler of the Tañjāvūr Nāyaka dynasty and his son Mannarudās in AD 1673 in a battle, Cokkanātha Nāyaka of Madurai ruled Tañjāvūr for a short period. This was followed by the brief tenure of Chengamaladās of the Tañjāvūr Nāyaka lineage as the ruler of Tañjāvūr. However, Ekoji I (also known as Veṅkāji), a general of the Bijapūr Sultan marched into Tañjāvūr in AD 1675 and occupied it. With this event began the Marāṭha rule of the south, which continued till AD 1855.

The Marāṭha kings were also great patrons of Sanskrit learning and literature. Many of the rulers of this dynasty were eminent scholars themselves and authored many works on diverse subjects, which included Āyurveda and music. Their court at Tañjāvūr became the centre of literature and art.

Shāhji II (AD 1684–1712) was possibly the most illustrious of the Maraṭha kings of Tañjāvūr and was a great patron of learning. Himself a renowned scholar who authored more than thirty works (nāṭakās, padas and kāvyās), he encouraged scholars and musicians at his court. In AD 1693 he gifted the village of Tiruvisanallūr, situated on the northern bank of the river Kāverī, and renamed after himself as Shāhji Rājapuram to a group of forty-six scholars for pursuing Sanskritic studies.[87] This band of intellectuals was headed by Rāmabhadra Dīkṣita, who was a master of the six darśanas, had made a critical study of the whole of the *Mahābhāṣya* and was proficient in Vyākaraṇa and who authored about thirteen books, the most important among which are *Jānakī Pariṇayam*, *Sṛngāratilakabhāṇa*, *Paribhāśavṛtti Vyākhyāyana* and *Ṣaḍdarśana Siddhānta Sangraha.*[88]

Many other great scholars were his contemporaries. They were Bhāskara Dīkṣita, who authored the *Ratnatūlika*, a commentary of *Siddhānta Siddhāñjana*, a treatise on Vedānta; Veṅkaṭakṛṣṇa Dīkṣita who wrote the *Naṭeśa Vijaya Kāvya*, *Śrī Rāmacandrodaya Kāvya*, *Uttaracampu* and *Kuśalavijaya Nāṭaka*; Vedakavi who wrote *Jīvānanthananāṭaka* and *Vidyāpariṇayanāṭaka*, both of which are attributed to his patron Ānanda Rāya Makhi; Mahādevakavi who authored the *Adhbhutadarpaṇa_Nāṭaka* and *Śukhasandeśa*; Srīdhara Veṅkaṭeśa, known as Ayyavāḷ whose *Sahendravilāsa Kāvyam* deals with the exploits of Shāhji.[89]

Triyambaka Makhi wrote the important Sanskrit work *Dharmakūṭa* and also the *Sthrīdharma*. His eldest brother Narasimharāya Makhi wrote the *Tripuravijayacampu* and another brother, Bhagavantarāya composed the *Mukundavilāsa-kāvya*, *Uttaracampu* and *Rāghavābhyudaya Nāṭaka.*[90] Other than these, many other excellent Sanskrit works were also composed during the Marāṭha period.

Shāhji's successors like Sarabhoji I (AD 1712–1728), Tuljāji (AD 1763–1787) and Sarabhoji II (AD 1798–1833) continued to patronize men of letters. It was due to the efforts of Sarabhoji II, that some very rare manuscripts were collected and preserved in the Saraswati Mahal Library in Tañjāvūr.[91] This ruler who was the author of a number of Sanskrit works like *Kumārasambhava Campu*, *Mudrārākśasachāya*, *Smṛtisangraha* and *Smṛtiratnasamuccaya* made a pilgrimage to Benaras, a great seat of Sanskrit learning between AD 1820 and 1830 and brought many important manuscripts to Tañjāvūr.

Thus, it can be seen that the impetus given to Sanskrit learning and literature in the Tamil country which started during the period of the Pallava rulers from as early as the AD 4th century continued in the ancient period under the Colas and the Pāṇḍyas and in the medieval age by the kings of the vibrant Vijayanagara dynasty, their successors the Nāyaka kings, the later Pāṇḍyan kings and finally by the Marāṭha rulers.

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Sufism: A Univeral Mystical Religion and Its Impact on India's Religio-cultural Life*

I

I have called Sufism a universal religion. This is not meant to undermine the fact that it arose within the Muslim society and was developed and expressed in the Islamic cultural framework. Sufism is often regarded, not as an integral part of Islam by the orthodox, and even by comparatively liberal Muslims but, as some sort of heretical movement which goes against the spirit of Islam. The several volume Encyclopaedia of Islam devotes half a page to Sufism! Their main contentions against Sufism are: (a) Sufis emphasize direct experience of God which implies subordination of the 'revelation' of the *Quran* to the inner experience of the individual. (b) Sufis change the social orientation of Islam completely, undermine and misinterpret such concepts as *jehad*. Introspection and otherworldliness of the Sufi way are foreign to the spirit of Islam. (c) Several of their practices as ecstatic dance (*sama*), excessive reverence shown to the *shaikhs* etc. go directly against the simplicity of Islamic monotheism.

As to the first objection, the Sufis do give greater importance to direct experience of God, or what they call God's 'revelation' in the heart, than His 'revelation' in the *Quran*. But it is not so much a subordination of the Quranic 'revelation' to their inner experience, as an endeavour to understand that 'revelation' in the context of their inner experience. Sufism is not a heretical movement; the Sufi saints took care to obey the Islamic law (*Sharia*), and always expressed full respect for the *Quran*. At the same time, they often distinguished their way (*Tariqa*) from the law (*Sharia*). They also often preferred to rely on *hadiths* (traditions) than on the *Quran* to explain and justify their ways and experiences. They did experience

God within their hearts and could not neglect its testimony. Some Sufis attempted to reconcile the two by saying that the Quranic 'revelation' is true, only it is not exhaustive; and the innermost experience of the Sufis is just complementary and not contradictory to it. Though the Sufis tried hard to adhere to the law, the nature of their unitive experience was such that they were often obliged to talk and behave in a way that seemed heterodox.

Though their ways sometimes went against the Quranic law, their love of God can hardly be said to endanger the spirit of any religion, including Islam. True, Allah's transcendence and *tremendum* are emphasized more in Islam, and yet there are frequent references to God's omnipresence, nearness and mercy in the *Quran*. The *Quran* also refers to men who find satisfaction in God alone. A beautiful verse of the *Quran* describes the desirable religious attitude thus: "Say, my prayer, my sacrifice and my life and my death are all for Allah, the Lord of the world".[1]

As to the second series of objections, the Sufis did sometimes undermine the social orientation of Islam by emphasizing the need for interiorization of consciousness. They also interpreted a few words as *jehad* as meaning not war against one's fellow men but against the internal enemy of one's lower self or ego. Some Sufis engaged in monasticism or flight from the world and its duties in order to seek God within their own hearts. The term 'Sufi' comes from the word *suf* or coarse wool which was the material of their garments, expressing their disdain for the niceties of life.

However, the objection regarding the Sufis neglecting community life and thus changing the social orientation of Islam is not justified. The Sufis lived in *khanaqahs* or *jamat khanas* which were the archetypal examples of community living. They also made disciples and listened to and taught the masses, as well as fed them in community kitchens. (We shall have occasion to discuss this aspect of Sufi way in a later section.) Only the excessive importance given to the *shaikh*, which is considered the pivotal institution of Indian Sufism by scholars,[2] seems to me to be somewhat against the spirit of Islam in which even Muhammad Saheb did not claim any special status for himself. Of course, a truly religious *shaikh* or Sufi saint encouraged his 'advanced' disciples to engage in their personal search for God through the Sufi path.

The sufi emphasis on the interiorization of consciousness compensates for a certain lack of profoundness in the Quranic religion.

The Sufi practice of introspection and their attempts to achieve direct experience of God have enriched and spiritualized Islam, so that the latter can never write off its debt to the former. Moreover, the practice of introspection is not against the spirit of Islam. Even the critics of Sufis accept various *hadiths* regarding the extreme absorption of Muhammad and his companions, especially Ali, in prayer.[3]

The same is true of religious goal in Islam. We find in the *Quran* descriptions of pleasures of heaven and tortures of hell. In contrast, the Sufis have developed the Quranic verse regarding "God's satisfaction in man and man's satisfaction in God," into a concept of religious goal which is much more emotionally and spiritually satisfying. In fact, the entire Sufi philosophy, with its basic vision of God being the Absolute Reality, the all-in-all, is a development of the Quranic view of God as the supreme Creator, the ultimate cause of every thing and event. The Sufi experience of self-naughting (*fana*) is the expression of the Quranic view of God as the supreme Reality, and the need for unconditional obedience to His will.

Islam represents the response of the soul to God which includes both fear (*khauf*) and hope (*raza*). The Sufis, with all their talk of love of God and even union with Him, always accepted the fear of God as a basic religious emotion. They transformed the Islamic emphasis on the need for obedience to God's will into a whole way of complete trust in God, total self-surrender to Him, culminating in self-naughting. Al Muhasibi finds support for the Sufi creed of love of God in the *Quran*: "Those who believe love God the stronger".[4] The Sufi love of God is also in accordance with the Islamic view of God being the Creator and absolute Agent of all action, so that even the love of Sufis is initiated by God's will.[5]

Thus Sufism, with its practices of asceticism, voluntary poverty, introspection and intense love of God, is an inner growth of Islam. Of course, many of Sufi experiences and practices were not altogether in harmony with the orthodox understanding of Islam. Sufi saints always walked on a razor's edge, balancing between their respect for the law (*Sharia*) and their own inner experiences. They always sought to understand and interpret their religious experience so as to be in conformity with the Quranic religion. This necessity resulted in a marked diversity in the beliefs, experiences and practices of Sufis and inner tensions in their views. It also brought them in constant conflict with the orthodoxy and the state.

In this, they were at a great disadvantage as compared to the Bhakti saints who thrived in a religio-social milieu which was highly supportive and receptive to their religio-spiritual teachings.

II

Very early Indian Sufism began to diversify into different sects or orders *(silsilas)*, each headed by some prominent religious leader or saint. There were several popular Sufi sects out of which four are more important from the point of view of their philosophical views and their impact on the then religious and socio-political life. All of them started in the North-West, spread to the entire North, and reached south India quite late. The four orders are—Chishti, Suhrawardi, Quadri and Naqshabandi. Very generally speaking, the various Sufi orders can be divided into mystical-oriented and this-world-oriented, or what is almost the same—heterodox and orthodox. Out of them Chishtis were most mystical God-oriented and somewhat heterodox, and the rest were more orthodox and oriented to this world. Now, this division is not meant to suggest either that the orthodox or this-world-oriented orders did not have mystico-spiritual elements in them; or that the mystical-oriented orders were fully other-worldly and heterodox. Let us remember that Sufism is a part of and has developed and thrived within the framework of orthodox Islam. There were marked differences in the beliefs, emotions, attitudes and practices of these various Sufi sects. All of them, however, professed themselves to be orthodox, that is, believed in and obeyed *the Quran* and the *Sharia.* There were common or shared points in their creed and practices, as well as issues on which they differed. In brief,

1. *Sharia* as the supreme standard was recognized by all the four orders; and any belief or practice could be recognized only by ascertaining whether it was in accord with *Sharia* or not. While the Suhrawardis and Naqshabandis were fully orthodox to the point of being legalistic and, we can say, fundamentalist, in their adherence to the *Sharia,* Chishtis were much more liberal and allowed deviations from it.
2. All the four orders believed that the Sufis should not have worldly possessions. But while the Suhrawardis and Naqshabandis interpreted it to mean that the Sufis can possess

wealth, only they must not be involved in it; the Chishtis, at least of earlier generations, adopted a life of utmost poverty. They believed in complete dependence on God for sustenance—a spiritual necessity, the faith which was carried out to the point of regular starvation.

3. All the four orders believed in Islam as the supreme religion and were instrumental in the conversion of Hindus to Islam. But while the orthodox sects looked down upon the idol worshipping Hindus, kept no contact with them, and even recommended and helped the state in adopting an oppressive attitude towards them; Chishtis were much more liberal, tolerant and even receptive to the Hindus. In the end they also preferred to convert them to Islam. In fact, Chishtis succeeded in converting the masses, where the power of the state failed, by the spirituo-moral appeal of their saintly character and gentle nature.
4. The greatest difference between the two groups of Sufi orders was in their attitude towards the state. The Chishtis consistently refused to seek aid from the state, and avoided all contact with the then kings. The Suhrawardis and Naqshabandis, on the other hand, were not only not averse to accepting state aid, but also were intimately connected with the state politics and its power games.[6]
5. The relationship between the spiritual guide (*shaikh* or *pir*) and the disciple (*murid*) was a basic feature of Sufism of all sects.[7] A religious seeker was declared a successor or a *shaikh* by his teacher only when he attained spiritual eminence and was found to be fit to instruct others. He was also seen as a *wali* (protector or benefactor).

In this context, miracles played a rather important part. Generally, Sufi saints did not perform miracles themselves, but they were fond of narrating stories of the miracles performed by their *shaikhs* or other renowned Sufis. M. Mujeeb suggests that miracles were used to create an atmosphere receptive to the Sufi teachings.[8] Moreover, the masses were far less interested in the mystico-religious experiences and achievements of these *shaikhs* and much more in their reputed power of healing. These Sufi masters used to give talismans in which names of Allah or some prayers were written. Though most Sufi *shaikhs* discouraged performance of any miracles (*karamah*), all were ready to give the talismans with God's names written in them to the needy. Shaikh Farid is said to have rebuffed his (future) great disciple Nizamuddin when the latter complained against having to write so many talismans, saying writing God's names is the duty of the *shaikh*; whether the wearing of the talisman alleviates the misery of the supplicant or not is in God's hands.

Utmost obedience to the *shaikh* was demanded from the *murid* or disciple. These disciples were of several kinds or grades. There were laymen among them, and the teacher did not demand from them renunciation of worldly duties, as long as they did not forget God while living in the world. It is for these lay disciples that even the Chishti saints insisted on complete obedience to the *Sharia*. The discipline expected from the resident disciples was much more difficult.

6. Community life or the institution of *khanqah* was a very important aspect of Sufi life. A *khanqah* consisted of a large hall, common kitchen and a few mud huts. Though the *shaikh* or the head of the institution and some advanced disciples spent a large part of their day in private contemplation and remembrance of God, they mostly lived together, ate in the common kitchen, prayed together, and practised *dhikr* (remembrance of God) along with *sama* (ecstatic song and dance) together. (*Sama* was usually practised among select or more advanced companion disciples.)

The community kitchen was run through *futuh* (unasked for charity). If sometimes some access wealth was received, it was immediately distributed among the needy and the poor. Moreover, the community kitchen was open to all the needy, the wayfarer, the poor and the rich, who came to visit the *shaikh,* without any distinction of caste or creed. Here everybody was equal; and there are stories as to how even the kings were not given any special treatment by the Chishti saints.

As a result of open hospitality of the *khanqahs*, combined with the fact that no state aid was accepted, at least by early Chishti saints, the *khanqahs* were always impoverished. Later Chishti saints and Sufis belonging to other orders as Suharawardi accepted state aid and were financially much better off. They also practised open hospitality, liberally offered food to all and gave presents to the deserving.

7. Not only these community centres fed the hungry, the poor and the wayfarer, they also served as centres of learning, dialogue and cultural give and take. The Sufi *khanqahs* or *jamat khanas* attracted many visitors, as varied as merchants, government servants, Sufi faqirs, qalandars and scholars. There was constant interaction between the *shaikh*, his disciples and the visitors. The interaction was naturally greater among Sufis belonging to different orders (*silsilas*), but it was also between Sufis and various Hindu wandering *sadhus, siddhas* and yogis, especially Nath yogis.[9]
8. The Sufi way (*Tariqa*) mainly consisted of two steps: *taubah* and *tawakkul*. According to Shaikh Nizamuddin, there are two kinds of *taubah*, the *taubah* of the common people consists in repentance from sin, while that of the elect is turning away from everything except God. The next stage is that of *tawakkul* which means complete dependence on God. The orthodox conception of *tawakkul* is to do one's best to earn one's livelihood guided by *Sharia*, and to depend upon God for the success of one's efforts. The Sufi saints expected their lay disciples to pursue this version of *tawakkul*. A lay disciple was expected to earn his livelihood for sustaining his family, and carry out other-worldly responsibilities. Shaikh Nasiruddin told a lay disciple:

> *If one is reciting the Quran all the time, whether at home, or on the way, and is engaged in dhikr, then his occupation is not a hindrance; he is a Sufi.*[10]

Sufi tradition is full of stories of lay men, like a butcher, and a doorkeeper of the palace, who were steeped in an overwhelming devotion of God, so that they remembered and saw nothing else but God while performing their worldly duties.

The *tawakkul* that was expected from the more advanced disciples (*murids*) was in the form of an absolute and unconditional dependence on God for sustenance. They survived on *futuh* or unsolicited charity, did not accept royal or any other grants; and as a result lived in abject poverty. In early Chishti *khanqahs* it was a practice to distribute all the food and money among the poor, and not to keep anything for more than a day, for storing food would mean a shortcoming in absolute dependence on God.[11]

9. *Dhikr* (constant remembering of God or repetition of Allah's name) and *sama* (ecstatic singing and dancing) were an integral part of Sufi way of life. Their manner and intensity differed in different Sufi orders. It was especially true for *sama* which was perceived by the orthodox as un-Islamic but was quite common among most Sufis. While more mystically inclined Chishti Sufis practised *sama* regularly and with abandon, it was also often practised by the followers of other Sufi orders. *Dhikr* or continuous repetition of God's name was unanimously accepted as the true Sufi way of life. Continuously singing God's praises in the form of devotional songs or *bhajans* and repetition of God's name were equally regarded as the best expression of true devotion (*bhakti*) in the Hindu Bhakti tradition also.
10. Interestingly, while different Sufi orders largely agreed about the Sufi way of life and Sufi practices, though there were differences also, they differed most over their fundamental metaphysical principles or beliefs. The doctrine of *Wahadat-ul-Wujud* (Unity of Being) was first promulgated by Ibn al Arabi in 11th century, and it might not have reached India before the end of 12th century. But the early Chishti saints, as Shaikh Muinuddin, professed some such belief based on their own inner mystico-unitive experience. Later, all Chishti saints professed the doctrine of the Unity of Being.

    This doctrine starts with the basic Quranic faith in the Unity of God and goes on to assert that it means that there is nothing else in the universe except God. It also means essential unity of all phenomena. Some Sufi saints used the expression '*Hama Ust*' (All is He) for the same belief. According to it there is nothing outside God, and nothing exists which is different from God. This also means that man is not ultimately different from God. In the Arab world Mansoor al Hallaz declared '*Anal Haq*' (I am He); and died for the same. In India, Chishti saints professed a similar view and were revered for the same. Muinuddin Chishti asserted that in the true love of God there is no distinction left between the Beloved, the lover (man) and love.[12]

    Inasmuch as the Sufi doctrine of Unity of Being bases itself on the Quranic belief in the Unity of God, and the Indian Sufis avoided any blasphemous utterances as that of Mansoor, the doctrine could not be declared anti-Islamic. Hence its popularity among Sufis and their widespread followers.

The doctrine of *Wahadat-al-Wuzud* resembles the much older Vedantic philosophy according to which the one Reality (*Atman-Brahman*) is the essence or truth of all. However, there does not seem to be any direct influence of Vedanta on the Sufi faith, both being the natural expressions of the seekers' inner unitive experience.

The philosophy or rather the religio-mystical vision of Unity of Being was not only strongly opposed by the *ulamas* or orthodox Muslims, it also did not find favour with some other Sufi orders. The Sufi orders which I have called orthodox and relatively oriented towards this world supported the doctrine of *Wahadat-al-Shuhud*, variously translated as unity of perception, or being witness to the Unity of God. This was first promulgated by Shaikh Ahmad Sarhindi, and later on taken up by most of the non-Chishti Sufi orders, as Suhrawardi, Naqshabandi etc. The advocates of the doctrine declared that: (1) The *Sharia* is supreme; (2) *Sharia* and *Tariqa* (Sufi way) are one and the same; (3) The experience of Unity of Being is just a state in the Sufi journey, whose final state is the realization of *Wahadat-al-Shuhud*. They condemned the doctrine of the Unity of Being as immanentist or pantheistic, and emphasized the transcendence of Allah so that man could but be a witness to God, never identical with Him. However, as Mujeeb observes, their main concern was to uphold the supreme authority of *Sharia*.[13]

On the other hand, the doctrine of Unity of Being, at least as it was understood, professed and experienced by Indian Sufis (Chishtis in particular), was not a pantheistic doctrine, but was simply an expression of the unitive experience. This explains why many of the prominent non-Chishti saints, such as Shaikh Sharafuddin Maneri, and Muhammad al Husaini Gesu-daraz, speak almost the same language as the Chishti saints, though they oppose the doctrine at the theoretical level.

III

We shall consider here the Chishti Sufis, their philosophy, values and experience in some detail for two reasons: First, the Chishti order is essentially an Indian one. Even though it originated in Afghanistan, it has not survived in the Persian–Arab world, while it has been the most popular, influential and widespread Sufi order in India. Second, Chishti understanding and profession of religious faith and the Chishti way of life come closest to the Sufi mystics of the Arab world.

Among the Chishti saints, Khwaja Muinuddin Chishti of Ajmer (early 13th century), Shaikh Fariduddin or Baba Farid of Ajodhan (early 13th century), Shaikh Hamiduddin of Nagaur (13th century), Nizamuddin Aulia of Delhi (13th century), and Shaikh Nasiruddin, again of Delhi (13th–14th century) are most well known because of their saintly character. There were many others who were similarly saintly and mystically inclined and exercised a great influence on the masses around them.

The three most characteristic features of Chishti saints were the practice of looking inwards for the search of God, fasting and universal compassion.

They did not decry *Sharia,* but found the externalistic rituals of Islam unsatisfactory. According to Muinuddin, while the *hazis* (orthodox pilgrims) walked around Kaba, the *arifs* (spiritualists) circumbulated the heart. The distinguishing mark of the seeker of God was his absorption in Him and his flight from crowds. Sufis constantly warned against seeking the admiration of others for one's austerities, and insisted on the need of retiring to one's cell in order to remember God. *Taubah* consisted for Chishti Sufis in turning away from anything other than God.[14] They also emphasized that remembering God (*dhikr*) is not an occasional duty, but must be continued throughout day and night. There are accounts how these Sufi saints remained absorbed in God's remembrance day and night. They also engaged in *sama* or singing and dancing out of sheer joy and intensity of their love of God. This *sama* was attended by a select few, and the *shaikhs* insisted on its being carried out in solitude.

With a few exceptions like Shaikh Fariduddin, Sufis generally did not undertake harsh austerities. But constant fasting was a way of life with them, and all early Chishtis almost regularly fasted throughout the year. Even at the end of the fast Nizamuddin ate very little and distributed the food brought for him among those present.

Fasting was mostly undertaken deliberately, but often enough it was a result of lack of food due to the Chishti saints' insistence on living on unasked charity and not accepting any royal grants. Khwaja Nizamuddin, Shaikh Fariduddin and others like Shaikh Kutubud-Din Bakhtiyar are said to have lived in abject poverty, and there are popular legends regarding their poverty. Their vow of poverty was disputed by the Sufis of other orders who lived in comfort in their *khanqahs.*

Though the *Chishti* saints loved solitude as it was necessary for the constant remembrance of God, they spent a large part of their day among the people. The latter consisted of their immediate disciples, as also the masses who gathered around them, attracted by their saintliness and spirituality. They talked with them, wrote prayers in the form of amulets for them, arranged for distribution of food to them. According to Khwaja Mu'inud-Din, there can be many forms of worship, but the most superior kind of worship is to assist the helpless and feed the hungry. All those possessing the three virtues—munificence like an ocean, kindness like the sunshine and humility like the earth are friends of God.[15]

Nizamud-Din Aulia is famous for his intense compassion for the poor and hungry. He supervised distribution of food to them, and his *langar* (free kitchen) was open to all, Muslims and Hindus alike. He arranged for any help which could be extended to the needy, and above all listened to their tales of woes, thus giving them moral support. He used to say: "No one in the world is as sad and unhappy as I am. Huge numbers of people come to me and tell me of their misery and troubles. All this afflicts my heart and soul". His compassion for the poor and the miserable was so strong that at the end of his daily fast he could not eat food because the thought of so many starving people around him made it difficult for him to swallow his food.[16]

The early Chishti saints' intense compassion for and rapport with the masses are remarkable and without any parallel in the history of world religions. Though the Bhakti saints were very hospitable to the *sadhus* or wandering religious persons, there is no evidence that they were equally concerned about the misery of the masses.

IV

The above account, mostly based on the views and ways of early Chishtis, could be said to be one sided, as it does not take into consideration the views of other orders of Sufis, particularly

Suharwardi and Naqshabandi ones. It is also important to note here that while Chishti saints, being absorbed in God, wrote very little, and we know about them only indirectly through others' accounts, many Sufis of other orders were prolific writers. Mention should be made here of Shaikh Sharafud-Din Maneri and Shaikh al-Husaini Gesu-daraz who were prolific writers.

Sharafuddin contended that the obstacles in the path of realization are many, such as desire for praise, self-esteem, excessive asceticism etc. Of course control of one's sensual nature is a must. He believed, like all Sufis and Bhakti saints, that God cannot be experienced by one's efforts; it is only when He chooses to reveal Himself to the inner vision of a man that He is known. He describes the passage to God-realization as consisting of several stages which include constant prayer, self-forgetfulness etc. Self-naughting (*fana*) is an important stage in man's search for God;[17] but it is not the last stage. Nor is unitive experience the last stage for him. To quote him:

> *It is not true that a person becomes God—for God is infinitely greater than any man—nor has the person really ceased to exist.*[18]

The consummation of man's search for God is not unitive experience but a blissful realization of God's immense mercy and supremacy.[19] Obviously, Shirafuddin, an intensely religious soul, interpreted his experiences in terms of the orthodox understanding of the *Quran*; and herein lies the difference between orthodox and relatively heterodox Chishti Sufis.

Gesu-daraz was a prolific writer. He waged an unremitting war against al Arabi's philosophy, as also against the Sufi poets, Faridud-Din Attar and Jalalud-Din Rumi who talked of self-naughting and unitive experience. He regarded them as enemies of Islam "who failed to recognize God's true transcendent form in which they and all other creatures dependent upon Him could not share."[20] He learnt Sanskrit in order to understand Hindu doctrines which he identified with pantheism, and refuted them with vigour. And yet, Gesu-daraz believed in intense love of God as the true religion or Sufi way, and even talked of the unity of the Beloved, lover and love.[21]

The main difference between the two major groups of Sufis, that is, Chishtis on one side and Suhrawardis and others on the other, was in their respective metaphysics, wherein metaphysics is not to be understood as intellectual philosophy but as an attempt to understand one's own mystical experience. As we have seen, while the Chishtis believed in Unity of Being or *Wahadat-al-Wuzud*, others professed what they called Unity of Witnessing or *Wahadat-al-Shuhud*. Interestingly, both groups acknowledged the vision or experience of the other order, but declared it as a stage in the spiritual journey which is inferior to the one advocated by them.

S.A.A. Rizvi has rightly argued that this fundamental difference in their understanding of the nature of Reality resulted in an overall difference in their general attitude towards other religious sects, society and state. The supporters of the Unity of Being were extremely tolerant of other religions, and did not condemn even idol worship and polytheism, so long as the object of worship was God Himself. They did profess faith in Islam as the highest or true religion, but did not try to convert people to Islam (though many got converted by the sheer magnetism of Chishti saints). The supporters of the other doctrine, on the other hand, were intolerant not only of Hindu beliefs and practices but also of Shia Muslims. They even supported the then state in its repressive policies towards other communities.[22]

Another important difference between the Chishtis and other Sufi orders was in their attitude towards the state. While Chishtis steadfastly refused to have any dealings with the state, and refused state aid consistently, the Sufis of other orders maintained a close contact with the state, and even occupied important posts in the government. That is why, there is such a marked difference in the perception of Sufism by a historian, and by a philosopher of religion.[23] The historians describe in detail how various Sufis helped the state, or supported this or that king, which seems to be so different from our perception of Sufism as a religio-mystical sect.

It seems to me that the difference between these various groups of Sufis was more a matter of interpretation than that of experience, at least as far as sincere religious seekers were concerned. While the Chishti saints, in spite of all their unitive experience, emphatically acknowledged God's transcendence, Sufis of other orders who chose to tread the mystic path spoke of unitive experience whose description does not seem very different from the Chishti experience. Of course, the non-Chishti Sufis hastened to qualify their assertions in the light of their orthodox understanding of the *Quran*.

The second reason for these differences in their beliefs and experiences was the fact that the non-Chishti Sufi orders developed later than the Chishti one. And by then, as Mujeeb observes, the spiritual intensity and mystical tenor of the early Sufis had waned. It was replaced by a reformist zeal that tried to instil in the masses religious and moral values, as understood by the orthodox Muslims.[24]

3. Fifteenth century onwards was also a period of greater interaction between the Hindus and Muslims in all fields of life—political, cultural, and religious. Muslims became more conscious of Hindu beliefs and practices. This resulted in two opposite reactions. The orthodox, including the orthodox Sufis, not only vehemently criticized Hindu beliefs and practices, they also supported and encouraged the state in a repressive approach towards them. On the other hand, there were still Sufis left who were very much at home with Hindu beliefs and mythology. We can include Kabir among such Sufis, as also Bulle Shah of Kashmir, Abdul Wahid Bilgrami and Abdur Razzaq Bansawi of Avadh. Muzaffar Alam presents a strong case of how these Sufi saints interacted with Hindu *sadhus* and *yogis*, and were respected among them as true *bhaktas* (devotees) of Rama and Krishna, without for a moment undermining their own faith.[25]

Rizvi explains that the love of Radha and Krishna, as portrayed by Surdas, was understood and appreciated by these Sufi saints as expressing the love of the soul for the Divine Being.[26] Especially, there is evidence of close contact between Hindu Nath yogis and later Sufis. The Sufis, with a few exceptions, were not only tolerant of others' beliefs, like the Hindu yogis and *bhaktas* (devotees) they also believed that the one God can be reached through many ways. To quote Mujeeb,

> *The outlook of the sufis was broad enough for them to recognize without inhibitions and reservations the possibility of there being many paths to God. 'God has a different secret, a different mystery, a different relationship with each person.'*[27]

Rizvi gives in great detail how later Muslim poets, as Bulle Shah, Waris Shah, Shah Abdul Latif, as also Malik Muhammad Jayasi et al narrated the stories of worldly lovers in order to express the intense longing of the soul for God; and how Hindu mythology and Hindu *yogis* (*jogis*) formed an integral part of their narrations.[28]

The fact that *Guru Granth Saheb* is a collection of devotional songs of both Hindu and Muslim saints is a witness to this interaction. But if we were to record this interaction and later Sufis' tolerance and even acceptance of Hindu religious beliefs, we would also have to take cognizance of the orthodox Sufis' passionate condemnation of Hindu beliefs and even their hostility towards them.

Historical society is a very complex phenomenon, more so if it were a volatile mix of two such divergent systems of thought and practice as Islam and Hinduism. The limitation of space prohibits any serious attempt to go into the details of the mutual interaction between Hindu and Muslim men of religion, though it would be a very fascinating subject of study. This much however is true that the widespread popularity and influence of Sufism led to an increased interaction between Hindus and Muslims. Rizvi has rightly observed that this interaction was greater at the village level. While urban Sufi centres remained aloof and elitist, the village centres or *khanqahs* provided a meeting ground for the two communities. Hindu masses flocked to the *khanqahs* and *mazars* of Sufi saints for talismans for recovery from illness or other wish fulfilments. They still visit with great faith Sufi *mazars* as that of Khwaja Muinuddin Chishti at Ajmer. Mutual interaction and fuzzing of boundaries dividing the two communities naturally result from such gatherings.

Hindu philosophical doctrines did not appeal much to the Sufi saints, but their devotional songs did. The recitation of songs by the Hindu Bhakti saints often led the Sufi mystics into ecstasy. Later Sufis adopted Hindi and other local dialects to express their views and experiences. The poetry of Muslim poets, such as Abdul Rahim (not a Sufi), Raskhan, Shah Manjhan Shattari, Bulle Shah and Malik Muhammad Jayasi, is an integral and cherished part of medieval literature of Hindi and other regional languages. The universality of their experiences and message is such that while reading them one is not conscious of the distinction between Hindu Bhakti and Muslim Sufi views and emotions.

Sufism has had a powerful impact on Indian Islam also, as a result of which it has become a much more tolerant religion, well-attuned to the needs of plural Indian society. To quote Mujeeb again:

> *The sufis made an intuitive choice of the common ground of spirituality between Hindus and Muslims and opened the way for mutual appreciation of aesthetic values which could revolutionize the whole cultural attitude of the Muslims.*[29]

The widespread popularity of Sufism has enriched Indian culture as a whole, so that the Sufi beliefs, literature and way of life do not belong to Islam alone, but are a valuable part of Indian cultural heritage.

NOTES

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1. *Quran, Sura* VI. 163 (The Meaning of the Glorious Koran, tr. By Marmudke Pikthall, Delhi: World Islamic Publications, 1997).
2. See M. Mujeeb, *The Indian Muslims*, New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1995, p. 117.
3. For a detailed discussion, see writer, *The Roots of World Religions*, New Delhi: Book and Books, 1982, pp. 115 ff.
4. *Sura* II. 155.
5. Al Junaid, quoted in A.J. Arberry, *Sufism: An Account of the Mystics of Islam*, New York: Dover Publications, 2002, p. 58.
6. See S.A.A. Rizvi, *The Wonder That was India*, Vol. II, *from the coming of the Muslims to the British conquest*: 1200–1700, London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1989, pp. 238 ff.
7. See Mujeeb, *op. cit.*, pp. 117 ff.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 121 ff.
9. See S.A.A. Rizvi, *A History of Sufism in India*, Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1978, Vol. 1, pp. 142–3.
10. See Mujeeb *op. cit.*, pp. 128 and ff.
11. See *Ibid.*, pp. 133 ff.; Rizvi, *op. cit.*, pp. 122 ff.
12. Quoted in Rizvi, *op. cit.*, p. 124.
13. See, *op. cit.*, pp. 246 ff.; Rizvi, *op. cit.*, pp. 194–5.
14. See Mujeeb, *op. cit.*, pp. 133–34; Rizvi, *op. cit.*, pp. 124, 127, 137 etc.
15. Quoted in Rizvi, *op. cit.*, p. 124.
16. See *Ibid.*, p. 164.
17. "Clinging to self means 'you'—Me you cannot reach.
To come to Me you must forsake your self."
Quoted by Paul Jackson, S.J., *The Way of Sufi: Sharafuddin Maneri*, Delhi: Idrah-i-abadiyat-i-Dilli, 1987, p. 225.
18. Quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 224.
19. See *Ibid.*, p. 231.
20. Quoted in Rizvi, *op. cit.*, p. 253.
21. See *Ibid.*, p. 255.
22. See *Ibid.*, Vol. 2, p. 460.
23. It is very significant that one and the same author, S.A.A. Rizvi, concentrates on the mystical and saintly aspects of Sufism when he is writ-

ing *A History of Sufism in India*; but he hardly refers to those aspects of Sufism and describes in detail how Sufis played an important role in the political affairs of medieval India, when he is writing a history of medieval India (*The Wonder That was India*, Vol. II). It means that any complex phenomenon as Sufism can be viewed from several perspectives, and we would come up with very different versions of the same. We would be able to reach a more comprehensive and balanced understanding of Sufism if we took these versions not as contradictory but as complementary. This however would be a difficult, though worthwhile task.

24. *Op. cit.*, pp. 165. ff.
25. "Assimilation from a Distance: Confrontation and Sufi Accommodation in Awadh Society," in R. Champaklakshmi, S. Gopal, eds., *Tradition, Dissent and Ideology: Essays in Honour of Romila Thapar*, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 174 ff.
26. See *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, pp. 433.
27. *Op. cit.*, p 160.
28. *Op. cit.*, pp. 433 ff.
29. *Op. cit.*, p. 167.

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The Trans-Regional Contributions of the Tamil Siddhas*

This paper consists of two sections, section 1 deals with a preliminary survey of the Tamil Siddhas and section 2 deals with the unique contributions of the Tamil Siddhas to the world of thought.

1. A PRELIMINARY SURVEY

The field of the Tamil Siddhas is relatively an unexplored area in that no serious study has been made about them in a systematic and scientific way. Their contributions to human thought, science, culture and civilization, if analyzed and presented cogently, will reveal that they are trans-regional in nature and universal in character.

The main problem in the study of the Tamil Siddhas is that the literature under the common name "the writings of the Tamil Siddhas" spans many centuries with an added difficulty of the absence of reliable editions of the Tamil Siddha works. There are still thousands of unpublished manuscript texts of Siddha works lying untouched, unhonoured and unanalyzed in various private and public manuscript libraries in India and abroad. To add to this difficulty we have a large number of cheap prints going under the name of Siddha works—both in the fields of medicine and philosophy. Even with the available editions there are numerous variations, corruptions and interpolations. One of the chief difficulties is the continuing process of corruptions and interpolations in the Siddha texts. Later editions of the Siddha works have a tendency to tamper with the original sources. A real researcher, in such a situation, must be like a legendary swan and be able to separate the milk from the water. In another sense the researcher must be like a bee sucking honey from the many flowers of the Siddha works without falling a prey to the artificial flowers.

1.1. The Characteristic Features of the Siddhas

The basic difficulty of a study of the Siddhas begins with the term "Siddha" itself. It is a Sanskrit term meaning "fulfilled." A Siddha is a *yogin*. Saint Tirumular says that those who live in *yoga* and see the divine power and light through *yoga* are the Siddhas.[1] He is an experimental *yogin* who attains perfection by the method of self-effort.[2] A Siddha is one who has attainted *siddhi*, a special psychic and supernatural power, which is said to be eight-fold in the science of *yoga*. The term *Siddha* comes from the word *siddhi* which means the experience of Śiva. The Siddhas are not atheists or agnostics as is commonly believed. They believe in God, but not a God of this or that religion. For most of them there is a God, a Śiva, without any limitation or attributes, Śiva is grammatically and philosophically an impersonal conception. The real name for "Śiva" is "It" or "Adu" or "Thatness" or "Suchness"[3] or "Paraparam." A genuine Siddha is beyond atheism and faith (theism) alike. A Siddha is a free thinker and a revolutionary who refuses to allow himself to be carried away by any religion or scripture or rituals. One Tamil Siddha says: "A Siddha is one who has burnt the *sastras*."[4] This is to be interpreted not in the literal sense but in the sense that for a *jnanin*, "the Vedas are not Vedas."[5] A Siddha is one who has attained a stage of realization where he is not bound by the injunctions of the *sastras*, and where he has gone beyond the Vedas. At this stage *sastras* become irrelevant trifles. The Siddhas seem to be opposed to the scriptures, but their temper is devout. They are "pious rebels" inside the field of religion and as such they are not atheists. Kārai-c-cittar draws a distinction between a Siddha and a non-Siddha by saying that a Siddha points to the path of the experience whereas a non-Siddha points to the path of scriptures.[6]

A Siddha is one who enjoys perfect bliss even while he is in his physical body. The body is treated by him as the best medium of realizing the truth. Similar to the sacred rivers, temples, mountains, etc., the body is a sacred passage to the ultimate Reality. Śivavākkiyar raises a pertinent question: why should we go out to these places when the threshold is in us.[7] In short, one who has obtained the power of dematerializing and spiritualizing the body, and knows how to transmute the corruptible physical into the incorruptible superphysical basis of life is a Siddha.

A notable feature that we find among the Tamil Siddhas is the total absence of any local cult of the deity. They are not "henolocotheists," believers in one local God. No genuine Siddha in Tamilnadu including Tirumular,[8] has sung in praise of any local God or deity or personal God. This is a feature that distinguishes Siddhas from other saints, especially Āḻvārs and Nāyanmārs. We may say that the chief characteristic feature, the differentia, to determine a genuine Siddha from a non-Siddha is to find out whether he/she has sung in praise of any local God or Deity. According to Śivavākkiyar a Siddha does not worship any deity in the temple.[9] As a Baul sings: "the road to the Absolute is blocked by temples, mosques and the teachers."[10] *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa* says that the knower of *yoga* should not participate in pilgrimages to the shrines of gods.[11] Pāmbāṭṭi-c-cittar also says that those who have built temples for local Gods and have offered prayers are those who do not get at the feet of the real Lord.[12] Tirumūlar also refers to Siddhas as those who have not tried the path of any (sectarian) religion.[13] The Tamil Siddhas do not belong to any religion or *samayam*. "*Samayam*" in Tamil means "convention," "rule."

The songs of the Siddhas do not show any trace of collective thinking; The Tamil Siddhas are not system-builders; their whole technique is to jolt people out of their intellectual ruts and their conventional, barren, morality. They laid before their audience an abrasive, shocking, uncompromising message exhorting them to shed their delusions, pretensions and empty orthodoxies in favour of an intense, direct, personal confrontation with truth. They are the "untethered," non-conformist, spiritual aspirants, yearning for a direct and natural approach to, and a more intense experience of, the absolute truth. They reject, the value and prestige of the scriptures, which remain the privilege of a few in Hinduism. The Tamil Siddhas may be considered as "scriptureless" or "bookless" or *nirgrantha* school of Hinduism, as they are detached from any scriptural authority. The Tamil Siddhas belong to a non-conformist, "counter-tradition." What is meant by "counter-tradition" is not that "which opposes tradition," but the "tradition which oppposes." The Siddhas challenges many of the accepted beliefs and practices of the Hindu society and thought. They denounced idol and ritualistic worship and petitionery prayers as fetters holding back the soul from liberation. Their language was as unconventional as were their lives. They led many people to think that the Tamil Siddhas were buddhists in disguise, since Buddhism also criticized vehemently the doctrines of the Hindus.

1.2. The Classification of the Siddhas

In Indian tradition we generally classify Siddhas into Nātha Siddhas, Rasa Siddhas, Maheśvara Siddhas and Saṅgata Siddhas. The Rasa Siddhas are medicine men while the Saṅgata Siddhas are the Buddhist Siddhas. The *Haṭha-Yoga Pradīpika*, a classical text on *hatha yoga*, contains a list of Maha-Siddhas beginning with Ādinātha.[14] Ādinātha is the mystical name for Śiva. The Siddhas belonging to the school of Ādinātha are called Nātha Siddhas. They are known as *kan-phaṭṭa*, because they have to pierce the cartileges of their ears and pass a heavy ring, known as *darśana*, around which by its weight cut longish slits up to their ear lobes. Gautama Buddha was having this mark on him. The Nātha Siddhas originated in North India. The Siddhas from the South are known as Maheśwara Siddhas who advocate the pure method, the *suddha mārga* of *tantra*. In India, *tantrism* has developed along two main lines—the *vāma* (left) and the *dakṣiṇa* (right). The *vāma śrota*, left current, sticks to the earlier traditions of *tantra*, which are more involved in mystic rites and rituals, in the five "M"s which include blood sacrifices, drinking and female consorts. The *dakṣiṇa śrota*, the right current, stressed on *vidya* (knowledge) through *yogic* practices. Hence it is called the pure way, the *suddha mārga*. The Tamil Siddhas belong to the *dakṣiṇa śrota*.

In Tamilnadu the Siddhas are classified in different ways. According to one classification Siddhas belong to *Bāla varga*, *Mūla varga* and *Kailāsa varga*. We find references in Tirumūlar, Bōgar and Kambaḷi-c-cattaimuni that they belong to the *kailaya* tradition and the latter gives a list of the Siddhas of the *kailaya parampara*. For *Bāla varga* Lord Muruga is the first Siddha and *guru*. *Siddhisena* is an epithet of Lord Muruga. Ascending the mountain to reach Lord Muruga is a symbolism for arousing the *kundalini* and its culmination in *sahasrāra*. The six *ādhāras* are considered to be the six mountains in Tamil Siddha literature and the six faces of Lord

Muruga stand for them. For *Mūla varga,* Tirumūlar is the *guru. Tirumulam* is another name for *mūlādhāra.* Agasthya is the *guru* for *Kailāsa varga.*

1.3. The Number of Siddhas

There is no agreed view as to the exact number of Siddhas. Buddhism speaks of eighty-four Siddhas.[15] The Nātha Siddhas are said to be nine in number.[16] In Tamilnadu, however tradition speaks of the eighteen Siddhas, called "Padineṇ Siddhargal." Each of these schools gives different lists of names and they seldom agree in respect of the names of the Siddhas.[17] The number "eighteen" current in the South, especially Tamilnadu, is considered to be mystical rather than a historical number. The concept of sacrifice is connected with this number,[18] and "eighteen" appears to be the symbolic equivalent of man as sacrifice. From the point of view of alchemy eighteen is an important number. In *Rāsesvara Darśana* eighteen modes of elaboration of mercury or eighteen modes of treating quick silver are discussed.[19] There is another view that the number "eighteen" may also refer to the "eighteen" worlds of ordinary human beings—the six sense organs, the objects of the six sense organs and the six forms of consciousness of eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind. The Siddhas are those who have gone beyond, transcended these eighteen worlds of ordinary men. Hence they are referred to as "eighteen Siddhas," i.e., people who have conquered the "eighteen worlds." In Siddha medicine, number "eighteen" has a special place. Maccamuni says that there are eighteen important herbs.[20] In *kuṇḍalinī yoga* "eighteen" is a significant number; *kuṇḍalinī* after reaching *sahasrāra* has to cross further through eighteen *mahāvidyas,* that is, eighteen energized subtle centres encircling the *sahasrāra* region, finally to unite with Śiva, in an act known as *maithuna yoga.*[21] In *Saṭṭaimuni Jñānam* the Siddha refers to the "eighteen" letters that are part and parcel of *vālai,* i.e., the *kuṇḍalinī śakti.*[22] All these internal evidences from Siddha *yoga* and medicine have been taken to show that "eighteen" in the "eighteen Tamil Siddhas" does not refer to the number of Siddhas (because Siddhas are innumerable) but to the attainments of a Siddha. It seems to the author that the number "eighteen" refers to the eighteen *siddhis.* The Siddhas are those who have attained the eighteen *siddhis.*[23] In short, the numeral "eighteen" is a holy number among the Tamil Siddhas. There is a verse which says that Siddhas know eighteen languages.[24] Here language means *siddhi.*

1.4. The Language of the Siddhas

The views of the Tamil Siddhas are couched in poetic form and belong to a sphere between philosophy and poetry. The basic source of the Tamil Siddha poetry and philosophy is in the spoken language of the people. What we have as Siddha poetry today has been handed over from generation to generation in the form of "oral transmission." In Tamil literature such an oral transmission is called *vāymoḻi* or *eḻudākkiḻavi.* To facilitate oral transmission the Tamil Siddhas used only the common words spoken by ordinary people—unpolished, crude, offensive, indecent and colloquial expressions. This use of the common speech of the people produces a powerful effect whenever we read Siddha poetry, even though there is no trace of conscious poetic calculation in the songs of the Tamil Siddhas. Although the Siddha poems are in the common language of the people, the meaning of the poems operates at two levels: one the exoteric and the linguistic and the other esoteric and the symbolical. The esoteric meaning is explained only to and understood only by the tested and the worthy. This paradox of language is the special difficulty, which a researcher meets in understanding and deciphering the Siddha thought. Due to a lack of systematic and coordinated study, some of the writers, after a superficial reading, have highlighted the overtly negative features of the Siddha poems. This is a highly one- sided interpretation. People have fallen a prey to this one-sidedness, which is always an evil due to misrepresentations and misreadings of Siddha poetry by vested interests. *Patañjaliyār Sūttiram-50* regrets that without going deep into the verses, people have interpreted the Siddha poems according to their own imagination.[25] The symbolic and secret language used by the Siddhas, called *sūnya sambāṣanai,* has been one of the causes of deep mistrust of their doctrines by the other classical systems of philosophy and religions in India.

The language of Tamil Siddhas is suggestive and paradoxical. It is called *sandhyā bhāṣa* or twilight language, which literally means that the ideas may be explained either by the light of day or by the darkness of night. It is also known as *sūnya sambhāṣanai* or the conversation about the void. *Sandhyā bhāṣa* has been variously translated as "enigmatic language," "hidden sayings," and "intentional language." This mystical language of the Tamil Siddhas is characterized by deceptive simplicity. The *Jñānabōdhakam* speaks of the dual meaning of the language of the Tamil Siddhas as "the treachery of the Siddhas." It calls that language as a "merciless language" since in it the Siddhas conceive one thing and express another. It warns people not to take the language of the Siddhas at its face value. The essential characteristic feature of the language is its polysemantic nature, its multivalence, and its capacity to express at the same time a number of meanings both at the level of ordinary experience and at the level of transcendence. The suggestive, epigrammatic and enigmatic nature of the language itself is mystical in nature, where the highest is clothed in the form of the lowest. The paradoxical expressions and their explanations are accessible only to the initiated. Probably the Siddha poems themselves function as an initiation. Most of the Tamil Siddha songs are written in veiled language, *paribhāṣa*. It is a secret language in which the numerals, ordinary words and symbols are deprived of any immediate, naturalistic meaning and endorsed with a much wider and spiritually richer, inner, mystical significance. The use of numerals to denote mystical experiences is a favorite device of the Tamil Siddhas and an authentic pattern of Tirumūlar, a Tamil Siddha *par excellence*. Alphabet symbolism is also a common technique that we find in Tamil Siddha poetry. We can safely say that the monosyllables that we find in Tamil Siddha poetry are no longer gibberish. They have a meaning and a message. The symbolic, twilight language of the Tamil Siddhas has the advantage of precision, concentration, secrecy, mystery and esoteric significance in that the symbols are objective shortcuts to the subjective states of bliss. The symbols, at the hands of the Siddhas, become a form of artistic expression of the inexpressible. The use of the symbolic language is not merely a protection against profaning the sacred by the ignorant, but also suggests that language, however enriched, is incapable of expressing the highest experience of the spirit. Indeed, language is but a broken lamp. In Sufi terminology, any attempt to convey the inner meaning of one's spiritual experiences in conventional language is like "sending a kiss to the beloved by a messenger." In short, the twilight language of the

Siddhas is, in essence, profoundly mystical in nature and contains a "numinous aura" and "existential revelations for the man who deciphers their message." The essential difficulty is that to understand the twilight language requires a total hermeneutic of reading, an awareness, in fact, of the total religious and philosophical structures, which infuse into it. It also requires one to enter deep states of meditation wherein the verse serves as a key, which reveals a higher meaning to the initiate.

1.5. The Siddhis

According to the Tamil Lexicon "*siddhi*" means "realization," "success," "attainment," "final liberation."[26] In the *Tēvāram* "*siddhi*" means "success" in attaining God.[27] *Siddhi* amounts to an actual surpassing of the human condition and may be likened to an "ontological mutation." In the words of Mircea Eliade, by attaining *siddhi*, "one is trying to break down the structures of the "profane" sensibility" to make way for extra sensory perception as well as an unbelievable control over the body.[28] A *siddhi*, in short, is an effort directed to the "death of the profane man" and a state of consciousness cosmic in structure. Traditionally *siddhis* are eight in number known as *aṣṭa siddhi*. They are:

(i) *anima*, the ability to become as minute as an atom;
(ii) *mahima*, the ability to expand infinitely;
(iii) *laghima*, levitation or the ability to float through the air;
(iv) *garima*, the ability to reach everywhere;
(v) *prākāmya*, freedom of will, or the ability to overcome natural obstacles;
(vi) *iśitva*, the ability to create or control;
(vii) *vasitva*, domination over the entire creation; and
(viii) *kāmavasāyitva*, the gift of wish-fulfilment or the ability of attaining everything desired or to attain the stage of desirelessness.

The Hindu thought generally recognizes eight *siddhis*, though occasionally eighteen and twenty-four *siddhis* are also acknowledged. The *Tirumantiram* speaks of sixty-four *siddhis*.[29] In *Jñānaveṭṭiyān-1500* and in *Agasthiyar Jñānakāviyam-1000* mention is made of sixty-four *siddhis*. Verse 337 of *Bogar Karpam 300* speaks of eighty-four *siddhis*. In Tamil literature a list of the *siddhis* is to be found in Parañjoti's

Tiruviḷaiyāḍal Purāṇam[30], in Tāyumānavar's *Tejomayānandam,*[31] and in *Siddharganam,*[32] in Pāmbāṭṭi-c-cittar's songs,[33] in Saint Rāmaliṅgam's the *Tiruvaruṭpā*[34] and Tirumūlar's the *Tirumantiram.*[35] It is said that one who has attainted *siddhi* "can hear the grass as it grows." Pāmbāṭṭi-c-cittar and Tāyumānavar have sung about the unlimited capabilities of the *Siddhas.* It is unfortunate that *siddhis* have always been considered more a hindrance to spiritual development than as *yogic* attainments. Saint Rāmaliṅgam, who has discussed the *siddhis* in detail, refers to the attainment of *siddhis* as "*piccu*" or "childish play" (*Piḷḷai-viḷayāṭṭu*). Paṭṭinattār calls *siddhi* as "bitter sugarcane" (*kacakkum karumbu*) to indicate its dual nature. The desire for attracting popular notice through a display of *siddhis* shows immaturity. As Pāmbāṭṭi-c-cittar says "those who have attained self-realization will not exhibit it and those who have not attained self-realization are those who exhibit it."[36] But to the true Siddha, who is a genuine *kuṇḍalinīyogin,* these *siddhis* are of immense value, for they indicate that he is in the process of deconditioning himself from the laws of nature and from *kārmic* determinism forever and breaking down the structures of the profane sensibility. *Siddhi* expresses the quality of mystic experience attained by the Siddha. The real *siddhi* consists in inner conversion, an inner world of oneness, an entering into the stream of liberation. What is prohibited is not the attainment of the *siddhis* but their exhibition to others.

1.6. The Siddhas—Tantra-Yoga and Alchemy

The Tamil Siddhas practised *Tantra Yoga.* There has been a strong prejudice against *Tantra Yoga,* the method adopted by the Tamil Siddhas. Further the doors of *Tantric Yoga* have ever been open to all classes of people, and some of the Siddhas are from the lower strata of society. This led people to hold the view that *Tantras* were meant for the degenerate and the fallen and it was considered to be in vogue among the low class people. To add to all these, the science of healing, to which a number of Tamil Siddhas are devoted, was relegated to the class of *avidya* or false knowledge. What is the need of medicine when disease is caused by the *karma* of the past life? According to the *karma* theory there is a *kārmic* connection between the act done intentionally and its consequent result of suffering from a disease. A human being will suffer from diseases if he does any or many of the following acts. Plucking the tender leaves and cutting the plants without any purpose; taking the living beings out of water and putting them on earth under the sun, disturbing the mobile and crawling creatures out of their normal way of movement, hitting the birds by stones and catapults, having intercourse with a person older than oneself and also with a lady during her period of menstruation, excessive drinking of toddy, taking food at irregular periods, during day or night, excessive indulgence in all things, insulting and showing disrespect to *yogins* and elders, walking alone in the mid of night and doubting one's own *ātmaśakti* (the power of one's own self) and the like, all these will lead one to suffer from fever, malaria, giddiness, piles, arthritis, leprosy, diabetes, asthma, ulcer, anemia, jaundice, typhoid, kidney failure, etc. The more heinous acts of *karma* we do, more and more varieties of diseases will be added on to this list.[37] Therefore one has to suffer these diseases and there is no point in treating the diseases by using medicines. Medicines can neither prevent nor cure diseases caused by *karma*. This was the argument put forward by the upholders of Vedic knowledge.

In Tamilnadu the Siddhas are identified with the alchemists. The traditional science of alchemy is considered to work not only on the matter under transmutation, but also on the soul. The Tamil Siddhas considered *yogic sādhana* as a sort of internal spiritual alchemy. Very often people confuse the analogy between the Siddha and the alchemist who is treated as a miracle man or a magician who turns base metals into gold. In Tamil language since the alchemist turns brass (*pittaḷai*) into gold (*aḍagam*), he is called *Pittalāṭṭa-k-kāran* (a man who turns brass into gold). This word also means a trickster in Tamil. Unfortunately as the Siddha is compared to an alchemist, he got the unsavoury epithet that he is a trickster not to be depended upon, i.e., a *pittalaṭṭa-k-kāran*. Alchemy is not to be looked up on as merely eulogistic of the metal gold. It stands for the conservation of the body, a means to the highest liberation. If we analyze further we shall understand the analogy between the alchemist and the Siddha. Just as the alchemist works on base metals and turns them into gold, the Siddha transmutes his psycho-physical life into a free autonomous spirit. In India gold symbolizes immortality. Viewed in the above sense, every Siddha is a spiritual alchemist *par excellence* and his *sādhana* is *kāyasādhana*, that is, cultivation of the body or transformation of the body into immortal essence. The *yogins* call their technique *sadhana* which is a sort of internal spiritual alchemy. Sometimes for the Tamil Siddhas, alchemy was merely an outer cover, husk or seal for something far more profound. It was a code for protection against unwary intruders.

1.7. The Biography of the Siddhas

It is very difficult to give a trustworthy biographical account of the Tamil Siddhas as very little about their lives is known or recorded in history. A verse from the sage Agastya says that most of the Siddha works were lost in the floods *(praḷaya)* and what we have now as Siddha poetry is only a small collection of verses which have been washed ashore and preserved.[38] Based on this verse there is a view that what is being circulated today as Tamil Siddha poetry is only a distortion of the original Siddha poems written by some ordinary human beings.[39] If this is the case, then, one must exercise great caution in accepting the historical or biographical information provided by the anthologists and other writers on the Tamil Siddhas. The biographical information provided by the various writers is a mixture of life-stories based on tradition, local folklore, mythology and sentimental accounts. All these life sketches are purely legendary. There is no historic proof for such legends; yet one can not reject them outright, since there must be some basic truth in them, to which additions were made by later generations. Hence it is not possible to say anything definite about the life, date, i.e., the biography of the siddhas. To trace the life history of the siddhas is as difficult as tracing the path of birds in the sky. Just as boats do not leave any mark on the seas or rivers where they sail, the siddhas have not left any autobiographical details in their poems. We may assign two reasons for this attitude of the Tamil Siddhas; one, as Mircea Eliade has said: "India is preoccupied with Being; and history, created by becoming, is just one of the forms of non-being."[40] In Karuvūrār, a Tamil Siddha and a disciple of Bōgar, we get another reason for this. According to him a Siddha is an adept in leaving his body at pleasure and entering into another body.[41] Since this device is adopted by the Siddhas, it is very difficult to identify "who is who," let alone give a biographical account of them.

According to tradition each Siddha gets five different names, the first one given by the parents and the remaining four are appellations for the stages in the spiritual progress attained by the person concerned. Among these four names is the name given by the *guru* (the spiritual teacher) at the time he initiated the disciple. Most of the works on Tamil Siddhas refer to sage Agastya as a preceptor of the Tamil Siddha doctrine. In Tamil literature and philosophy there are references not to one but to several Agastyas.[42] Agastya is also called by different names as Kumbamuni, Kalasamuni, Kuḍamuni, etc. Similarly there are more than one Paṭṭinattār mentioned in Tamil literature. The recurrence of the same name goes to show that most of the names of the Tamil Siddhas are acquired ones. Once Siddhahood is attained, the saint acquires a new name to show that he is "born" into a "new experience"' and hence has to shed his old name with all its associations and acquire a new name befitting the spiritual level that he has attained. One may safely say that most of the names of the Tamil Siddhas are not historical names, but only of certain abstract *yogic* principles and are acquired ones. Many names of the Tamil Siddhas are symbolic. They are not family names but names bestowed on a saint when he reaches certain stages of spiritual perfection. These names refer to some transcendental states of consciousness attainable through the practice of *kuṇḍalinī yoga*; they are the spiritual appellations given to persons who have attained certain *yogic* adeptness. The name Agattiyar (The Tamil version of Agastya) means one who has kindled the inner fire in him; (*agam* = inner; *tī* = fire); that is, one who has roused the fire of *kuṇḍalinī* in him. One who has conquered sex and anger is called Gorakṣa. "*Matsya*" means fish. In *tantra* it stands for senses. Matsyendranāth means "one who has mastery over the senses" (*indriyas*) and stands for one who tears the fetters of bondage. In the same manner one may construe the name Paṭṭinattār as "*Paṭṭi*" plus "*nāthar*," that is, a man who can save the souls. "*Paṭṭi*" in Tamil means " the pound for herding the cattle;" it may also mean, "herding of souls," souls wallowing in darkness. Paṭṭinattār is one who helps and guides these souls by providing a method for getting out of the "pound of the world and the senses" and get liberated. Pāmbāṭṭi-c-cittar is a name of one Siddha. "*Pāmbu*" in Tamil means snake. Snakes are emblems of eternity and the snake skin is supposed to procure invisibility. In the words of Vogel: "The practice of casting its skin suggested longevity or even immortality in the snake."[43] The sloughing indicates the freeing of oneself from evil and liberation from mundane existence. The term "snake" refers to the coiled *kuṇḍalinī*. A Siddha who has perfected *kuṇḍalinī yoga* and attained immortality is a "*Pāmbāṭṭi*." There is another Tamil Siddha by name "*Kudambai*." "*Kudambai*" in Tamil means earring, and *kuṇḍalinī* is coiled like an earring and Kudambai-c-cittar stands for a *kundalini yogin*. "*Kudambai*" stands exactly for what is meant by *kan-phata*, piercing of the cartileges of the ear. This term is a *pan-tantric* Indian term referring to the Siddhas. A Siddha who takes the nectar *(amṛta)* secreted at the *sahasrāra*, which is a *kamala* (lotus) is a Kamala Siddha. The term "*iḍai-k-kāḍu*" in Tamil refers to the space between the eyebrows. A Siddha who has gone through the middle of the brows *(bhrūmadhyaka)*, and who unites his soul with the cosmic soul is Iḍai-k-kāṭṭu-c-cittar. A Siddha who has controlled the wavering mind referred to as "*agappēy*" in Tamil (i.e., the internal ghost), is Agā-p-pēy-c-cittar. In Greek, the term "*agappe*" stands for pure spiritual love. There is a Siddha with the name Kambaḷi-c-caṭṭaimuni. Probably he acquired the name because he was wearing a woollen upper garment. There can be little doubt that woollen dress was associated with spirituality in India. Bōgar calls Kambaḷi-c-caṭṭaimuni as a *bear Siddha (Karaḍi-c-cittar* in Tamil).[44] The name Bōgar means "one who is enjoying"' that is, one who is enjoying the bliss of immortality. The name Śivavākkiyar is an acquired one and not his original name. Probably he has got this name because he has used "Śivāyam" in more than sixty places in his work. The above discussion shows that it is very difficult to have an authentic account of the lives of the Tamil Siddhas. Yet one finds certain account of the biographies of the Tamil Siddhas with various details in some works.

The main difficulty in interpreting the Siddha philosophy is that it is an open system. By "open system" is meant that the questions raised by the Siddhas cannot be put into an "either-or" pattern and their answers cannot be reduced to any one view. As *Dhammapada* speaks of the *arhat* we can say of the Siddha that his track is as difficult to know as that of birds in the sky.[45] It is not restricted to a particular group of people; all shades of humanity can participate freely in the Siddha philosophy.

1.8. The Concept of Guru

A general discussion of the philosophy of the Tamil Siddhas will be incomplete without mentioning their concept of *guru*. The place of the initiator, *guru*, is an important aspect in the method of Siddhas. According to them *kuṇḍalinī yoga* and other esoteric things must be learned from the master-teachers, *gurus*, only and almost all the Siddhas refer to their tradition of *gurus (parampara)*. The *guru* is the primary threshold or the first step in the ascent of the staircase to liberation. There is a proverb in Tamil which says that a man who does not have a *guru* does not know the path (or root) of knowledge (*guruvaṟyān karuvaṟiyān*). The Siddhas are actually the worshippers of their *guru*. This fact distinguishes the followers of the *tantric* faith from the followers of the *Vedic* faith who are called *devabhaju* or the worshippers of the *devas*. To the Siddhas of Tamilnadu the *guru* is invisible to the physical eye. Sometimes the *guru-parampara* (the lineage of the previous *gurus*) itself stands for the *guru*; that is, the *guru* need not necessarily be a living human being. The *guru* helps the pupil to look and examine, to think and meditate and to practice and realize. The *guru*, according to the Tamil Siddha tradition, is not a bundle of theories; he is an authority who has lived his thoughts. He is not a mere fount, a wise man, but the drink itself, the man who "knows"—one who has experienced freedom. Tamil Siddha culture is based on *dīksa* or initiation. A better translation of *dīksa* is "empowerment," because in it the teacher carries the pupil in himself, as it were, as the mother bears the embryo in her body and "empowers" the disciple with all his *jñāna* energy. Empowerment effects a spiritual rebirth; it means for the individual a total transformation. It is no wonder that Socrates claims that his mission is that of a midwife; for he "delivers" a "new" man and "aids" in the birth of him who "knows."

In *tantric* literature there are two processes of initiation called *madhura pāka* and *haṭha pāka* (also called *māntri* and *sāmbhavi*, respectively). *Madhura pāka* is the usual ritualistic, outer process of initiation; it is a process of elimination of irrelevant elements from one's inner being by a graduated and slow course of regular practices on the basis of the teachings of the *guru*. *Haṭha pāka* is three-fold: *Sparśi*, based upon touch, which tends the disciple in a manner of a bird nourishing its young ones within the warm folds of its wings; *cakṣuśi*, based upon sight, acts like the fish which bring up their offspring by means of sight alone; *mānaśi,* mental, which builds like the tortoise feeding its infant, by only thinking of it. All these three types are referred to by Gaṇapatidāsar.[46] Tāyumānavar goes a step froward and suggests that the mere presence of the *guru* or a sage is enough to initiate a man for liberation. He compares the *guru* to a ripe plantain fruit in the midst of the cluster of plantain fruits. The very contiguity of the ripe plaintain fruit changes the unripe ones in to ripe fruits.[47] As *Kulārṇava Tantra* says: "The form of the *guru* is the root of *dhyāna,* the lotus-feet of the *guru* is the root of *pūja,* the word of the *guru* is the root of the *mantra* and the grace of the *guru* is the root of the *siddhi.*"[48]

2. THE UNIQUE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE TAMIL SIDDHAS

In this section, I want to highlight the mystic contributions of the Tamil Siddhas with special reference to certain concepts used by them such as "corugi-k-kiḍakkum tuṟai," "tani-k-kumari," "veṭṭaveḷi," "sūnya," "cummā," "cōmbar," etc.

According to Tirumūlar, the mystical state is one where the self is free from any religious identification.[49] That is, the mystical experience cannot be identified with any one particular religious experience. To be in a mystical state of freedom, the self must be an absolute affirmation without any identification. Such a state of liberation is called *yoga samādhi* by Tirumūlar.[50] This state is also called as "a state of deep inner nature" or "*corugi-k-kiḍakkum tuṟai*" [51], which means, "penetrating field," a deep state of consciousness," "a penetration of the self into itself." It means that Siddha mysticism is soul mysticism, a quest of the self and not a quest of God. Hence there is no place for the God of religion, its idols, rituals, pilgrimages, sacred places, tanks, rivers etc in the philosophy of the Siddhas. As Bhadragiriyār says, this intuitive union of the self is "knowledge which knows knowledge through knowing knowledge.[52] According to the Tamil Siddhas true liberation can be obtained by *jñāna* only and not by *bhakti.* The Tamil Siddhas feel that rigid theism has been responsible for a good deal of unnecessary controversy and hostility among the followers of different religions.[53]

2.1. Siddha views on liberation – veṭṭaveḷi, cumma, beyond the beyond, kaivalya

According to Śivavākkiyar liberation is self-realization. In self-realization, "there is no distinction between I and Thou, nor is there anything in between; there are no blemishes (of mind, speech and body); there is no teacher and taught; nothing is created nor destroyed; nothing is born."[54] Explaining this state, Saint Rāmaliṅgam says that it is a state which has become blissfully one, two and a state which is neither one nor two (that is a state in between one and two, as the state of one-in-one and two-in-one).[55] This is a state of *samādhi* where, according to Tirumūlar, there is no distinction between "I" and "you."[56] It is a state of spiritual impersonality where the sense of otherness disappears. Paṭṭinattār says that he has become an "individual," the moment he realized his self.[57] He uses the term "*tanik-k-umari,*" which may be translated as individuality, which means freedom from personality. We are that Individuality with a capital 'I,' but we do not know that we are. Paṭṭinattār's lament is significant. "We are inside the river, but yet we are in search of the bathing ghat to go to the river.[58]

2.1.1. Veṭṭaveḷi

In Tamil Siddha literature liberation is referred to as *veṭṭaveḷi.* On the plane of spiritual activity *vettaveli* is the space of consciousness. It is transcendental awareness; it is the awareness of Being itself. It is cosmic consciousness, which is multi dimensional. Paṭṭinattār calls this infinite awareness as "the *veḷi* which is free from the five avasthas."[59] Bhadragiriyār also refers to *veṭṭaveḷi* as a "place" where all the thirty-six principles (*tattvas*) have no place.[60] It is a "place" where the thoughts drop off, one by one, until our consciousness exists merely as an empty expanse. It indicates that Reality is unlimited and cannot be localized. This is the reason for the Tamil Siddhas to say that God, i.e., Reality cannot be confined to local temples. *Veṭṭaveḷi* also stands for freedom from time; for existing in time is pain. It is referred to by many Tamil Siddhas as a "place" where there is neither night nor day.[61] In that vast realm of *veṭṭaveḷi,* which is always an instant eternity, which is time rediscovered, the small pronouns "I," "mine" and "thine" become meaningless. It is "isness" everywhere. It is an "eternal now." Nothing has to come; it is "now." Now is eternity; it is the immortal life. This sense of timelessness or emergence from time which is one of the characteristic features of Siddha mysticism constitutes the meaning of *veṭṭaveḷi*.

Veṭṭaveḷi is an empty expanse called *sūnya* by a few Tamil Siddhas. The Tamil word for *sūnya* is "*pāḻ*". *Sūnya* is not emptiness; it refers to unsubstantiality. It means absence of things; it is not thinghood with attributes and qualifications. It is an open dimension not bound by concepts and percepts; it is non-operational. It implies the vastness of mystical experience which has passed beyond the disturbance of thought. When the self is emptied of all content what is left is the empty self itself. In the beginning it will feel like emptiness because the ego disappears, the mind disappears, thinking disappears. All the constitutes of the ego disappear by and by. It is like taking the furniture out of the room by and by, and the room becomes empty. But simultaneously the room is becoming more roomful as one removes a chair. That chair was occupying a certain room-now the room is free. With the going out of furniture, the room is becoming more roomful. Once everything is removed and only roominess is there, emptiness, there comes a transformation. Suddenly one sees that room is not empty, it is only full of room. By emptying one's ego, one is becoming more and more roomy, free, blissful. Thus the void or *sūnya* is actually a plenum of bliss. The experience of *sūnya* brings a sense of independence, a sense of freedom from all determinants. This is the paradox of the term "*sūnya*," although it connotes negations, a mere absence, yet it also means positive experience; that is, it is consciousness, not a consciousness of any particular existence nor consciousness of any idea, but it is "experiencing truth." *Sūnya* is not a theory advocated by the Tamil Siddhas; rather it is the end of all theories about reality. It is referred to by Tirumular as *yoga-nirvāṇa* or *jñāna-nirvāṇa*.[62] The term "*nirvāṇa*" is significant because to call that state as existence or non-existence or even a state of bliss would impose a limitation. *Nirvāṇa* stands for the fact that even denials must be left behind as incapable of expressing the mystic experience. The negation of the conceptual realm means negating and transcending even the concept of negation. Negations are themselves negated in the state of *Nirvāṇa*, not in order to yield a logical affirmation but in order to pass beyond every denial, beyond every assertion.

Thus the term "*veṭṭaveḷi*" has a very special meaning in Tamil siddha literature. It stands for the indescribability of the mystic experience. Bhadragiriyār says that just as a dumb man who has had a nice dream is not in a position to describe the joy of it, the joy of mystic experience is an indescribable one.[63] Tirumūlar likens mystical experience to what he calls *anubhōga kāmam*, that is, the experiencing of the pleasure of love.[64] He also says that just as a mother cannot explain or express to her son her enjoyment with his father, similarly mystical experience cannot be explained or expressed in words.[65] The nature of mystical experience can be understood only by self-experience and Tirumūlar has gone to the extent of saying that the experience cannot be understood even by artists who always have a deeper insight into things.[66] Śivavākkiyar uses two rare expressions, one, "that which has no grammar" and another "that which has gone beyond the pure Tamil word," to refer to the indescribable nature of the mystic experiences.[67] We come across several such rare expressions in Tamil Siddha poetry. When something is indescribable one has to remain silent. The term "*veṭṭaveḷi*" as an expression for mystic experience gradually led to convey the meaning of silence.

2.1.2. *Cumma*

The concept "*cumma*" in Tamil Siddha literature refers to the mystical silence. It stands for the hidden silence, the mystic quiet and the mystical stillness. Tirumūlar and Iḍai-k-kāṭṭu-c-cittar say that there is liberation in the state of silence.[68] In Tamil Siddha philosophy silence, called *cumma*, is a mystical metaphor often used for distinctionlessness. It is the negation of reason whose function is to distinguish and define. It is a state of total disappearence of all distinctions. *Cumma* is the silent language of the heart. It is a state of consent, of being one with the Reality. It is the absolutely motionless state of the mind where all stimuli are lost.[69] It is the "silent listening" of the undeniable, where everything is "fresh", free from the travails of the mind or ego. As the Tamil Siddhas say it is a state of "sleepless sleep," which means the stilling of the mind.[70] It is a paradoxical statement like "a swimmer who remains dry." It is a state of restful alertness or operative rest or conscious sleep or what the Tamil Siddhas call *aṟituyil* or *yoga nittirai*. *Cumma* is a state of choiceless awareness, to use J. Krishnamurthi's expression. It is a state of actionless action, an imageless vision. Tirumular calls it as a state of knowing while sleeping.[71] An interesting feature of ordinary sleep is that one is aware of not being in that state when one is not asleep but not aware of being in it when one is asleep. The "sleep" in "sleepless sleep" refers to the state where the senses are asleep and where the consciousness is alert. There is only awareness, without any distinction of material, mental or even spiritual consciousness, an egoless awareness, without any "otherness" in it. The "silence" of the Siddhas stands for the unspeakable level of Reality—the non-verbal, the non-symbolic and the wholly indefinable one. *Cumma* is utterly irreconcilable with all the ordinary rules of human thinking and language and it is a state free from logical understanding or explanation. It is blessedness which fascinates. It is a state of imageless awareness. As Tirumūlar says "*cumma*" stands for "speechless liberation."[72] Since it is a state of completeness or wholeness, there is no scope for any action. The Tamil Siddhas call this state "*combar*," and hence they are called "*combargaḷ*". It is not a state of idleness, but a state of Siddhahood which is the occupation of all occupations. The state of "*combar*," which is the state of *samādhi*, is the state of actionless action.

2.1.3. Beyond the Beyond

The Tamil Siddhas prefer to express the state of silence as a state of "beyond the beyond".[73] This expression means that the Ultimate Reality is beyond the three thresholds of man, the threshold of world, the threshold of time and the threshold of his limiting consciousness. It is beyond the contrast of subject and object, knower and known. It stands for inexpressibility which is a feature of genuine mystical experience. Even the terms of greatest exaltation cannot embrace an account of its nature. In Tamil Siddha literature we find that there is a kind of tension when the *yogins* try to speak about the Reality as inexpressible and translinguistic and at the same time try to describe it in such language as "beyond the beyond." There is a vicious circle in that when we try to communicate what is incommunicable we must somehow put it into words. This paradox of mystical experience has been referred to by Tirumūlar as expressing in language the one which is really inexpressible.[74] The term "beyond the beyond" also suggests the nature of reality as understood by the Tamil Siddhas. It means wider than relations. Reality is not relational. It includes all relations but it is not exhausted by any one of them or their sum total. It is beyond all these relations. Whereas "you" and "I" as persons have sets of relations, Reality does not have such a set. In this sense, Reality is an "alogical whole," not determined by any set of relations even though all sets of relations are contained in it. This is the paradox of mystic experience which is one of its universal characteristics. If Reality is beyond relations, it must be a state of "not twoness," i.e., it must be one; but it is not the one of many. That is, this one must be interpreted non-dualistically and Siddhas call it Śiva or Absolute, outside which there is nothing. If the Absolute is one and beyond all relations, it cannot be the God of religions, for it implies a relation between the worshipper and the worshipped. This relation creates a rupture in the oneness of God. This is what Tirumūlar says: there is no "particular" God[75] and those who speak of this one God as Śiva, Viṣṇu and Brahma are prattling.[76] That is, Siddha mysticism (in which there is no conception of personal God) is an experience where God's existence itself is a matter of indifference. God is the one institution that can never be grasped in a particular religious concept, though it is always being defined differently by many religions, It is never being fully or finally defined or grasped by the religions.

2.1.4. Kaivalya

Liberation is a flight of the alone to the Alone. To use the expression of Tirumūlar It is a "Great Aloneness" which means non-duality or secondlessness or *dvaita rahita.*[77] This is the meaning of the term "*kaivalya*" that we find in Siddha literature. It is the deepest consciousness which constitutes the highest state of man. Śivavākkiyar calls it as "*Ambalam*" or "*Param.*"[78] In the state of *kaivalya* or Absolute Bliss, where the *jiva* is equal to Śiva, where the *ātman* is equal to Brahman, it is not as if something different is seen, but only one sees differently. In Siddha mysticism a completely new point of view has been found. According to this new point of view, the world is not lost or treated as *tucca* or as illusory, but is given a new significance in its totality. That is, the non-dualism of the Tamil Siddhas is not a negation of manifestation, but the fullness of manifestation. Vālmīgar, a Tamil Siddha, says that one who sees the entire universe as Śiva is a Siddha[79]. This is pantheism which has its roots in Siddha mysticism. We may call the philosophy of the Tamil Siddhas "Siddha Advaita" which contains a pantheistic paradox, according to which the Absolute reveals itself not only as the Absolute or *Ātman,* but also as the world. Or to express it in the words of Zaehner, it would be more appropriate to call Siddha mysticism as pan-en-henism, or "all-in-one-ism" instead of pantheism, since it is an experience of Reality in all things or of all things as being one with Reality.[80] In "*Siddha Advaita*" the *mahāvākya* "*Tat Tvam Asi*" "That Thou Art," is an expression of the macro-micro unity.

All the Tamil Siddhas refer to the mystical *mantra ci, va, ya, na, ma.* The sacred five letters are called *pañcākṣara.* This form of the *mantra* is a *mahāvākya.* "Śiva" stands for "*Tat,*" "*nama*" stands for "*Tvam*" and "*aya*" stands for "*Asi.*" Hence *Śivayanama* means *Tat Tvam Asi.* Tirumūlar speaks of the mystical state as a state of enjoying the fruit called *Namaśivaya.*[81] To sum up so far: The metaphorical expressions to describe the mystic experience of the Tamil Siddhas, such as, *veṭṭaveḷi, sūnya, cumma, cōmbar,* beyond the beyond, *kaivalya, param, samādhi*—all refer to getting the mind rid of all images and thoughts and the obliteration of all multiplicity.

2.2. *The Philosophy of the Human Body*

The *mantra* of *Namaśivaya* takes us to the Siddha concept of the human body. A discussion of the philosophy and mysticism of the Siddhas will be incomplete without an attempt to understand their conception of the human body, which is unique and which is not accepted by any system of Indian philosophy. In Tamil Siddha philosophy the human body has acquired an importance it had never before attained in the spiritual history of India. All the orthodox systems suspected the Siddhas because they advocated the theory that one can attain freedom or *mokṣa* with the body. According to the Tamil Siddhas the aim of *yoga sādhana* is *kāyasiddhi* or the perfection of the body. It is an unacknowledged postulate in Indian tradition. According to the Siddhas, an adept's experimental field is always himself and his body, which contains in itself an immortal essence. The ordinary human body can be and should be transformed into a divine body and must be made an aid to liberation. The Siddha view of body as a *mokṣa sādhana* is known as *kāya sādhana.* In *Tirumantiram* we come across a number of verses praising the importance of the human body as a ladder to *mukti.* In one celebrated verse Tirumūlar calls the human body as the abode of God.[82] In Tamil Siddha literature the temple is an image of both the macrocosm and the microcosm, the cosmic man as well as the inner being of man. The various parts of the structure of the temple are designed as features of the human body.[83]

The Tamil Siddhas understood the human body as a threshold, a passage to the ultimate Reality. Śivavākkiyar is fond of using the expression threshold, i.e., *"vāsal"* in Tamil and he calls the human body as a threshold where God resides. The concept "threshold" is a mystical one and the body is one such mystical threshold, the other threshold being the *guru*. In Siddha literature the threshold is a mystical thing. It is a boundary between two worlds, the ordinary, profane world and the sacred world beyond. It is a point where we pass from one mode of being to another, from one level of consciousness to another. The term *"vāsal"* used by the Tamil Siddhas stand for the moment when we ourselves open up to new depths of our being. They say that one need not go to places of pilgrimage or study *sāstras* when the threshold is in oneself.[84] The idea of the body as a microcosm of Reality received a spiritual, mystical denotation in the Tamil Siddhas as against the purely physical denotation of it in the other traditions. The inter-relations of man's body and the universe (that is Reality) have to be realized by a spiritual endeavour. *Kāya sādhana* is such an endeavour. Another important aspect of the Siddha view of the human body is *nyāsa,* which consists of feeling the God or powers representing the Gods in different parts of the body.

In Siddha literature we come across the following types of bodies—the *sthula-deha*, the *yoga-deha*, the *siddha-deha*, the *praṇava* or *mantra deha* and the *jñāna* or the *divya deha*. Turning the *sthula-deha* into *divya-deha* is *kāya sādhana*. Śivavākkiyar explains the transformation of the physical body into a divine body on the analogy of a worm turning itself into a butterfly.[85] Let us state briefly the various stages involved in *kāya sādhana*. *Sthūla sarīra* is the unripe, ordinary, physical body not disciplined by *yoga*. It is a "deceptive threshold," and one has to "open" it , i.e., go beyond it to achieve *kāya siddhi*. Śivavākkiyar says that people should protect, immortalize and preserve the body through the method of *yoga* just as they would protect a beautiful lady of the house.[86] When the *sthūla sarīra* is disciplined by *yoga* it becomes ripe or *pakva*. Pāmbāṭṭi-c-cittar uses the term "*puḍam*" in Tamil which is the equivalent of "making one ripe" *pakva*.[87] *Agatiyar Pañcacāram-37* speaks about removing the unwanted elements from the body through the process of burning (i.e., *kuṇḍalinī agni*).[88] Once the *deha* is hardened by *yoga*, the internal forces help the *sādhaka* to arouse the *kuṇḍalinī* in him, which passes through the six *ādhāras*. It is a process of the acquirement of *yogic* powers, *siddhis,* leading to a *siddha deha,* where the body can do and be anything at the will of the *sādhaka,* since it does not have to adhere to the spatio-temporal laws or the laws of space and time of the ordinary body. After the attainment of the *siddhis,* the *siddha deha* is turned into a *mantra deha* called *praṇava tanu.* The *praṇava deha* is a body consisting of the sacred formula "*AUM.*" It is the body of *nāda* or sound. This *yogin's* body is accompanied by certain mystic sound vibrations in the form of *mantra* called "*Aum Namasivaya.*" The *yogin's* body at this stage is not different from the *mantra,* that is, the body gets transformed into a sound-form, *mantra*-form. This body is called *praṇava* or *mantra deha.* We find a description of this body, *mantira mēni (mantra deha)* in *Tirumantiram.*[89] The human figure representing the *praṇava deha* is called the *mantiramēni cakkaram* in Tamil Siddha literature. In a Tamil work called *Tirumantiramālai-300* we find a description of how the fifty-one letters of the alphabet constitute the various parts of the body.[90]

According to the Tamil Siddhas the man with the *praṇava deha* is a *jīvan-mukta,* "the man liberated while living". In *Tirumantiram* we find a description of the characteristics of a *jīvan mukta.*[91] In Siddha philosophy there is no *videha-mukti* (post-mortem liberation) but only *jīvan mukti;* for *videha mukti* is, at best, only a hypothesis. A *jīvan mukta* does not possess a personal consciousness, but a witnessing consciousness. Even though he acts in the world, he does not have the sense of "I act." He sees all the usual things in a miraculous new light as he has entered into the heart of reality. The Bauls of Bengal call this state of *jīvan mukta* as *jiyanta-mora,* "being dead while yet alive." We find similar expressions used by many Tamil Siddhas. As a Taoist thinker has said, "The perfect man employs his mind as a mirror. It grasps nothing; it rejects nothing. It receives, but does not keep." In Siddha philosophy a *jīvan mukta* does not die to attain liberation, but is transformed into the very mode of liberation, viz., the *divya deha.* When the *jīvan mukta* gets into *divya deha* he becomes one with Eternity, a *paramukta.* The "either-or" category of logic regarding his existence or non-existence does not arise in the case of a Siddha who has attained the *divya deha. Divya deha* is a situation in which one is participating in immortality from now onward and from this present world; and immortality should not be conceived as a survival, *post mortem.* The attainment of *divya deha* is not *videha mukti.* There are standing examples against *videha mukti*, such as Saint Nandanār, Saint Māṇikkavāsagar, Srī Āṇḍāḷ (merging with the Lord at Srīraṅgam), Srī Caitanya and Srī Rāmaliṅga Swāmigaḷ, who have attained *divya deha*. It is highly interesting and instructive to note the process which the great *yoga* master Srī Kṛṣṇa adopted for transforming his material body into a *divya deha* when he desired to leave the world. He, in concentration, executed a *yoga* process termed "*agneyi-yoga-dharma*," i.e., the process of radiating inner fire, by which he reduced his body to a subtler form, and with that body he left the world. This is mentioned in the *Bhāgavata*.

The *divya deha* is called *cinmaya*, "the body of light." It is a "body" of infinite space, *veṭṭaveḷi*, a vast expanse without any determination.[92] At this stage the "body" glows with the fire of immortality. It is called "the body of light," *oḷi uḍambu* in Tamil. As Tirumūlar says figuratively even the "hairs" of this transmuted body will shine.[93] When a Siddha attains *divya deha*, he attains Śivahood. Hence *divya deha* is referred to as *kailāya deha*.[94] In Siddha mysticism the liberation of the soul is not conceived as a *puruṣārtha*; rather we have the concept of *jīvan mukti* or liberation within the span of life in the form of the attainment of immortality.

Without entering into the details we may say that in Tamil Siddha literature we come across three methods by which the human body can be transmuted into immortality. First, there is the method of alchemic process (containing Siddha medicine) which, instead of being performed in the laboratory, takes place in the body and consciousness of the *sādhaka*. In *Bōgar 700*, we find a reference to the method of preparation of the greatest of medicines –*muppu*— by advocating which, the body will turn into *divya deha*, an immortal golden body.[95] The second is the method of *kuṇḍalinī yoga*, which is the method adopted by all Tamil Siddhas. A third method that is suggested is what is called *ulṭa sādhana* "contrary practice" which states that the sex sentiment properly cultivated may lead man back to the very heart of reality. When sex energy is sublimated and transmuted the *yogin* rises above the sense of identity with the physical body. This state is technically called *ūrdhareta*. *Agastiyar Jñānam*, *Bōgar's poems* and *Tirumantiram* speak of the third process and assure us that there is no death for a man who adopts it perfectly.[96] The way to overcome physical evil is to accept the Siddha doctrine of body. For, in acceptance there is transcendence.

2.3. *The Social Philosophy of the Siddhas*

The *mantra* of the Tamil Siddhas "*Śivāyanama*" is not merely a philosophico-mystical concept, but a social one too. "*Nama*" means *tyaga* or sacrifice and "*Śiva*" means bliss (*ānanda*). "*aya*" means outcome or result. The term "*Śivāyanama*" means, "the result of sacrifice is bliss." The Tamil Siddhas felt the bliss in sacrifice and they construed sacrifice as an opportunity to serve. To them service and work begin with one's own self-realization. That is, the social concern of the Tamil Siddhas has provided them with one more path for the discovery of the Self. The mystic experience of the Tamil Siddhas has given a new meaning to social service. The "*āṟṟuppaḍai*" concept, that we find in Tamil literature, that is, " the concept of directing or showing the path to one and all," irrespective of caste, creed, sex, religion or nationality, has acquired a socio-philosophical meaning at the hands of the Tamil Siddhas. It is a concept emphasizing the vow of helping humanity by one's own enlightenment. Their songs are indicators of the path of self-realization for the seeker after truth. The Siddhas wanted everyone to enjoy what they themselves have enjoyed. They have a loving desire to secure the welfare, happiness and solidarity of all beings. As a Sufi mystic tells his hearers that they are ducks being brought up by hens, they have to realize that their destiny is to swim, not try to be chickens. The same is the attitude of the Tamil Siddhas. In Siddha mysticism humanity and not God is the point of reference. The "*aṟṟuppaḍai*" concept [the method of showing the way] is an expression of the mysticism of the Siddhas in that it is their commitment to humanity to indicate the pathway. This concept of Tamil Siddhas to pass on the torch of spirituality to other men is the highest altruistic action. They sincerely felt that genuine freedom is not in isolation.

This concept, that is, showing the path to people, has two aspects in the philosophy of the Tamil Siddhas—one positive and the other negative. In the negative aspect the Tamil Siddhas emphasize what one shall not do in order to achieve realization. To achieve self-realization, the mystic *anubhava*, the Siddhas exhort people not to take rest in halfway houses like caste, scriptures, rituals, ceremonies, *pūjās*, etc. According to the Siddhas, the cause of the prevalence of delusion in our lives is institutional rather than personal. The method of *kuṇḍalinī yoga*, their ethical precepts, their system of medicine, above all their simple language intended to convey what they wanted to convey, form the positive aspect of the "*aṟṟuppaḍai*" concept. The social concern of the Tamil Siddhas is best exhibited in their system of medicine. In short, the Tamil Siddha does not renounce the world; instead he tries to dedicate himself or herself to its upliftment, while enjoying perfect freedom. This social concern of the Tamil Siddhas nullifies the general view of the Western critic about Indian mystics, that they are not devoted in seeking unselfishly the welfare of others. The Siddha philosophy, with its social attitudes as well as its spirituality, may constitute a new and genuine humanism on a world scale leading all living beings to live in a world of brotherhood as a big universal family.

NOTES

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A. The footnote references contain only the author's name, the title of the work and the page number. The bibliographical details are provided in the bibliography.

B. The references to the Tamil Siddha songs are from the book: Aru. Ramanathan, ed., *Cittar Periya Jñānakkovai Ena Vaḷaṅgum Cittar Pāḍaḷgal,* Two volumes, (Madras: Prema Prasuram, 4th edition, 1984).

C. The references to *Tirumantiram* are from: Tirumūlar, *Tirumantiram* (Madras: Saiva Siddhanta Maha Samajam, 1940).

1. *Tirumantiram*, verse 1490.
2. Śivavākkiyar, Vol. I, verse 329 and 211.
3. Refer Kārai-c-cittar, *Kanaga Vaippu*, verse 78; p. 145.
   aranaippāḍi yuyarndiṭṭār aṟupattumūvar;
   aruḷappāḍi migundiṭṭār aruṭperuñjōti;
   ariyaippāḍi cirandiṭṭār āṟiraṇḍāḷvār;
   adanaippāḍi niṟaindiṭṭār aṟumūnṟu cittar.
4. *Agastiyar Jñānam-2*, Vol. I, verse 5; refer also to Bhadragiriyār, Vol. I, verse 155.
5. *Agastiyar Jñānam-1*, Vol. I, verse 7; Bhadragiriyār, Vol. 1, verse 147.
6. Kārai-c-cittar, *Kanaga Vaippu*, verse 205, p. 183.
7. Śivavākkiyar, Vol. I, verses 17 and 33.
8. *Tirumantiram*, verse 109.
9. Śivavākkiyar, Vol. I, verses 26 and 250.
10. Deben Bhattacharyya (trans.) *The Mirror of the Sky: Songs from the Bauls from Bengal,* p. 37.

11. *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa*, XLI. 4 ff.
12. Pāmbāṭṭi-c-cittar, Vol. I, verse 94.
13. *Tirumantiram*, verse 2838. Refer also to verses 1533 and 1568.
14. Pancham Sinh (trans.), *The Hatha Yoga Pradipika*, Chapter I, verses/stanzas 5–8.
15. Shashibhusan Das Gupta in his *Obscure Religious Cults* (pp. 203–4), has provided a list of eighty-four Siddhas.
16. There is a difference of opinion as to the names of the nine *Nātha Siddhas*. G.W. Briggs, in his work *Goraknath and the Kānphaṭa Yogis*, (p. 136) gives the following nine names of the *Nātha Siddhas*: Goraknatha, Matsyendranatha, Carpatnatha, Mangalnatha, Ghugonatha, Gopinatha, Prannatha, Suratnatha and Cambanatha. See also Sashibhusan Das gupta's *Obscure Religious Cults*, pp. 206–208, and Kalyani Mallik's ed. *Siddha-Siddhanta-Paddhati and Other Works of Nath Yogis*, pp. 7–8. In Tamilnadu we find four different lists of *Nava Nātha Siddhas* given in the following works:
    1. *Jñānabōdhagam*, a palm leaf manuscript available in the Kerala University MSS Library.
    2. Singaravelu Mudaliar, ed., *Abhidhanacintamani*, p. 940.
    3. M.S. Purnalingam pillai, *Tamil Literature*, p. 263.
17. The author has come across at least twenty- five different lists of Tamil Siddhas. They can be found in:
    (i) *Jñānabōdhagam*,
    (ii) *Nijānanda Bōdhagam*, in *Cittar Paḍalgaḷ*, Vol. 2, p. 227.
    (iii) *Karuvūrār Māntrika Aṭṭamāsittu.*
    (iv) *Karai-c-cittar, Kanagavaippu*, verses 7–11, pp. 124, 125.
    (v) *Kalai-k-kalañjiyam*, vol.4, p. 645.
    (vi) *Abhidhanacintamani*, p. 638.
    (vii) M.S. Puranlingam Pillai, *Tamil Literature*, p. 265.
    (viii) Ka. Su. Pillai, *Ilakkiya Varalāṟu*, p. 338.
    (ix) C. Balasubramanian, *Tamiḻ Ilakkiya Varalāṟu*, p. 157.
    (x) Aru. Ramanathan, *Cittar Pāḍalgaḷ*, Vol. 1, p. 7. Refer also vol II, p. 330. These two lists themselves differ.
    (xi) A. Shanmugavelan, *Siddhar's Science of Longevity and Kalpa Medicine of India*, p. 40.
    (xii) A.V. Subramania Aiyar, *The Poetry and the Philosophy of the Tamil Siddhars*, p. 72.
    (xiii) R. Manickavachagam, *Nam Nāṭṭu Cittargaḷ*, p. 105ff.
    (xiv) K.R.R. Sastri, "*The Path of the Siddhas*".
    (xv) Kamil V. Zvelebil, *The Poets of the Powers*, pp. 132–3.
    (xvi) S.A.A Ramaiah, ed., *Bōgar Kaṇḍa Yōgam*, Vol. I, preface, p. 1.
    (xvii) *Tirumūlar karukkiḍai Vaitiyam-600*, verse 1, quoted in S. Kalyanaraman, *Cittar Nāḍi Vijñānakkōvai* I, part I .

(xviii) S.A.A Ramaiah, *Babaji Padinen Siddhar Yōgak-Kōvai Pārāyaṇappā*, p. 28. The list is in the verse form from an ancient MSS giving the places of birth also.

(xix) *Ibid.*, p. 430 (in verse form).

(xx) *Ibid.*, p. 431 (in verse form).

(xxi) *Ibid.*, p. 432 (in verse form).

(xxii) "*Ūrvaśi Vākku,*" in S.P. Ramachandran (ed.), *Ūrvaśi Rasavāda Ciṭkā; Vaidya Chitka, Pancaratinam*, verses 5–7, p. 112.

(xxiii) S.P. Ramachandran (ed.), *Nārpatteṇ Siddhargal Peria Jñānakkōvai*, verses 20–21 of *Satchitānandar's Suḻimunai Sūtram–1*, pp. 141–2.

(xxiv) S.P. Ramachandran (ed.), *Caturagirittalapurāṇam*; pp. 217–36.

(xxv) Ibid., pp. 247–8.

18. G.A. Feurstein, *Introduction to the Bhagavad Gita*, pp. 63–7.
19. Madhavacarya's, *The Sarva Darsana Samgraha*, p. 140.
20. *Maccamuni Meyjñānam Perunūl Kāviyam 800.*
21. Ajit Mookerjee and Madhu Khanna, *The Tantric way*, p. 156.
22. *Caṭṭaimuni Jñānam*, Vol. I, verse 3.
23. That there are eighteen *siddhis* is referred to in the *Bhāgavata* where Lord Kṛṣṇa says: "Those who are experts in concentration and *Yoga* call the powers eighteen in number. Eight of these are pertaining to Me and the remaining ten are due to a perfection of *sattva.*" (Swami Madhavananda, ed., *Uddhava-Gita*, pp. 141–2.) In this connection it would be of interest to note that in comparing Swami Vivekananda with other spiritual luminaries of his time, Sri Ramakrsna said of him: "If Keshub Chandra Sen had one power which made him famous, Vivekananda had eighteen such powers in the fullest measure..."(Refer to E.R. Marozzi, "The Making of Swami Vivekananda", p. 11.).
24. S.P. Ramachandran (ed.), *Nārpatteṇ Siddhar Periya Jñānakkōvai*, p. 171.
25. *Ibid.*, verse 4, p. 46.
26. *Tamil Lexicon*, Vol. III, part I, p. 1412.
27. *Tēvāram*, 6.83.6.
28. Mircea Eliade, *Myths, Dreams and Mysteries*, pp. 91–2.
29. *Tirumantiram*, verses 631 and 1426.
30. Parañjoti, *Tiruviḷaiyāḍapurāṇam, Kūḍaṟkāṇḍam*, sections relating to *Ellām Valla Cittarāna Paḍalam, Kallānaikkukarumbaruttiya Paḍalam* and *Aṭṭamāsiddhi Upadēsitta Paḍalam.*
31. Tāyumānavar, *Tējōmayānandam*, verse 8 and *Tiru-p-pādaṟṟiraṭṭu.*
32. Tāyumānavar, *Siddhargaṇam*, verse 1.
33. Pāmbāṭṭi-c-cittar, Vol. I, verses 25–34; verses 35–39.
34. Rāmaliṅga Aḍigaḷ, *Tiruvaruṭpā*, ed., verses 3.8.4, p. 450.
35. *Tirumantiram*, verses 640–711.
36. Pāmbāṭṭi-c-cittar, Vol. I, verse 95.
37. S.P. Ramachandran (ed.,) *Ūrvaśi Rasavāda Citkā*, pp. 121–2.
38. *Agastiyar 12000*, vol., verses 271, 272,quoted in *Siddhar Varalāṟu*, p. 199.

39. N. Kathiraiver Pillai, *Tamil Moli Akarāti*, p. 626.
40. Mircea Eliade, *Myths, Dreams and Mysteries*
41. Karuvūrār, quoted in *Siddhargaḷ Varalāṟu*, p. 54.
42. A.Chidambaranar, *Agattiyar Varalāṟu*, p. 1.
43. J.P.Vogel, *Indian Serpent Lore*, p. 14.
44. *Saptakāṇḍam*, Vol. V, verse 154.
45. Edward Conze, *Buddhist Text Through the Ages*, p. 45.
46. *Neñjaṟi Viḷakkam*, Vol. I, verses 14, 16 and 12.
47. *Tāyumānava Swāmi Pāḍalgaḷ*, Poem Sugavāri, verse 6.
48. C, X, 13.
49. *Tirumantiram*, verse 2838.
50. *Ibid.*, verse 1490.
51. *Ibid.*, verse 1987.
52. Bhadragiriyār, Vol. I, verses 192 and 23 refer also to *Tirumantiram* verse 1360.
53. *Tirumantiram*, verses 1568 and 1533.
54. Śivavākkiyar, Vol. I, verse 12.
55. *Anubhava Mālai*, verse 65.
56. *Tirumantiram*, verse 1788.
57. Paṭṭinattār, *Aruḷ Pulambal*, Vol. I, verse 23.
58. Paṭṭinattār, *Podhu*, Vol. I, verse 40.
59. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, verse 25.
60. Bhadragiriyār, Vol. I, verse 224.
61. *Tirumantiram*, verse 1856; Kākapusuṇḍar, Vol. II, verse 30. Kambaḷi-c-caṭṭaimuni, *Munjñānam-100*, Vol. II, verse 10.
62. *Tirumantiram*, verse 1466 and 1476.
63. Bhadragiriyār, Vol. I, verse 182.
64. *Tirumantiram*, verse 2943.
65. *Ibid.*, verse 2944.
66. *Ibid.*, verse 956.
67. Śivavākkiyār, Vol. I, verse 90.
68. *Tirumantiram*, verse 1611. Iḍai-k-kaṭṭu-c-cittar, vol. I, verse 98.
69. Bhadragiriyār, Vol. I, verse 74.
70. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, verse 1; Pāmbāṭṭi-c-cittar, Vol. I, verse 116; Paṭṭinattār, *Neñjoḍu Magiḻtal*, Vol. I, verse 11.
71. *Tirumantiram*, verse 129.
72. *Ibid.*, verse 2635.
73. *Tirumantiram*, verse 1768. Śivavākkiyar, Vol. I, verses 9, 12 and 211. Bhadragiriyār, Vol. I, verse 149. Paṭṭinattār, *Neñjoḍu Pulambal*, Vol. I, verse 3.

    In this connection it would be worthwhile to note that the *Guhyasamāja Tantra* is described in the colophon as the 'beyond the beyond in the tantra' (*tantrānām uttarottaram*). Saint Appar also describes the Absolute as one who is 'Beyond, Beyond the Beyond'. Kabir also states that 'the knowledge beyond the knowledge is my knowledge'. *The Bijak of Kabir*, p. 112.

Refer also to 'The Great Being beyond boundaries and beyond beyond', the 'Beyond-Beyond God' of Meher Baba's philosophy.

74. *Tirumantiram,* verse 2648.
75. *Ibid.*, verse 109.
76. *Ibid.*, verse 110. Refer also to verse 1087. Refer to Śivavākkiyar, Vol. I, verse 9.
77. *Tirumantiram,* verse 2450.
78. Śivavākkiyar, Vol. I, verses 402, 409, 410 and 274.
79. Vālmīgar, Vol. I, verse 2.
80. R.C. Zaehner, *Mysticism Sacred And Profane: An Inquiry Into Some Varieties of Praeternatural Experience* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957), p. 28.
81. *Tirumantiram,* verse 2962.
82. *Ibid.*, verse 1823.
83. The *pāda,* foot, stands for the base or the plinth. *Jaṅgha* represents the legs. *Bandhana* is the belt running round the entire structure of the temple. The *vimāna,* trunk, stands for the tower with its front and back, the two sides represent shoulders and neck. The *sikhara* stands for the top of the head.
84. Śivavākkiyar, Vol. I, verses 17, 18 and 33. Refer also to *Gaṇapatidāsar,* Vol. I, (verses 19 and 24) who asks why one should wander throughout the country when the God is in oneself.
85. Śivavākkiyar, Vol. 1, verse 103.
86. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, verse 5.
87. Pāmbāṭṭi-c-cittar, Vol. I, verse 128. Refer to *Tirumantiram* (verse 2432) where the same idea is conveyed. Refer also to Bhadragiriyār's expression "cutting the five senses by burning them" (Vol. I, verse 1); Śivavākkiyar uses the term "*Siṇukkaṟuttal*" (Vol. I, verse 98) which conveys the process of "making a thing ripe" (*pakva*). Kākapusuṇḍar says that once the mind is controlled through *yoga,* the *deha* becomes strong and adamantine (verse 58). In a symbolic language, Kambaḷi-c-caṭṭaimuni says that the five senses are deadened by the *yoga* technique (*Munjñānam-100,* Vol. I, verse 14). Iḍai-k-kāṭṭu-c-cittar rejoices that he has "roasted" and "made them dance at his will" (all the five goats, i.e., senses) by driving them into *yoga veli* (i.e., *yoga technique*) (Vol. I, verse 27). In Siddha literature we come across a Tamil expression "*tokkavalladu*" which stands for emptying oneself of all accertions just as fire does when something is brought to it. The expression stands for the *yoga* technique of stopping the *citta vṛttis.* Refer also to *Tirumantiram,* verse 1692.
88. S.P. Ramachandran (ed.), *Agastiyar Jñāna Amudam* verse 20, page 183.
89. *Tirumantiram,* verse 941; Śivavākkiyar, Vol. I, verse 93.
90. *Tirumantira-mālai- 300,* verses 51–8.
91. *Tirumantiram,* verse 1624.
92. *Ambigānandar Jñāna Upadesam,* verse 17, MSS available in Tanjore Saraswati Mahal Library.

93. *Tirumantiram*, 93.
94. Kambaḷi-c-caṭṭaimuni, *pinjñānam-100*, Vol. II, verse 87. Refer also to Kākapusuṇḍar, Vol. I, verse 23.
95. Bōgar, *Sutras of Wisdom on Muppu-51*, Vol. II, pp. 215–22.
96. *Agasthyar Jñānam-2*, Vol. I, verse 2. Refer to *Tirumantiram* verses 828, 834, 1937, 1949, 1950, 1956, 1961, 1965 and 1966. In verse 1447 Tirumūlar calls such an *ulṭa yogin* as *veṇ yōgattar*. Refer also *Kambaḷi-c-caṭṭaimuni Munjñānam-100*, Vol. II, verse 88 (first two lines) where there is an indirect reference to *ulṭa sādhana*.

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Sankaradeva: His Contributions to Assamese Drama and Theatre*

It is believed that drama that includes dance and music is anterior to and older than any other form of art. By drama, however, is meant not the written play, but dramatic or drama-like activities which instinctively issue from man's inborn love of dance, song and imitation. So drama in this sense has been there from time immemorial among all peoples and in all climes.

Like in any other parts of the world having human habitation, dramatic activities had been there from times beyond the reach of history in this small part of the planet now called Assam. In course of time such activities which consisted primarily of dance, songs and playing upon instruments like drums, cymbals and pipes, took somewhat organized forms which are known as folk drama or dramatic institutions. Such dramatic forms have been there in nearly all regions of our country and they are found in abundance in this geographical expression called Assam and the North East. Some of these are *putala nac* (puppet dance), *oja pali, kushan gan, bhari gan, deudhani, dholiya bhaona, khuliya bhaona, mahkheda utsav* (ritual driving away of mosquitoes), *garakhiya puja* (cowherd worship), *Devadasi* dance, to name only a few from among a multitude. These folk dramatic activities and dances must have been very active before and during Sankaradeva's time. The Sanskrit drama, which was outside the reach of the common people, had already played itself out and whatever was left of it was nearly forgotten. It was not until Sankaradeva, the great poet and reformer (1449–1568), came forward to reorient Assam's sociocultural life that the people of Kamarupa-Asoma got a regular, well-written drama and a well-organized stage and auditorium.

It is to be noted that except *Bhakti Ratnakara*, which is in Sanskrit, all other works of Sankaradeva were intended for all sections of the society, including the lowest of the low, in the prevalent social hierarchy. These were written with the primary object of spreading the message of '*Bhakti*'—that is, complete devotion to one and only one Godhead, without any expensive and ostentatious rituals in the name of worshipping a heterogeneity of gods and goddesses and thus precipitating the already existing differences among the various ethnic groups. Sankaradeva, as is well known, laid emphasis on '*Sravana*' and '*kirtana*'—listening to the name of God through his name being chanted again and again—activities where dramatic elements were inherently present. But from his experience as a traveler and his contact with various sections of the people in Assam and outside, he must have realized that a full drama or 'drisya kavya' would add to the popular appeal of '*sravana*' and '*kirtana*' or it would give '*rupa*' or form to what was repeatedly recited and listened to. Meanwhile Sankaradeva, who had acquired a large following, got a '*kirtana ghara*' or '*nam ghar*' built at Bordowa where the '*Fakuwa*' festival or the holi festival of Lord Krishna was celebrated. In his activities like composition of songs and verses for repeated chanting, building of a prayer hall where people could assemble for prayer and deliberation and celebration of Shri Krishna's '*dol jatra*' lay the seeds of dharma which the poet-playwright was to develop soon. It is universally agreed that regular drama, wherever it exists, grew out of various kinds of folk dramatic activities and dances practiced by the people from times far beyond the reach of history. As already stated, Assam, like most other parts of India, abounded in such folk plays and dances with which Sankaradeva, who had to move from one place to another because of hostile circumstances and to avoid royal persecution, was familiar. As a pilgrim spending nearly twelve years during the first phase of pilgrimage to most holy places of northern and central India, Sankaradeva also must have been acquainted with the various forms of folk dramatic institutions some of which have been mentioned already. And as a Sanskrit scholar Sankaradeva's being well versed in Indian classical drama and dramaturgy was beyond question. All these factors must have helped the poet immensely in giving shape to a form of drama during the later half of the fifteenth and the earlier half of the sixteenth centuries when not much of this was there elsewhere and when the great Shakespeare was not even born. Like the medieval clergy who made use of drama as a means of teaching the laity the lessons of the Scriptures, so also Sankaradeva aimed at teaching the masses the principles of Vaisnavism through dramatic performances, for he knew very well that the visual presentation of selected stories from the life of Lord Krishna or Rama would effectively supplement what was being recited (kirtana) and heard (sravana). Classical Sanskrit plays were intended for the higher echelons of society and were quite away from the reach of the common people. Sankaradeva whose audiences consisted of all sections of the people knew fully well that if the common people were to understand and enjoy drama it had to be freed from the shackles of classical dramaturgy. No doubt, he drew inspiration from classical drama and dramatic theory, but the founder playwright of Assamese drama leaned heavily on the already mentioned popular institutions of entertainment where dance and song preponderated. Thus combining elements of classical Indian drama, folk dramatic and dance institutions of Assam and India at large and other dramatic activities, Sankaradeva gave birth—indeed he gave birth, for we do not know of anything like this existing before his time—to drama in Assamese five hundred or so years ago. Known as '*ankiya nat*', it was these plays that inaugurated Assamese drama and acting which pervaded for a long period the entire socio-cultural life of nearly all sections of the people of Assam.

It is interesting that Sankaradeva's full-fledged plays of which six are known to be his for certain were preceded by a dramatic performance called *Cihnayatra* of which no manuscript has been found. *Cihnayatra* was, as the name suggests, a dramatic presentation in signs or painting of the seven '*Vaikunthas*' (Abode of Lord Visnu) with accompaniment of song, music and dance. Sankaradeva himself drew the scenes using paints prepared from indigenous materials, played the drum or '*khol*', acted out the role of the Sutradhara and also of one of the Visnus. It is narrated in Sankaradeva's prose biography (*Katha Guru Carit*) that this dramatic presentation, although without dialogue, had extraordinary impact on the spectators. They were so astonished to see such a spectacle that "Everybody looked upon Sankaradeva as a god. Even the Brahmins, having seen his divine powers, began to take spiritual initiation from him". It is to be noted that except a piece of cloth used as a curtain at the time of entrance of the dramatic figures and a canopy (*chandratapa*) hung over the open space used as stage, no other stage properties were employed. The preponderance of songs, music and dance and the use of a single open space, not raised, as the stage undoubtedly points to the fact that the first dramatic presentation of Sankaradeva was closer in many respects to some of the folk dramatic and dance institutions, already mentioned, than to classical Sanskrit drama.

It may be reasonably presumed that the instant success of his first dramatic venture even without dialogue convinced Sankaradeva that drama could be most effectively used as a means of propagating the message of 'bhakti' and the principles of his *eka sarana nama dharma* (complete submission to One Supreme Lord through repeatedly chanting His name) among the diverse people of Kamarupa-Asoma of his time were caught in a labyrinth of faiths and cults all overladen with rituals. His next step, naturally, was to write and produce plays where characters would act and react like living human beings. So he selected such themes as would be able to instill in the minds of the audience, through providing entertainment, a sense of complete devotion to Krishna, the Lord incarnate in human form, and thus paving the way to achieving social unity and brotherhood through all people believing in and worshipping one and only one God, the creator and cause of all living beings. Sankaradeva found from his experience of presenting *Cihnayatra* that this could be best done by dramatizing episodes from the life of Krishna or Rama like it was done in medieval Europe by the church fathers who dramatized selected events from the life of Jesus Christ and other saints. Consequently Sankaradeva came out with plays like *Patniprasada, Keli Gopala, Rukminiharana, Kalidamana, Parijataharana,* and *Rama-vijaya* the themes of which, except the last named play, he drew from the *Bhagavata-purana,* the last one being based on stories from the *Ramayana.*

The plays of Sankaradeva, as already noted, are commonly known as *ankiya nat* and their performance is known as *bhaona.* Sankaradeva, however, has nowhere used the term *ankiya* to denote his plays; the terms he used are *yatra, nata* and *nataka.* It was his biographers who employed the term *ankiya* to refer to the plays of Sankaradeva probably after the Sanskrit *anka* or *utsrisstikanka,* a kind of one-act play. Although a Sankaradeva play does not have much similarity with the Sanskrit *anka,* the fact that it has no act or scene divisions probably persuaded the biographers to designate his plays as *anka* which, in course of time, became *ankiya* with the Assamese suffix *yia* being added to it.

When we look at the plays of Sankaradeva either from the Indian or western point of view expressed in respective dramatic theories, we find that they contain almost all the features of a *nataka* or *rupaka*. Plays like *Rukminiharana*, *Parijataharana* and *Rama-vijaya* have well-defined plots, a set of characters and dialogue. According to Indian dramaturgy, the main objective of a play is the creation of rasa of which nine are noted which are also believed to be the source of nine sentiments. Although nearly all the sentiments or emotions like *sringara, vira, hasya, karuna* are present in Sankaradeva's plays, all these, however, are intended to instill in the audience the sentiment of *bhakti* which pervades not only the plays but all other works of the great master. To give an example, this is how the playwright describes the plight of the lustful kings who suffer because being drowned in carnal desires they are completely bereft of the sentiment of *bhakti*. The Sutradhara says:

> Being maddened with lust, the kings give expression to their carnal desires through various erotic gestures. On seeing this the friends of Rukmini push away some of them, while they strike others with their heels and upbraid them. Even then the kings continue to be lascivious persisting in their infatuation and show of unseemly gestures.

At the end of the narration of this erotic scene the Sutradhara comments:

> O you members of the audience, look at the pitiable condition of those who are lustful and devoid of *bhakti* (devotion) to Hari (Krishna)

In this way Sankaradeva the playwright, entertains the audience through presentation of thrilling and theatrical scenes, but he never swerves from his prime mission of creating in the audience a sense of complete submission to the Almighty, represented through Krishna in human form.

A full-fledged drama must have certain features the chief among them being plot, character and dialogue. The plot or the combination of the episodes has to be an organized whole with a clear-cut beginning, middle and an end. In this respect the plays of Sankaradeva, particularly *Parijataharana*, *Rukminiharana* and *Rama-vijaya* are almost like modern dramas having definable plots, characters and dialogue. It is seen that while choosing the themes of his plays from the numerous stories of the two epics and the *Bhagavata Purana* Sankaradeva took into consideration the inherent dramatic qualities and appeal of an episode—a prime concern with any serious playwright who wants to amuse and teach at the same time. His first play, *Patniprasada*, which was written and produced after the unexpected success of the painted dramatic presentation, *Cihnayatra* is, however, a small play comparatively weaker in construction and execution than the three major plays just mentioned. This points to the fact that *Patniprasada* was an experimental play with dialogue, though minimal, which the poet-playwright felt encouraged to compose after it had been found that even a play without dialogue had immense popular appeal. Except the words spoken by Krishna and a line or two uttered by a Brahmin, the rest of the dialogue is spoken collectively or in a group almost, and no speech is given to Boloram who accompanies Krishna. *Patniprasada* however, is not without dramatic and even theatrical scenes like the one where the Brahmin husbands try to stop their wives from going to visit Krishna or another which shows a married woman committing suicide. Such scenes had undoubted popular appeal which helped the playwright to instill in the minds of the audience the ultimate message of *bhakti*.

The skilful playwright in Sankaradeva is clearly seen not only in the choice of the themes but also in the way he presented them in order ultimately to inspire the audience with the sentiment of *bhakti* giving them at the same time mirthful entertainment. He selected stories from his sources which have dramatic and also theatrical potentialities so that the intended message could be driven home without causing any sense of boredom. Consequently we find that the plays of Sankaradeva contain almost all the elements of which thrilling comedy or melodrama is made without, however, sacrificing the sense of dignity inherent in the stories. In *Keli Gopala* there are the sports and antics of the youthful Krishna with nearly unscrupulous presentation of the erotic sentiments and sensuality which get free expression in the songs and the words in prose spoken by the Sutradhara. Such scenes would no doubt appeal to most sections of the audience, but Sankaradeva knew when and where to put the stop and so there are the warnings that the milk-maids have gone too far taking krishna for granted who soon crashes their growing sense of pride and arrogance. And thus the maids are subdued and made to realize that Krishna is not an ordinary human but the Almighty incarnate, and then they start paying obeisance or *bhakti* to him. For the sake of theatrical effect the playwright also has not forgotten to present the fearful sight of the demon Shankhachura who appears two times trying to elope some of the maids and then engage in violent fights with Krishna who chases him away. Similar dramatic or melodramatic situations are also there in plenty in *Kaliyadamana* where the *gopis* cry and shout thinking that their dear Krishna has been killed by the fearful Serpent. Krishna fights with the great snake dancing on its hoods and Kaliya's wives vent their lamentation appealing to Krishna not to kill their husband. There is then the horrible fire in the forest which would have caused irreparable destruction if Krishna did not gulp it to the great astonishment of the onlookers. After all this everybody is however, made to realize the supremacy of Krishna who is the Supreme Being in anthropomorphic form and is here shown as a symbol of love, equality and brotherhood.

The three other plays, which can be considered Sankaradeva's major dramatic compositions, are of extraordinary merit, both dramatically and poetically and also as entertainment pieces. A close look at the plots of these plays shows that while Sankaradeva's prime consideration was to impress on the audience the supremacy of Lord Krishna and to evoke in them a sense of complete submission to him, the playwright took particular care to see that all this was done in a dramatically appealing way. This is evident in the choice of the stories, in the preponderant use of songs and musical accompaniment, in the presentation of scenes of battle, of love making and elopement rituals, of erotic scenes like a saintly priest behaving unmannerly at the sight of a bridal beauty, erotica in descriptive verses and numerous other theatrical and melodramatic devices. In fact, these scenes and pictorial description of scenes as given by the Sutradhara both in prose and verse would be considered taboo in classical drama. All this shows how Sankaradeva acted outside the confines of classical Sanskrit drama and dramaturgy, but in close proximity with folk dramatic institutions in order to reach to a larger range of people without, however, compromising on the principle of dignity.

In spite of the features that characterize a medieval drama, the *ankiya* plays reveal certain characteristics that would make a modern drama. In the first place, we may take the question of conflict which is said to be a cardinal part of drama. Conflict may be outer or inner, the latter being chiefly a characteristic of tragedy or serious drama. In comedy the conflict is usually of the outer type: it may be between personalities, between the sexes or between individuals and society. The *ankiya* plays are of the nature of comedies as, despite scenes of death and destruction, they have a happy ending. Much of the conflict in these plays is of the outer kind. Yet we find conflict in plays like *Rukminiharana* where the commotion in the mind of the heroine is subtly brought out. Krishna in this play is very much a human being pinning for the heroine as much as she pines for him. Secondly, the characterization in some of these plays may be said to be in advance of the times as some of the characters are so distinctly drawn that they very much look like characters in a modern play. In *Rukminiharana, Parijataharana* and *Ramavijaya,* particularly, the principal characters stand out in bold relief so that despite their mythical origin they look like real human beings. Thirdly, it is noteworthy how Sankaradeva creates humour and fun for the satisfaction of the audience without bringing in clownish characters or cheap comic stuff. Instances of this are found, among others, in the unnatural behaviour of even divine and saintly figures like Brahma and Visvamitra, acting as wedding priests, when they fall down almost unconscious being charmed by the extraordinary beauty of the brides, Rukmini and Sita in *Rukminiharana* and *Ramavijaya,* respectively. The brevity and deftness in the presentation of such humorous scenes are undoubtedly extraordinary inasmuch as they are not thrust from outside and also that they do not smack of cheap comic jingle.

In view of the time during which Sankaradeva wrote and produced his plays and the avowed purpose with which the plays were written, one cannot expect social criticism or subtle study of character. Sankaradeva's aim was not to hold the mirror up to nature nor to reform society by holding its follies and foibles to ridicule. He, on the other hand, aimed at enlightening the unlettered folk in the teachings of the Vaisnava faith through the medium of drama which could be profitably used to amuse and to teach at the same time. Social criticism was, however intended not through satire but through showing the greatness of that One Supreme Being before whose eyes all men and women were equal. Yet the playwright occasionally hinted, directly or indirectly, at social evils like polygamy, as can be seen in *Parijataharana* where Krishna has to try hard to appease the jealous Satyabhama, one of his wives, by fetching the *praijata* flower from the heavenly garden of Indra. Another interesting exposure of social or familial problem is found in *Rukminiharana* when the wishes of Rukmini's old father and king to give his daughter in marriage to Krishna are thrown to the wind buy his young and arrogant eldest son Rukmini who prefers his friend Sisupala instead for the hand of his sister. The uncomplaining meekness with which the old king yields to the arrogance and haughtiness of his young son is reminiscent of the universal helplessness of the older generation before the younger. There is then the quarrel between Shachi and Satyabhama which comes down to such a low level that it appears to be no more than hair-splitting between two rustic shrews. It is difficult to understand why Sankaradeva chose to melodramatize the quarrel between these two princely female characters unless he wanted to portray a realistic enough picture of the quarrelsome Assamese women of the time and also to provide amusement to the audience who were no doubt amused by such boisterous theatricalities. The playwright's portrayal of the characters of the lustful kings and princes in *Rukminiharana* and *Ramavijaya* is also full of sarcasm and satire through which he unveils the real nature of those in whose hands the responsibilities of ruling and leading people were vested. In addition to all this, there are many other scenes and episodes in the plays which, while providing entertainment, hold out small sketches of the society and social-familial life of the people.

It is to be noted that unlike in a modern play, dialogue does not occupy a major place in an *ankiya nat* where there is much of dance and music. A Sankaradeva play contains Sanskrit *slokas* and a large number of songs written in Brajabuli, a mixture of Assamese, Maithili and Hindi, a lingua franca which the poet-playwright developed to make his play easily intelligible to not only all sections of the Assamese people but also those coming from outside, and also to uphold the dignity of the Krishna themes for which ordinary Assamese was perhaps considered too mundane. Again, whatever dialogue is there is spoken in a typical way through appropriate dance movements and gesticulations. Characters also enter the stage dancing to the tune of songs and music in keeping with the occasions and the status of a character or characters. Many things which the characters could have spoken out themselves are told by the Sutradhara, thus still minimizing the role of dialogue. The Sutradhara has immense importance in Sankaradeva's plays who can be called actor, dancer, singer and director all rolled into one. However, in spite of all these dance-drama or ballet-like characteristics, a

Sankaradeva play can be undoubtedly called a play in the round, as noted already, it contains most of the elements of full-fledged drama.

In course of time the popular *ankiya* plays became a welcome means of entertainment for the royal family and the nobility. Ahom kings and counties invited Mahantas from *sattars* (spiritual leaders and preachers at cultural-spiritual seats of learning) to perform plays in the royal places. For instance, it is mentioned in the *Tungkhungia Buranji* that at the invitation of king Kamaleswar Singha the Mahantas of Bareghar satta presented the play Rukminiharana (1816) and another *sattra* called Namati Dihing sattra enacted a play titled *Akrura-gamana*. This is proof enough that *ankiya* plays were occasionally presented in the royal court and places. Besides, some scholars who were patronized by the kings, also wrote plays in Sanskrit interspersed with Assamese on the model of *ankiya* plays. But because of the unintelligibility of the language these plays could not go out of the confines of the royal palace and died a natural death with the decline of royal patronage. The continued invasions by the Burmese, the devastations caused by the foreign looters and plunderers and subsequent loss of the country's long-cherished freedom caused havoc in all spheres of Assam's life and society. It is difficult to understand what could be the fate of art and culture and drama and theatre under such extremely hostile circumstances. With the change in the political scenario changes in the socio-cultural life of the people, however slow, became inevitable affecting, among other things, drama and theatre also.

The tradition of writing and producing plays on the model of Sankaradeva and his greatest disciple and follower Madhavadeva continued till late into the eighteenth century and somewhat erratically into the early nineteenth, but drama gradually deteriorated as the writers were mostly imitative having no knack for play writing, True, even during the period of extreme socio-political chaos, as noted already, the *ankiya* plays continued to enjoy their quiet life mainly in the countryside, but drama as a living literary and artistic form suffered greatly. After the British take-over English education was gradually introduced in Assam and in course of time more and more young people became familiar with the English language and literature. Young Assamese students who went to Calcutta (Kolkata) for higher education in the collages there came into contact with western drama and theatre, and some of them began to write plays in Assamese on the model of English plays, particularly the plays of Shakespeare and also of Bengali plays written after the style and technique of western plays. Thus both in the subject-matter and technique it was rather Shakespeare, not our own Sankaradeva, who got the upper hand. Beginning with a social play of tragic nature called *Ram-Navami Natak* (1857) by Gunabhiram Barua, Assamese drama gradually grew and developed in course of the last century and a half into a variegated art form embracing in its ambit mythological and historical plays, tragedy, comedy, farce, melodrama, one-act plays and many other forms of modern drama.

It is true that the incentive for modern drama—social, realistic, psycho-analytic, problem plays—came from the west; but it would be wrong to presume that the plays of Sankaradeva and Madhavadeva had no role to play at all in the growth and development of modern Assamese drama and theatre. In some plays of the nineteenth century, there are unmistakable traces of *ankiya nats*, although the relation became weaker and weaker with the increasing influence of modern western drama. But *ankiya* plays and *bhaona* are still a living force in Assam's cultural life, and they are being performed with gusto not only in the villages and *sattras* but also in urban centers on special occasions and also as part of religious-cultural festivities. In fact, two main streams of dramatic activities co-exist in Assam at present—*bhaona* of *ankiya* plays as well as plays written in imitation of these plays, and performance of modern social, realistic plays on proscenium stage and also through other experimental means. The mythological subject-matter and the sentiment of *bhakti* still persist in the plays of the former genre, although some changes have been noticeable in certain respects like an increasing use of prose, introduction of characters like clowns and jesters, violence and myriad other materials of popular comedy. But these changes are only peripheral and the spirit remains unaffected. The *ankiya* plays of Sanakaradeva were a popular dramatic institution and the taste for theatrical activities which this gave to the people of Assam is no less responsible for the growth of the new drama and theatre. It is also a matter of significance that in recent years there has been an increasing revival of interest in the plays of Sankaradeva, Madhavadeva and their immediate followers among present-day playwrights, producers, directors and other dramatic artists and activists. Plays are being written and produced where elements and technique of *ankiya nats* are effectively made use of and to which all sections of the audience appear to respond positively.

This shows how the founder-playwright of Assamese drama is still a force to reckon with, thus reminding us of his great contributions in this particular field like in most other spheres of Assam's socio-cultural life.

Nearly five centuries have rolled by since Sankaradeva wrote and produced his plays, but interest in them and their popular appeal have not waned. The tradition of writing and acting plays which he created so long back in time has continued unabated although there have been fluctuations on account of reasons, social, political and others. The poetry in the plays and the universal, humanistic outlook despite their religious subject-matter are the main pillars which have sustained this interest. And Sankaradeva's influence on Assamese drama and acting is so impacted and ingrained that like an undercurrent it may not be apparent to the eye. But the glaze of modern drama imported from the west and the increasing supply of soap opera in the electronic media have not been able to override this traditional dramatic form which, as has been noted already, is rather staging a comeback.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

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1. *Kame matta huya itydi nana vivatsa bhavana kayala rajasava. Pekhi rukminika sakhi save kaheka thengani dei, kaheka gore mari bhartsaya. Tathapi rajasava kamatura huya kumarika katare kaya thika (Rukminiharana).*
2. *ahe loka, haribhakatihina kamaturaka dukha dekhaha. Iha jani harika cintiye hari bol hari bol (Rukminiharana).*
3. S.K. Bhuyan (ed.), *Tungkhungiya Buranji*, OUP, 1933, p. 188.

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DISCUSSIONS

Raghunath Ghosh

‘*Parasya na parasyeti mameti na mameti ca*’

I propose to consider and discuss the implications of the problematic statement made by Viśvanātha, in his *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, towards illuminating a feature of aesthetic experience. There, it appears, is a built-in paradox in the experience. Experiences are intentional in having objects, and they are owned by their subject. There is the Vedantic distinction between *dṛk* and *dṛśya*, the owner of the experience, and the object of experience. When I am moved to tears by the pathos of the dramatized character, whom does the sorrow belong to; the dramatic person or me? This is the problem, and it calls for metaphysical resolution. Viśvanātha has suggested a one line approach, and it is worth one’s while to look into the thesis. What is the locus of the feeling experienced in course of our aesthetic encounters with the *dramatis personae*?

It is a fact that the nature of aesthetic experience is indeterminate in the sense that it is not easy to locate the substratum of the experience. It is not determinable whether it belongs to me or to the other, i.e. objects. Viśvanātha captures the uniqueness of the experience by saying—‘*Parasya na parasyeti mameti na mameti ca/ Tadāsvādervibhāvāvadeḥ paricchedo na vidyate//*’[1]. At the time of enjoyment of *Vibhāva* etc. there is no determinant in the sense that they do neither belong to others nor to me. At the same time the feeling belongs to me as well as does not belong to me. In fact, there is no determinant through which the nature of the experience or the substratum of awareness could be mapped.

In the *Kusumapratimā* commentary on *Sāhityadarpaṇa* the point is explicated in the following manner. Before the aesthetic experience occurs the joys and sorrows depicted in the drama belong solely to the dramatic characters, as no communication had been yet established with the audience. The activities like crossing of the sea etc. (*Samudralanghanādivyāpāra*), which are enacted on the stage, belonged to the heroes like Rāma etc. (*Rāmāderāsīt*) in the past, but at present the act of *observation* (*darśanādivyāpāra*) of such activities belongs to me due to empathic involvement with the characters of the drama, but it is not any longer related to the heroes like Rāma etc. In the same way, the phenomenon of *viewing* etc. (*darśanādivyāpāra*) of activities belongs to me. But the real activities like crossing the sea etc. (*samudralanghanādivyāpāra*) do not belong to me. The difference of the dramatic activities with our soul does not remain at all due to the difference of time and action. The term '*iti*' used twice signifies both others and me just as the principle involved in the analogy of the eyeball of a crow (*kākākṣigolakanyāya*). In order to show that there is a basic difference between the audience (connoisseur) on the one hand and the heroes like Rāma etc. on the other and also between the two types of activities, the usage of '*iti*' has been appropriately employed.[2]

It has also been stated that the activities staged by the actors for the dramatic persons certainly belong to others as well as not to others. It belongs to me and does not belong to me as well.

The activities belong to the dramatic character (*parasya*), but the present awareness of such activities (*darśanādivyāpāra*) does not belong to them (*na parasyeti*). On the other hand, the present awareness of the activities performed by the dramatic characters belongs to me (*mameti*), but the real activities do not belong to me (*na mameti ca*), as they are performed by the characters in drama. In fact, in such cases there is a self-identity no doubt, but there is a self-distancing no less. When it is felt that they belong to me (*mameti*), not to others (*parasyeti na*), it is the result of self-identity (*ekātmatā*) as evidenced from Viśvanātha's statement: "*pramātā tadabhedena svātmānaṁ pratipadyate*" i.e. the subject sees himself in the object being identified by it.[3]

When the same phenomenon is interpreted as belonging to others (*parasya*), and not belonging to me (*mama*), there is a psychical distance, which makes our feelings impersonal. Had there been self-identity alone, it would have been taken as a case of personal or pathological feelings, but not a non-pathological one.

This concept of psychical distance involved in aesthetic experience has been accepted by the Western thinkers. Looking back to Kant perhaps Bullough's theory of 'psychical distance' maintains that an individual actively distances himself from any object or event in such a way that he can dissociate himself from the practical mode of awareness and its consequences. The phenomenon of aesthetic delight is possible through such psychical distance. One can have aesthetic delight after seeing fog in the sea, as for example. The passengers aboard in the ship may be in agony regarding the consequences of the future accident due to the fog, as they fail to distance themselves from these practical modes. Had they been able to distance themselves appropriately, they would have tasted the aesthetic delight. Bullough's usage of the term 'distance' in the context of aesthetic experience is quite different from its use in ordinary language. In ordinary usage the term 'distance' means the measurement of space between two points or places, which means spatial distance. Bullough uses it in a special sense, and calls it 'psychical'. The delight arising from the aesthetic experience is not related to our personal loss or gain. In aesthetic experience an individual does not allow personal factors to affect his perception. An event, if viewed by maintaining the proper psychical distance, provides us aesthetic delight. When personal considerations become factors in a feeling, an individual is affected by the series of personal emotions. Aesthetic experience is not based on such personal feelings or desires and hence it is of disinterested nature. In the aesthetic experience we are directly aware of the object. In exercising the distance, a relation between the self and the object is not totally denied. Bullough thinks, 'Distance does not imply an impersonal, purely intellectually interested relation of such a kind. On the contrary, it describes a personal relation, often highly emotionally coloured, that of a peculiar character. Its peculiarity lies in that personal character of the relation, which has been, so to speak, filtered'.[4] From the above statement it is obvious that Bullough also has maintained a relation between the self and the art-object as well as distancing between them, which is so similar to the view expressed by Viśvanātha in the dictums: '*Parasya*' etc.

The indeterminate character of the aesthetic experience can also be substantiated through the following observations:

That the aesthetic pleasure is somewhat paradoxical in character can further be known from the fact that the emotional mood involved in grief also gives rise to the realization of joy. In normal life one feels happy and miserable from the joyful and painful situations, respectively. How is joy realized from the painful situations depicted in a piece of literature? In this situation our mind is absorbed in the performances and this absorption depends on the equilibrium of mind. When our mind is disturbed, the pain follows. If our mind remains in the state of aesthetic experience, there is something, which forcibly snatches our mind away from the everyday world and keeps it in a state of complete rest, which is called *viśrānti*. Professor K. Krishnamoorthy observes "When a human situation is artistically presented usually against the background of nature, the critic does not get himself transported to the peak of *rasaviśrānti* or repose. It is in fact the last stage of his contemplation. Leading up to it are the diverse impressions he is receiving from different angles, almost simultaneously. His imaginative sensibility helps him in reception while his intellect is at work all along sorting them out. When the intellect and imagination slide into the margin, his heart is moved to an intense aesthetic state of repose which is an end in itself."[5] It is the aesthetic pleasure, which only can do the miracle. The joy is endowed with a mystic power by which audience can enjoy bliss even out of the depiction of a painful situation, but in our practical life human nature is found averse to experiencing pain. Hence, Viśvanātha remarks that poetry is a peculiarly unworldly phenomenon, an extraordinary creation of supernatural supernormal genius and hence it cannot be governed by the rules of ordinary human intellect. In ordinary life sorrow comes from sorrow, fear follows fear, but in the world of poetry we find pleasure deriving from the painful, horrible and even terrible situation. Such *Virodhābhāsa* is just like the experience—'it belongs to other' (*parasya na parasyeti*) etc.

It is arguable that a connoisseur relishing literature transcends his own personal interests and enjoys the pathos or feelings of others without being indifferent to these. Hence, the pleasure arising through the empathy with the characters of the drama is designated as disinterested or non-pathological. This point can be rendered viable by the following argument. An individual being's attitude towards an object may either be of three modes: inclination (*pravṛtti*), refraining from it (*nivṛtti*) and indifference to it (*upekṣā*). Human inclination presupposes the knowledge of the conduciveness of what is desired (*iṣṭasādhanatājñāna*), refraining from some activity implies an awareness or knowledge of the conductiveness of what is not desired (*aniṣṭasādhanatājñāna*). If there be any object or activity which is related neither to the conductiveness of what is desired nor undesired, there arises the attitude of indifference. As the pleasure or grief of a dramatic character is not related to our direct interest, we should have shown an indifferent attitude to them. But it is found that we are inclined, in a free manner perhaps, to share their joys and sorrows, and enjoy disinterested pleasure, which is characterisable as non-pathological. From this it follows that the domain of aesthetic experience is qualitatively different from the experiences of the mundane world. In the mundane world we generally derive pathological (*laukika*) pleasure on being told 'your son is born' (*putraste jātaḥ*) or sorrowfulness when told 'your unwed daughter is conceived' (*kanyā te garbhinī*) etc., but the non-pathological aesthetic pleasures are non-mundane (*lokottara*). Form this it may be inferred that such aesthetic experience is unique or non-determinable in nature.

This character of such cognitions may also be brought home with the help of the following considerations.

If it be argued that the scenes, background music etc. (in the case of the dramatic performance) are the causes of the realization of aesthetic experience, it may be asked whether these causes are producers (*kārakahetu*) or revealers (*jñāpakahetu*). The *kārakahetu* ceases to exist with the advent of the effect. As for example, a table, made by a carpenter, may last even after the death of its maker. So far as aesthetic experience is concerned, it ceases if the scene, background music etc. are withdrawn and hence, they are not to be taken as producers. On the other hand, they cannot be put under *jñāpakahetu* because aesthetic pleasure did not preexist before scenes, background music etc. were set. When a cause reveals an object, it must be there. As for example, the opening of the door reveals the objects inside the room and hence it is called a revealer. It cannot be said that the aesthetic experience exists before the causes mentioned above are set. Nothing is properly speaking revealed by aesthetic experience but only suggestions of pleasure enjoyed by us. The object, created by imagination, is, neither caused (*kārya*) nor revealed (*jñāpya*) nor found in the empirical world. The aesthetic enjoyment is non-determinable and hence transcendental.[6] From another standpoint too aesthetic experience may be considered as indeterminate. Each and every type of experience must be either determinate (*savikalpaka*) or indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*). Such type of experience is not indeterminate because it gives rise to bliss (*ānanda*). In the indeterminate stage one has the feeling of indifference. But in the case of aesthetic experience there is a feeling of bliss and hence it is not indeterminate. It cannot be described as determinate either (which is definite and related to name, quality etc.), because the experience, though blissful, is not capable of being expressed. After having enjoyed reading a novel one may have blissful experience that cannot be explained with the help of descriptions (like name, quality etc.) like any ordinary pleasure and hence, it is not determinate.[7] As the experience does not come under the purview of both types of knowledge, it is considered as non-determinate. Further, each and every type of experience is either wholly true or false. But aesthetic experience is not wholly true because it is contradicted by our knowledge of the world just after the aesthetic absorption breaks up. When we return to this practical world from the world of aesthetic experience, we do realize that the characters and the incidents that occurred (in the drama) were not real at all, but imaginary creations. Again, aesthetic experience cannot be designated as wholly false, as it gives rise to a particular kind of pleasure towards which we are drawn again and again and hence, it cannot be ignored by saying that it was unreal. On account of this nor can the experience be ignored as partially true and partially false, which is not possible at all, because such type of object is not found in this world. Hence it can be concluded that it is mystical in character.[8]

The active process of concentration (*yoga*) is generally characterized in respect of the perceiver, as one of complete detachment from practical action; complete disinterestedness from any practical ends of life and perhaps also a certain kind of psychical distancing. To what extent such detachment, disinterestedness and distancing are possible, is a question that has not been satisfactorily answered. Thus detached, disinterested and distanced perceiver experiences a sort of intense joy and delight arising out of tasting Brahman.

The pleasure derived from art is a kind of spiritual joy, transcendental and supersensuous. This is a concept difficult to be proved or disapproved by reason because the existence and conception of soul are matters of never-ending controversy. If I do not have necessary scientific data to prove the existence of soul, I do not, at the same time, have any unimpeachable evidences to disprove it. Viśvanātha has eulogized the transcendental nature of aesthetic experience after considering its true manifestation. To him such a nature of aesthetic pleasure is not a defect, rather an ornament (*alaukikatvameteṣāṁ bhūṣaṇaṁ na tu dūṣaṇaṁ*)[9]. The factors generating aesthetic pleasure are also taken to be ornamental (*bhūṣaṇaṁ*). In other words, they are efficacious for the manifestation of *rasa* just like ornaments (*bhūṣaṇavadupakārakaṁ rasābhirbhāvānukūlamityarthaḥ*)[10] are.

The aesthetic pleasure leads a man to the world of creativity. After perceiving the separation of the curlew-couple (*krauñcadvanda*) Vālmikī was moved and out of his grief he composed a *śloka*. He had intense feeling of pathos in which he had lost himself. Due to the complete loss of personality he had a sense of joy out of grief. This joyous experience of pathos provided him with the power of composing a *śloka* spontaneously. *Vālmikī*'s grief was not this-worldly. If it were so, he would have some sympathy with the bird from which the creation of poetry would not be possible. This-worldly grief makes a man idle. When a poet's vision becomes penetrating and clear, he gets an inspiration from within. So, the poet's genius depends on the absorption of the aesthetic enjoyment and this absorption is endowed with the power of composing a *Kāvya* spontaneously. If a poet's heart is filled with emotion, it (emotion) finds a spontaneous outlet in the metrical form. This spontaneity comes when there are no barriers (like personal interest etc.) for the realization of aesthetic pleasure. This spontaneous poetry is called *śloka* as it arises from the grief due to the separation of the curlew-couple (*'krauñcadvandvaviyogotthaḥ śokah ślokatvamāgataḥ-Dhvanyāloka*$^{1/15}$). From the above case it is statable that there is both self-identification and self-distancing. Aesthetic contemplation is self-absorbing, which presupposes the identity of the self with the object. Vālmikī had a strong feeling for the curlew-couple due to his extension of self with them. That is why he had emotionally entered into their feeling of them. But it should be borne in mind that such a feeling of pathos is not a personal one and hence it is not mere sympathy. At this stage he has transcended his personal feelings and hence transmuted it into an impersonal one. This impersonalisation becomes possible if there is a *psychical distance* as advocated by Viśvanātha and Bullough. It is a unique situation when we think that such experience belongs to us and at the same time it does not belong to us (*mameti na mameti ca*). The former experience owes its possibility to our self-involvement and the latter to our maintaining psychical distance.

In holding out the thesis *parasya* etc. Viśvanātha has outlined the phenomenology of aesthetic experience. The two poles of the experience the *dṛk* and the *dṛśya* have distinguishable properties, and yet, the *dṛk*, the subject experiences to undergo states of mind and feelings that do not properly speaking belong to it, and yet they are somehow *owned temporarily* by the subject or the experiencer. This is the mystical about aesthetic experience. Viśvanātha has succinctly laid bare the philosophical foundation for the viability of the aesthetic experience. He occupies the foremost place among those of matured thought who had expounded the *Dhvani* school.

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The Spectrum of Behavioural Evolution in Man

In the essence of modern evolutionary theory we primarily find a continually changing environment where species keep endlessly expanding their range to invade new habitats. In this ceaseless process, species keep evolving, and, it is where selection pressures of endless variety grow parallel with genetic variability. It thus implies that the *two processes of variation and selection interact continuously*. The implication finds more strength from Howard's statement: "Variation is a necessary condition of evolution by natural selection".[1] In this work of natural selection, nature grants a vast, yet a finite, time span for, "all organic beings are striving".[2] Evolution follows. In its growth process, an evolution "responds only to contingency"[3] and "follows the route of maximum resource use".[4] If, otherwise, the contingency is too strict or, the competition too intense, or, there come extreme cases of structural non-adaptation, stabilization of *successful* types would be a far cry and, death and extinction would be the outcome. In fact, death and extinction appear "as a necessary effect of the passage of time on a population of organisms".[5] It thus ensures that *perfection* in biological organization (seen precisely as the ability to reproduce successfully) could be defined "only in relation to the environment"[6] in which a species lives. In this perfection, "structural adaptation"[7] remains the "central phenomenon".[8] With all these ideas in hand, if we relate nature's principle of economy "in turning the performance of an organism to the maximum capacity of its environment"[9], we can trace an evolutionary history.

In the evolutionary history of the earth the human species simply appears as an *accident*, euphemistically a *departure.* But even in this 'departure' track there is little indication that "we have changed much genetically since Cro-Magnon man first appeared".[10] Most of our change is the product of handing on learned knowledge, coined by Julian Huxley as "psycho-evolution".[11] But this psycho-evolution has one unique dangerous consequence. Man's superior intelligence should have guided his development in a *definite* direction and, for a *special* purpose. Instead, unfortunately, we have long changed our environment in caprice, including our social one, so fast that it has outpaced our genetically determined behavioural adaptation. We sometimes wrongly hope to gear up our genetic evolution sufficiently to cope with these terrifying changes. Our only hope lies "in adjusting ourselves by learning to cope with our new environment".[12] This is why we should study human behaviour—a rather adaptive selection process.

Both the genesis and the evolution of the human behavioural patterns being a labyrinthine study by themselves, we get confused where to start with. In the beginning, let us see man as a combination of structural adaptation and refined behavioural patterns—developed through many generations. This feature of man has given this species its supreme survival value. The term *fitness* applied as a biological synonym of *survival*, when applied with certain extension, attributes men's uniqueness over other animals. Such fitness of his owes, *inter alia*, to his inborn learnability, his developed ways of communication, his cultural evolution, his growing tendency to match his organismic tenet with the sociologic one—all of which demand separate study. This *unique fitness* of man that helps his understanding from the point of *departure* earns support from the citation: ".... The essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations".[13] From this point there comes up the significance of tracing man's behavioural evolution.

Since "fossils do not *behave*",[14] we lack the direct knowledge of the course of human behavioural evolution. This, therefore, poses difficulty in our study and, hence, mostly we have to correlate with that of animals, save some fascinating departures.

There are two basic points in our consideration. One: individuals (animal or man) behave in a way that seem best suited to their needs, and two: most behaviours are a combination of the inbred ones and the acquired ones. The first one *sows* the seed of adaptive behaviour, while the second one *strengthens* and *nurtures* the behavioural adaptability. If any behaviour fails to be adaptive, it is said to be *selected against*, i.e., having no evolutionary significance. Such behavioural traits extinct by being fragmentary relics in the course of evolution. The behavioural evolution in man involves a graded psychological evolution with his instinctive as well as learned facets of behaviour. *This is the very foundation of human progress.* And, this is a dire necessity for the growth of mankind. Now, since a change towards a better suitability (adaptability) is the rule of progress, every human progress aims at maximum possible adaptability with enormous latent growth potentiality. This objective of man is achieved by the continuous refinement of his 'personal' and his 'social' behavioural patterns. We will now consider these two patterns in sequence.

Behavioural mechanics basically falls into three categories, viz., (i) "following response"[15] type, (ii) "habituation"[16] and (iii) "learning".[17] The last one is further categorized as (a) learning *by imitation* and, (b) learning *by experience.* Of these, the first two mechanics are concerned with one's personal behaviour, while the third controls the social behaviour of man.

The *following response* is a case of external programming. This is often seen in children. A child usually knocks the entry door following his father's or mother's way of knocking. Also, he shows walking postures, observes some domestic rituals, recites a poem, chants or sings (initially in solitudes) following either of the parents, learns to entertain guests similar to his parents' way etc. This type of behavioural pattern found during human infancy almost resembles the learning by imitation, that again works best during the formative periods (childhood).

This category is very much significant in the primary make-up of one's first-sight behaviour. It offers the child his family-identity for quite a long period. Rest of behavioural expressions develop in due course, but this *following response*—an offshoot of animals' instinctive responses—shows its *innate* attitude in the true sense of the term. This is innate because a following-response requires neither practice (as in learning by imitation) nor a trial-and-error conditioning (as in learning by experience). It is thus an instant expression found among children in their different chores (specially in domestic ones). They succeed in such expressions, because the innate tendency in man is *inherently pleasurable.* Now, since the anticipation of pleasure serves as an impulse to action in man, the human kids get naturally inclined to this, and, starts mirroring their parents fast. And, this is not at all unnatural. Yet, we, the adults, wonder at our children when we discover them exhibiting some mirror-images of our own doings. The following-response, marks the base of different behavioural mechanics and, therefore, *appears to be the real foundation of behavioural evolution.* An absence of this pattern would create a wide lacuna in one's behavioral development. This pattern in our kids at the same time has a hidden warning for us, the parents. If the parents are not friendly or caring to their offsprings or, there exists even a trace of an inimical or a competitive relationship between the mother and the father, the formative kids, in their *following-response* pattern, acquire some abusive language/manners in natural course. A distraction from the expected pattern gradually leads to the development of some restless children in domestic as well as social premises. Society elders blame the growing-ups as a safeguard measure. How delicate then is this following-response! What an alarming value it possesses! For all these factors this pattern is the seat of all other human behavioural patterns. In conclusion we can see the following-response as a 'learning from a parent out of an anticipation of pleasure' pattern of child behaviour. When we find a child more like his parents than like others in this pattern, we reach a point where likeness appears heritable. This stand invites an individual as well as a social responsibility.

Habituation involves individual interaction with environment. It implies that natural selection should have impact on this type of behaviour, i.e., the selection pressure can keep this pattern on its toes to select the desired habituations.

Here, one has to get used to a particular stimulus. For example, a child fears an unknown object, say, an elephant, a policeman, a tall, gigantic man or, the like. He develops an alarm and, possibly crouches down every time he comes across such one/more objects of his fear, because of his nascent alertness to danger at an early age. But, after a few interactions (experiences) with this (these), his response wanes, i.e., his sensitivity to the stimuli gradually decreases. This process is called *habituation.* In fact, exposure to the same stimuli for a prolonged period almost kills responsive power to such stimuli (that is why persons working in breweries gradually lose their olfactory responses—the smell behaviour—and, do not feel any obnoxiety). Thus, habituation reduces the responsive capacity.

In contrast, *learning* increases the responsive capacity. Let us see how sometimes a child 'learns' to respond to a stimulus to which he was originally indifferent. If we observe one's programming to learn a particular subject, say, drawing or painting or, *karate* (as a self-defence mechanism), we find a gradual increase of responsiveness.

Both the learning mechanics (by imitation and by experience are forms of environmental interactions and, hence, subject to adjusting instructions from the environments. This idea conceives that a learning is an interplay though, it is monitored essentially by the associated environment. So, environment becomes the guiding principle that guides a person to accept the principle of imitation or experience in learning something. With a remarkable change in the environmental factors one's learning procedure changes from imitation to experience and vice versa. When one's formative period is crossed, one does not usually remain satisfied with his imitated learning and, quite naturally, he/she shifts to experience-learning (identified by one's persistent and consistent endeavour to be acclimatized with the trial-and-error process for bringing a positive change within) to satiate the inbred thirst of increasing responsiveness to stimuli. Sometimes, however, even an adult follows an imitation (i.e. a copycat) learning for some immediate benefit. Such vested objective in one's responsiveness is often seen in some professional worlds. More precisely, we find people altering their speaking tempos (unconsciously or consciously) to match the speech pattern of those around them. Professional musicians often do the same thing when playing. These show that *imitation-learning in the formative years is an unconscious art, but that in the adulthood, is very much a conscious one.* The learning by experience method, by contrast, strengthens one towards a wide positivity for, from here only, one can learn what to accept and, what not to.

An overview of different behavioural mechanics helps us to infer, what is 'innate' does not demand 'learning', when it is seen as a time-bound conditioning. Now, since the "response to be conditioned is already in the organism's repertoire",[18] learning for man seems to be urged on the circumference of his innate (reflexive) behavioural circle. However, this inborn attribute of a being may be programmed by either of the learning methods cited earlier. It, therefore, implies that innate responsiveness of ours reflects our 'primary behaviour', while the programmed set shows behavioural ramifications, better coined as 'integrated behaviour'. And, in the spectrum of human behavioural evolution, no single being could be traced as a possessor of any one of these behaviours. In reality, we exhibit a mosaic pattern of responsiveness with endowed plasticity of different categories of behavioural mechanics. As living beings cannot deny environmental pressures, we also *require to change* our patterns of behaviour as per the demand of the factors around. Matching of this requirement reflects our behavioural adaptation. But the inevitable existence of the so-called 'primary' and 'integrated' behaviour in varied proportions, has often a misleading impact while reading a human being from a different perspective. This is also why an impersonal judgement seems almost a utopian idea for a man. In the behavioural array, the shift of different behavioural mechanics sometimes gets delayed. Consequently, an underrated behavioural adaptability results, and, the being becomes a subject of irritation, anxiety, confusion etc., and, may then become a victim of the associated environment. Sometimes, however, the shift is so fast that the behavioural type (often taken as the yardstick of one's personality trait) of a person is simply misread, unlike that of an animal, where the behavioural pattern being mostly instinctive (and, *not learned*) helps one to read its responsive features to different stimuli in a particular direction. Possibly for this reason, animals are said to be easily readable. Is it then the development of language, culture, etc. (all are divisions of learning) had opened the door of a confusing horizon in the study of mankind? This is undoubtedly a fascinating question, but the answer lies elsewhere. An intensive study of human behavioural philosophy—that gives coverage to sociobiology, anthropology, psychology, philosophy with subtle details—should be our approach to 'know' a man.

Before we proceed to this cherished direction let us see why does a person's 'primary' behaviour (developed in childhood) is identified as an 'integrated' behaviour, when the person reaches adulthood. Although it then appears to be a factor of time (i.e. age), the single answer might be the *knowledge*, that is gathered in course of life, to help bend one for a search of the world of experience. But, how this knowledge comes into play here? Is it something unradical or, a floating factor? Truly, neither of them at all.

There is one potent power in every human being as an exclusive mark of man's distinction from other animals, and, this is called the *reason*. This 'reason' that "exists for the sake of knowledge"[19] is a "conscious art".[20] Thus, there is always a logic at the root of every reason. And, this is why reason is functionally a science. Structurally, however, it is strongly "ideative",[21] i.e., it seeks to understand and interpret life by a symbol only, and, this symbol is the *idea*. Here lies the root where we discover why most of the reasons appear individualistic or, at least a reason can bind little groups of a human community, instead of being universal. Persons vary, their interpretations of life vary, so do vary the reasons. Yet, by nature, every reason shares some common properties. The very nature of a reason is *to observe* and, *to respond* quickly to new needs and possibilities. Every reason is both *observation* and *speculation* and, so arranges "truth of facts"[22] and forecasts "truth of potentiality"[23] respectively. Man, who seems unique in his ability to learn, is endowed with an enormous capacity to look into the future (for assessing the probable aftermaths of his actions). His capacity works well when he stands on a reason. The word reason has a profound significance. Our observation tells that a reason can accept neither a tradition merely for its "past greatness",[24] nor a convention "merely because men are agreed upon it".[25] It always asks whether the tradition contains any existing truth or, whether men are right in their agreement, respectively. A reason, therefore, acts as the conscious authority of human being to kindle his will 'to know'. The being thus kindled unlocks himself to know. This is where he begins to imbibe knowledge. As every knowledge obligatorily begins with wonder, this imbibition lets a man immediately focus on either of the learning procedures. Of these, the experience-learning becomes the major one to transmute primary behaviour to integrated behaviour. Psychologists also view learning as a change in behaviour as the result of experience. Its truth is evident in the very nature of 'learning' that increases one's responsiveness to stimuli. And, the said transmutation itself exemplifies a varied increase of such responsiveness. In this graduation process an innate/instinctive behaviour gets converted into a 'lawful' one.

In short, then, man's reasoning ability *kindles the latency 'to know'* which, in turn, sets his learning capacity, that then increases his appropriate responsiveness to stimuli. His behaviour is thus said to be *set* (for a particular environment and for a particular period of time). This condition-pair is an auto imposition to the *'set' behaviour*, because every human being could subtly be identified as a mosaic of different behavioural mechanics. And, this mosaic, being very much individualistic, comes up as the measure of individuality. This is where one's personality development begins manifesting. *Also this individuality shapes one's ego—a totally human attribute.* However, one point appears transparent here, that, if there were no external environment (that acts as a stimulus) man's power to reason would have been defunct. This is why behavioural adaptation (and, so its evolution) works better in association than in isolation, where there is little or no interplay. The more the associative interactions, the better remains the chance of development of integrated behaviour that often helps identify one's formed identity. It was likely the feeling of a 'desire' (need) to remain in groups that one day grew among the *Homo sapiens* as the 'seed' of adaptive behaviour expressed as what is called behavioural evolution (Darwin views adaptation and evolution as "the two sides of the same coin").[26] Precisely then, the group-mentality, i.e., the society attitude of man marks a sharp departure from most of the animals. Although some animals show gregariousness (e.g., lions) or, society formation (e.g., bees) there is no sign of interaction of thoughts, criss-crossing of logical ideas, directive movements of reasons etc., by which a society of man develops.

If man is seen as a *sharp departure* from other animals in his behavioural aspect, then a question haunts around some frequent co-existences of animalism and humanism in the same human being. And, this sometimes blurs our view about man's position in the ladder of evolutionary progress, especially when it is case of behavioural evolution. A very common tilt is noticed when we see man ruthlessly engaged in fighting. Does not this brutal involvement of man stand as an anomaly to his behavioural tenet? Or, is it something that stands as a vestige of what was (and, what is still) a dominant feature among animals or, even primitive men (men without the resources of proper language, culture, vast sociobiologic interactions etc.)? To answer these pertinent questions, we first require to know clearly, what is a fight and why does a man fight?

Basically a fight is a *deliberate* or *conscious* signal that more or less acts as a response to an outside stimulus (while, of course, a man lives in a group). Such signals are so widespread that, they are seen as "common inheritance of humanity".[27] The outcome of these signals likely appears due to uncontrolled flux of some deliberate or conscious entities that make up the decisive thought of an authority. Through a fight, therefore, the fighter is grossly involved in the so-called struggle for existence to establish own dominance. This is doubtlessly an aggression behaviour. Now, the next question comes: why does a man show such aggression? It is a fact, that, man is "inherently equipped with both individual and group aggression".[28] Right from infancy, individualistic aggression gets prominence in mankind. The tendency to a head-up posture (a denial or ignoring of attraction due to gravity), toddling (as an indication of successful bipedalism), defiance activities, snatching own share of food from friends/brothers or sisters (to establish some inherent ownership) etc., all bear testimony to the existence of individualistic aggression. In this light even *friendship* could be seen as "a concomitant of group aggression"[29] where a "shared hostility forges powerful links between individuals."[30] This visualization, although seems illusive, has got a sound base, which would soon be analysed.

However, this discussion leads us to the confluence of two opposite polarities, where we notice the same aggression as the root of a fight (that often leads us to enmity) as well as that of a friendship. This, therefore, appears as a paradox. This phenomenon reflects a behavioural polymorphism arising out of the same motive—aggression.

A second question now comes in the way about this aggression. If friendship stands solely on this motive there is every apprehension of "sociotomy"[31] i.e., *splitting of a community into two or more roughly equivalent communities*). Such a direction is ensured if selfishness becomes the essence of the idea of 'shared hostility' and gets crystallized as aggression. And, this is perhaps the most basic sociobiological challenge we are facing now—lack of a fellow-feeling. This is inviting sociotomy with the result that little sub-groups spined with characteristic aggressions (even in 'intra'-levels) are crowding the human society. But the point is: why this lacking?

The longing for one's free movement of mind, will, etc., i.e., the liberty, is "individualistic in its origin",[32] it has no "collectivist ideal".[33] A society, although an organized collection of individuals, is not merely a multiplied product of behaviours of different individuals. A society is precisely a 'set' of elements, i.e., individuals as well-defined entities, where everyone tends to retain own entity (*behavioural identity*). In this set, each element works hard to express individuality and, does so to satiate the inherent thirst for liberty. In this play, the individualities, as a rule, 'struggle' for existence owing to the inherent property of individual and group aggression, that equips a man. Since struggle of any form is a sign of inbred aggressiveness, it can be inferred, that, a struggle crops up only when this aggressiveness crosses a threshold level. When does it happen then? Whenever one's behavioural principle or disposition is injured by someone else or considered inferior to someone else's, to such extent as to disturb the former's stability in a society-set, he immediately feels ignored and, a loneliness shrouds him. This is where one falls short of the so-called fellow-feeling. Sometimes little sub-sets (groups of people) become victim to some other sub-sets as a proliferative evil aftermath of sociotomy. In this case, the intra-elements in any subset share hostility and, in natural course, develop strong linkage among themselves. This linkage does not mirror a fellow-feeling, rather it is strengthened on the formation of 'shared hostility'. In short, this is how one lacks the desired feeling for fellowman, and, we find how surprisingly aggression remains as the root of friendship.

If, however, we concentrate to deflect and sublimate our aggression by its inhibitions through *appeasement* behaviour, and, by reasonably mutating 'individualistic' idea or, thirst of freedom, to the "collectivist" one, which is, however, a formidable task, we inculcate what is called *morality.* This morality idea matches with Darwin's "inward monitor"[34] that diverts a being to follow the right impulse, with a conscious ought-to sense as its base. Friendship developed this way shows obligatory cultivation of altruism in the community and, becomes more stable than that grown through a cultivation of shared hostility (primarily a mean and selfish attribute). In this light, now, friendship behaviour shows a motivational polymorphism, i.e., both aggression and appeasement motives are able to dictate the origin of friendship (a valued behavioural disposition), though the evolutionary significances vary in these two cases.

At this point we encounter a vast array of human responsiveness, where behavioural and motivational polymorphisms show alternate existence and, where behavioural polychotomies are often detected in the same individual element, we feel inclined to honour all possible entities in the kingdom of man. The present observation clarifies that man is waving between the two defined points in respect of his behaviour: 'instinctiveness' and 'expressiveness'. The shift from the former to the latter never follows a rectilinear motion. This is why a man, at any of his growth-age (save that of infancy), shows a webbed responsive pattern. And, this shift parallels that of human childhood to adulthood. This also marks an overall triumph of the unconscious in man's life.

The basis of evolution of 'instinctive' behaviour to the 'expressive' one (i.e., of 'primary' to 'integrated' one) has a strong connection between "man's facility for language"[35] and "his extraordinary reasoning power, or intellect".[36] These together build up communication that "ensures continuity in the development of culture,"[37] and, keeps human behavioural evolution progressive. *This, therefore, proves why man could be regarded as a 'departure'*. In fact, Darwin views 'language' as man's "instinctive tendency to speak"[38] and, considers it as a *specialized adoptability*. This adaptability is the key distinguishing attribute of man. A possessor of this attribute, man gradually learns to monitor his growing intellect, and, we feel surprised to read a very slow but steady change from the 'innate' to the 'set' behaviour within ourselves. But, as there is nothing like a perfect adaptation (for a perfection simply terminates a growth) anywhere, we are to pass through a ceaseless interaction, where language itself evolves and the reasons refine. Since biology is never practised in a social vacuum, and, since "socialization is obviously a necessary condition for the evolution of language"[39] the growth of population increases the scope of such interplays and, hence, the whole study of human behavioural evolution comes under the umbrella of sociobiology—an exploring subject of intense care.

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BOOK REVIEWS

T.N. Ganapathy, *The Yoga of Siddha Boganathar*, Vol. 1, Babaji's Kriya Yoga and Publications, Inc. St. Etienne de Bolton, Quebec, Canada, pp. 355, Rs. 250.

One of the intriguing and fascinating figures in the vast Yogic and mystic lore of India is Boganathar. Popularly known as Bogar, he is an important element in numerous legends and traditions in South India—probably next only to the mythical sage Agastya.

Boganathar can be described as semi-mythical, if such a term can mean a personage who was evidently historical but who had also been the central point in several legends, some clearly symbolic and some hazy. One even wonders if Boganathar's time could be determined for certain. It could be between 200 BC and AD 200, as some scholars claim. But the legends about him could counter them by asking, "How can you locate within a span of four hundred years one who lived for thousands of years and most probably continues to live?"

What is even more challenging an issue to be sorted out is, some traditions trace his origin to China. He is believed to have been a follower of a sect founded by Pieng-tsu and he came to India accompanied by a Chinese compatriot who became known as Pulipani. Both were responsible for imparting Taoist techniques to a group of south Indian seekers which emerged as the school of Siddhas. Incredible though it may sound, almost all the legends regarding Bogar assert his link with China where he was known as Bo-Yang. There is also a tradition giving out the view that Bo-Yang and Lao-Tzu were the same. The basis for such an opinion, according to the author of the work under review, is that both Taoism and Bogar's discipline visualized the possibility of physical immortality.

However, as the author states, "A little reflection will show that all these viewpoints that Bogar is Chinese by birth do not stand the test of reason. First, Bogar himself in his *Saptakandam* has said that he was born in the lineage of Visvakarma and was the disciple of Kalangi who is the disciple of Tirumular. In several places Bogar calls Tirumular his great grand guru, in Tamil *pattar*. Even though tradition says that Bogar had authored several works in the Chinese language, most of which are now lost, there is no denying the fact that his main works are in Tamil language, and his magnum opus, the *Saptakandam*, is in Tamil".

Boganathar was a Siddha. The terms has wide range of meaning. At a popular plane of understanding a Siddha is an accomplished performer of certain miraculous or supernatural feats. Hence Patanjali decries Siddhis as "obstacles to the attainment of true perception." At a higher plane a Siddha is a Yogi who has conquered his passions and has found enlightenment through strenuous disciplines and has mastered great occult powers. He does not subscribe to any recognized philosophy, any creed or set of rituals. There is a good deal of similarity between the lifestyle of the Siddhas and that of the Avadhuts.

Says the author, "It is very difficult to give a trustworthy biographical account of Siddhas as very little about their lives is known or recorded in history. A verse from the sage Agastya says that most of the Siddha works were lost in the floods (*Pralaya*) and what we have now as Siddha poetry is only a small collection of verses that have been washed ashore and preserved. Based on this verse there is a view that what is being circulated as Tamil Siddha poetry is only a distortion of the original Siddha poems written by some ordinary human beings. If this is the case, then one must exercise great caution in accepting the historical or biographical information provided by the anthologists and other writers on the Siddhas. The biographical information provided by the various writers is a mixture of life stories based on tradition, local folklore, mythology and sentimental accounts. All these life sketches are purely legendary. There is no historic proof for such legends; yet one cannot reject them outright, since there must be some basic truth in them to which additions were made by later generations. No authentic account is available since the history and biography of the Siddhas have been handed over from generation to generation in the form of oral transmission, giving rise to numerous variations, corruptions, interpolations, and, in many cases, distortions to suit one's whims and fancies. It is difficult to separate the grain from the chaff. One is not sure whether there is any grain apart from the chaff. In some of the biographical accounts the imagination of the writers run riot, making them difficult to believe. A real researcher must be like the legendary swan, able to separate the milk from the water."

This difficult situation notwithstanding, *The Yoga of Siddha Boganathar* is a patient attempt at culling out facts and probabilities out of this confusing mist. The author establishes that Boganathar was not only a great Siddha, but also a master who delineated the Siddha doctrines later followed by the illustrious pioneer of the Kriya system, Babaji Nagaraj and a long line of seekers. Boganathar roamed about in a miraculous way all over the world, imparting to the eligible ones lessons in occult sciences.

The work contains seventy-five selected verses of Boganathar in Tamil and presents commentary on them, apart from their faithful rendering into English. It is significant that the very first verse is on *Aum*. This puts the philosophy of Boganathar firmly in the essential Indian mystic tradition. The summary of the verse, as given by the author, reads:

> By uttering the one letter, which is inexpressible in language, which have two curls of a latter in it, which is a divine mark of wisdom, which is Aum and if one renounces everything in the world and meditates daily on it, Siva and Sakti and the whole universe will be under one's sway. The sacred syllable *Aum*, which in Tamil has two curls in it.

The other verses throw light on subjects like Kundalini, Pranayama, Sivajnana, concentration, meditation, Hathayoga, preservation of the body, Chakras, Astanga Yoga, so on and so forth.

The work is a commendable addition to the list of theses on the vital body of mystic and occult traditions.

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R.C. Pradhan, *The Great Mirror: An Essay on Wittgenstein's Tractatus*, Kalki Prakash, New Delhi, 2002, pp. xi–403, Rs. 565.

Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus, regarded as one of the classics of 20th century philosophical literatures, is unique in promoting a new genre of philosophical discourse and dialogue across the disciplines of knowledge. Professor R.C. Pradhan's reading of the *Tractatus* reveals a new dimension of Wittgenstein's philosophy which is concerned with Eastern mysticism. He systematically traces the layers of linkages between the logical and the mystical. The knowledge of the mystical is inexpressible. The manifestation of the *inexpressible* in the logico-linguistic realm of life indeed comes as a 'revelation of the reality.' Revelation as a mode of realization of truth emerges beyond the categories of the logico-scientific structure of knowledge (p. 361). From the expressible to the inexpressible, from the empirical to the mystical, the author emphasizes the *transcendental move* of Wittgenstein by following Plato, Kant, Frege and Schopenhauer. It is a move to reach out to the *deep*er notion of reality that philosophy is concerned with. The author delves rigorously into the Tractarian notion of *silence* by taking into consideration the logical foundation of thoughts and language. Wittgenstein's notion of silence, according to the author, aims at showing the limitations of expressing the ethical and the religious truth with the help of logical and scientific language. He has no interest in any epistemological theorization of the nature of the *inexpressible,* rather he is very keen to build up a metaphysics by emphasizing the underlying thoughts of Wittgenstein's philosophy. For him, 'Epistemology is replaced by logic and metaphysics as the main activity of philosophizing' (p. 324).

Professor Pradhan has been very careful in preserving the originality of the *Tractatus,* nurturing its points of view and locating the meaning of the *mystical* as another alternative dimension central to the text. As he puts it, "My answer is that the originality of the *Tractatus* lies in a new synthesis of the age-old ideas which have been woven into the new system of thought. Wittgenstein has very ingeniously integrated the logical system derived from Frege and Russell with the spiritual understanding of life derived from Plato, Kant and Schopenhauer. There is, besides, a nostalgia for Eastern mysticism found in Vedanta and Buddhism" (p. XXII). The *Tractatus*, in the author's reading, maintains its *analytic rigor* in the tradition in which it was born and succeeds in delving into the notion of *spirituality* in which life is to be ultimately related, interrogated and synthesized, reflecting the true philosophical spirit of Wittgenstein. Pradhan writes, "*Tractatus* bears testimony to his interest and the suprarational and supernatural domain of reality.... My effort has been to highlight the integral aspect of the philosophy of the *Tractatus*. I have not attempted to give a mere textual interpretation of his important work. Instead, I have tried to outline the system of philosophy which underlies the text. The stem is more important than the specific doctrines propounded by Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus*" (Ibid.).

The book begins with a foreword by Professor D.P. Chattopadhyaya in which he provides a sound background of Wittgenstein's philosophy and simultaneously depicts the author's deep involvement in the philosophical works of Wittgenstein. The book contains twelve chapters. They are: 'The Beginning and Sources of Wittgenstein's Early Philosophy', 'Wittgenstein and Russell: Founding Logic and Metaphysics', 'Wittgenstein and Frege: The Linguistic Turn', 'Wittgenstein, Schopenhauer and Kant: The Transcendental Roots of *Tractatus*,' 'Philosophy, Metaphysics and the Critique of Language', 'The Structure and Limits of Sense', 'Language and Reality: Towards the Possibility of a Picture Theory of Language,' 'Logic, Logical Form and Logical Necessity,' 'The Metaphysics of the World: Essence and Existence,' 'Self, Will and the World,' 'Free Will, Determinism and Ethics,' 'In Defence of the Mystical', along with a selected bibliography and Index.

The author begins his analysis by looking at the metaphysical presuppositions of logic and language. The foundations of logic basically deals with *logical forms* of propositions. Logical forms of propositions are explicated by the use of logical language. Logical language has limitations in analyzing the structure of atomic propositions. The description of the logical form of atomic propositions, therefore, can only be *shown* in the way which 'the forms get revealed'. The notion of revealing is *mirroring.* As he puts it, "Mirroring is the task of language in its logical structure. It is internally connected with the sense of propositions" (p. 10). Language takes care of showing the internal structure of the logical form of the propositions. At the deeper level structure language and logic are related. 'Language is a medium of mirroring in which logical form is mirrored.' The notion of mirroring is well developed by focusing on the concept of *representation,* especially on *linguistic representation.* Language is representational. It mirrors the reality. The grammar of representation *shows* the deeper structure of logic and thought as it stands in a pictorial relationship with the world. The world is not pictorially reproduced, as the author categorically points out, *picturing as an activity* in which the world is constantly *mirrored* (p. 24). 'This projection is an internal move within language' (p. 210).

Linguistic representation, treated as an autonomous activity goes beyond the logic of its description of meaning and function of the contingent propositions. Language itself can construe the representational mechanism, and there is no need to introduce any *metalanguage* (p. 11). 'The sense and logical form have transcendental dimension; they, in fact, are the transcendental condition of the possibility of propositions' (p. 199). Logic is transcendental and signifies that there is an *a priori* condition for 'the syntactic structure of thoughts rather than its meaning' (p. 16). So far as the nature of formal logic is concerned, the author does not go by the general impression of Kantian spirit in Wittgenstein. Rather he suggests, "...Wittgenstein takes a non-Kantian turn towards formal logic for ensuring the logical necessity that must accrue to the domain of logic. Logical necessity now has its origin only in the formal relations among sentences and not in the realm of reality. The realm of reality is now left out as contingent and so it must remain outside the pale of logically necessary truths" (p. 21). The transcendental feature of logic shows that it is beyond the realm of the empirical facts of the world. Science explains the empirical facts with the help of universal laws. But logic is beyond the scope of the universal laws. 'Science represents the intelligible aspects of the world and it is at par with logic and mathematics' (p. 32). Scientific thinking itself presupposes logic and logical connection in structuring models for an explanation of the world. In this regard, logic is instrumental in developing models. And models only provide a schematic representation of the reality. Representation in order to be complete must go deeper into the realm of studying the grammar of what could be *thinkable* or sayable and what is to be passed over to silence for further interpretation.

At the bedrock the picture theory, the deeper notion of representation shows that 'sense and logical form cannot form part of the representational mechanism of language' (p. 201). But "[T]his consequently implies that the mirror imagery built into the theory keeps out many aspects of language from the domain of representation. The propositions of logic and semantics mirror the forms of language and the world and so have no representational content. They constitute the domain of the ineffable" (p. 221). The ineffable feature of logic shows that 'it is a self-contained system of truths which needs no validation in reality'. Logic is autonomous and self-consistent (p. 56). Moreover, its self-consistency and autonomy lie in building up the formal structure of the symbols but not with meaning. Here, the author does not isolate the meaning rather emphasizes that the structure of logical forms are the 'bedrock of all logical thinking' (p. 245). As a result they are self-sufficient in describing 'logical truth'. Moreover, self- sufficiency of logical forms reveals that 'truths of logical are self-manifesting'. Pradhan writes, "It is the system of logic underlying the structure of language. It is the extensional logic represents the deep structure of language. Simultaneously, it represents the structure of reality as the latter is reflected in language. Logic thus presents the *Great Mirror* of language and the reality" (p. 161).

The metaphysics of language brings out the limitation of language representing the reality, rather than of logic showing the limitation of thoughts. Pradhan is apprehensive that the emphasis on the latter would be a reason for giving rise to 'some sort of paradox' (p. 147). Philosophy as a critique of language must involve the idea of autonomy of language. As he writes, "Thus the idea of having to draw the limits of thought is superseded by the idea of drawing the limits of language. This facilitates the idea of a philosophical critique of language. The critique is no more a critique of thought, but a critique of language" (p. 149). Though Wittgenstein accepts logic as the foundation of thought and language, he, unlike Frege, does not restrict himself to the notion of depsychologizing logic. Rather in his understanding, Frege's approach does not succeed in bridging the gap between logic and semantics. So 'turning to language' in the case of Wittgenstein specifies the role of philosophy as a critique of language that brings down the duality between *logical syntax* and *logical semantics* (p. 189). In this regard, the *semantic turn* in *Tractatus* is significantly developed while construing the idea of a *linguistic turn.*

However, the linguistic turn highlights the notion of necessity of *logical language* and *logical syntax.* The Fregean contention is further carried out by dissolving the distinction between the formal language of logic and mathematics and the ordinary language (p. 99). Pradhan asserts that the *linguistic turn* shows a *transcendental* move in Frege's and Wittgenstein's notion of characterizing objectivity of thought. Frege's notion of *conceptual world* for delivering logical thoughts and Wittgenstein's notion of the *metaphysical self* as a limiting condition for the language and the world, aim to have a common move that 'language alone can take care of our representation of the world'(p. 104). Language is self-consistent in representing reality. Linguistic representation goes beyond the logico-syntactical model of explanation, and is certainly a greater move of Wittgenstein's philosophizing than of the Fregean kind. It motivates the author to substantiate the idea that 'Language is a Great Mirror'.

'The transcendental root of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus'* is an influence coming from two quarters; one is Kant's methodology, and another is Schopenhauer's mysticism. Above all Pradhan writes, "No such single foundation can be presumed to be present, but it cannot be denied that they share a common intellectual background which made room for a metaphysics of will over that of intellect and made intellectual life itself subservient to that of will" (p. 118). The *will* is a metaphysical will. It is the *willing subject/self* that transcends its empirical, rational, intellectual boundaries. Hence it is regarded as the *agent* of moral action. Moral *agent/will* is not affected by the history of the world since it deals with values and operates beyond the realm of facts. Moral will is the basis of morality rather than 'the contingent features of the world like material and mental progress'. The self with its transcendental character "has brought the metaphysics of self to a close for the reason that is no more concerned with the vicious puzzles regarding the self because we understand it when we understand language and the world. Wittgenstein's inclination to make self the limit of experience of the world is due to his understanding that self is not a matter to be investigated but reflected upon as the presupposition of our language and the world. Self is not a substance, yet it is real in the sense that it is the transcendental ground of all existence", as Pradhan elaborates (p. 309). The metaphysics of the self as the ground of all existence reflects not only upon its own nature but also on its intimate relationship with the world. From a *transcendental point of view* the world is not an idea of any subjective thinking rather it is a 'construction out of the linguistic activities of the self'. Self in its subjective mode of existence with the world not only looks for meaning but also looks forward to have a coherent world view—an objectivity in the meaning of life. Thus the author does not see any 'possibility of Wittgenstein committing subjective idealism' but sees him as committed to *internal realism* (pp. 311–20). Although there are evidences of idealism and realism in *Tractatus,* the author maintains that the transcendental move shows that '*Tractatus* is realistic in tone'. A systematic representation of the world would disclose the deeper dimension of grammar structuring the thoughts and making them intelligible. Hence linguistic representation does not separate logic from the world, rather he suggests an interface between them, i.e., 'logic requires the world as much as the world requires logic.' Logic provides *foundation* to the metaphysics of the world, whereas language and logic share a *conceptual relation.* Pradhan strongly argues that "Wittgenstein strives to show in the *Tractatus* that the truths in logic and mathematics are rooted in the transcendental structure of human thinking such that they provide the necessary ground of language and thought" (p. 257).

However, in the discourse of life it is difficult to put the self at the centre with regard to all its engagement with the world. Its engagement opens up, as Pradhan shows 'a metaphysical polarity' i.e., 'when it is related to the world' and 'when it is posed outside the world'. The latter matters most because it is the 'source of moral freedom'. It justifies the possibility of ethics. As the author points out, "Ethics is central to the *Tractatus* because the aim of Wittgenstein's early philosophy is to promote moral life." (pp. 331–2) The Wittgesteinian notion of morality looks forward to hold the 'spiritual freedom' rather than the 'moral freedom'. Moral agency in the Western tradition is not rooted in 'the transcendental idea of freedom'; an ultimate *self withdrawal,* which 'ensures that the self and the world are ultimately real'. That is found in the Eastern ethical systems of Buddhism and Vedanta. (p. 334). The self as the part of the world is plunged into *misery*. And getting out of this agony of life, he seeks to attain real *happiness/ ananda.* Hence there is a need to have *philosophical reflection*, the *knowledge* to make the self free from the burden of suffering.

Wittgenstein's urge for a philosophical reflection was to build up a new metaphysics replacing 'the myth of logical atomism' by *semantic holism*. The truth of life is realized in its meaning that emerges in its continuous engagement with the world. Life cannot be seen as a piece-meal enterprise with the world. It is the unity that the author emphasizes and truth is ultimately a revelation in the process. Moreover, the author translates Wittgenstein's notion of *continuity* as *eternity*. It is *timelessness* rather than *infinite*. As he puts it, 'Life transcends time and history and so there is no death in the life that is eternal' (p. 347).

Realization of truth or attaining liberation is to enter into the state of eternal happiness. The state of *ananda* itself is an inexpressible state. It is the realm of the mystical that the discourse on the value of life subsequently leads to. As Pradhan mentions, "ethics in a sense signals the end of discursive reasoning." And, it is related to the realm of the divine, the spiritual order which all religions propound. (pp. 366–67). Hence there is a limitation of the language of science in reaching out to the realm of the mystical. Professor Pradhan does not state that it is the limitation of the language of philosophy. Rather philosophical discourses are not "rhetoric; it is something serious and deep. It cannot provide a scientific account of what is mystical because such an account is not logically possible" (p. 363). Thus, his explication of the nature of the notion of *silence* exposes a metaphysics of the self, and the world, in which language remains as *the great mirror* by retaining its autonomy in determining limitations of knowledge and comprehension of the mystical.

The work shows the analytic rigor of the author in construing metaphysics in the discourse of logic and philosophy. The analysis has not dismantled the logical foundation of *Tractatus*, rather it has shown how the *logical scaffolding* is at a *melting point* and consequently gives birth to a new metaphysics. Therein lies the author's contribution in locating a new meaning in *Tractatus* by relating it to his own tradition and showing that it can be named as the *The Great Mirror* to reflect on the deeper truth of life.

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REPORTS

Workshop on Foundations of Sciences, NIAS, Bangalore, 23–25 February 2004

A three-day workshop on *Foundations of Sciences* was held at NIAS during February 23–25, 2004. Out of 23 invited speakers, 22 were able to attend and present their papers, under six sessions. While each speaker gave a half an hour presentation, at the end of each session, 45 minutes to 1 hour was reserved for detailed discussions. The proceedings have been tape recorded.

In his welcome and opening remarks, Prof. B.V. Sreekantan said: the topic *Foundations of Sciences* is one on which it is nice to have a discussion at any point of time and at any location. However, the present workshop is being held in the context of the mammoth effort that the Centre for Studies in Civilizations under the Chairmanship of Prof. D.P. Chattopadhyaya has undertaken to bring out a series of publications, 96 volumes, on a variety of topics concerning History of Science (including Technology) Philosophy and Culture, out of which 30 volumes have already been published. As a part of this effort, it is proposed to bring out a volume on *Foundations of Sciences*. It was thought that the best way of going about this endeavour was to have a workshop involving experts in various related fields and define the contents and scope of the volume and also elicit their co-operation as contributors of relevant articles to the volume.

The first session was on *Historical Foundations of Sciences*. Prof. B.V. Subbarayappa, Former Director of the Indian Institute of World Culture, Bangalore, presented his paper on *The Origin and Evolution of Numbers* in which he highlighted the origin and evolution of numbers/numeral forms in different ancient cultures with particular reference to the number reckoning system developed in India. He also dealt with the decimal place-value system and its transmission to West Asia and Latin Europe at the time of Renaissance, and also of the transformation of the Brahmi-numerals (one to nine) into their present form and the use of zero.

The second paper in this session was presented by Prof. Prajit Kumar Basu, of the University of Hyderabad. He gave a historical account of the problems confronted by chemists in the 17th and 18th centuries in making chemistry a branch of natural philosophy free from mechanistic philosophy and highlighted the role played by social forces in this endeavour. A necessary consequence of all this was drawing up of a clear distinction between the notions of chemistry like chemical element, chemical property, chemical compound, chemical process and the corresponding mechanical concepts of time, like mechanical particles, mechanical aggregates, mechanical operations and so on. The role played by the chemist Greg Stahl in weaning chemical philosophy from mechanical philosophy and also in influencing the great chemists of the time Joseph Priestley and Antoine Lavoisier to fall in line with this view, was also emphasized in the lecture.

Dr M.G. Narasimhan of NIAS, spoke on the *Foundations of Natural Philosophy in Ancient Greece.* Among a wide range of topics that the Greeks were interested in, the three most significant ones were (i) the Greeks were keen on searching for a unifying and universal causal explanation for natural phenomena, (ii) they made an important distinction between the concept of a "generalized science" and a set of empirical rules and (iii) the Greeks formulated an "axiomatic" method in mathematics, a formulation which had a deep impact on that discipline. In sum, these three distinctive features of Greeks' natural philosophy played a major influential role in further development of natural philosophy and modern science.

The second session was on *Epistemological Foundations of Sciences.* The first talk in this session was by Dr M.G. Narasimhan, entitled *Rationalist and Empiricist Foundations of Modern Science.* He pointed out how the emergence of modern science in the 16th and 17th centuries gave a severe blow to the traditional scholasticism that had dominated till then and highlighted the role of Francis Bacon and Rene Descartes in bringing about this change. The new thinking resulted in creating a controversy between rationalist and empiricists in the domain of epistemology of science, which got resolved to some extent by the work of Immanuel Kant.

Prof. G.L. Pandit in his talk on *Can the Methodology of Science be Naturalized?* said that it was his belief that it is the prerogative of the epistemologist to analyse the questions of the structure of science and scientific change, and then to work out how the changes at different levels of analysis can be correlated with one another. Even as scientific knowledge grows, we should keep asking "What is science?". Since science is search for knowledge it is necessarily an epistemic project in the making.

Our model of a science, such as physics and astronomy, should at any time reflect on the realism of (i) its arrows of explanation converging in some single robust theory and (ii) its movement forward where a successful theory has the possibility of becoming the generator of new frontiers of science.

Prof. N. Mukunda of Indian Institute of Science, in his talk on *Mathematics as Foundational in Physical Sciences* traced the historical connection between mathematics and physical sciences right from the time of Galileo and Newton. There have been periods when the two have progressed hand in hand and also periods when advances in mathematics found their application much later in time, as it happened in the case of mechanics, field theories, relativity and quantum mechanics. He raised the fundamental question whether mathematics is a purely human creation or whether it is already there in Nature in some form—a question that remains unanswered yet.

Dr Usha Devi of Bangalore University, in her talk on *Thermodynamics and Statistical Mechanics as Foundational Theories* emphasized the universal character of these theories which deal with large class of systems and have an empirical structure. The equations of state cannot be derived from a common source. Thermodynamics set a new standard for scientific theories. Statistical mechanics, which attempting a mechanical representation of thermodynamical principles, could not free itself from probabilistic considerations and had to become a new discipline by itself, which assumed importance in its own right. Dr Usha Devi discussed the problems associated with the direction of time and the apparent incompatibility between the macro-system with time irreversible behaviour and the micro-system with time reversible behaviour. The contributions of Boltzman and Gibbs to the fields of statistical mechanics and thermodynamics were highlighted.

Prof. R.M. Varma, Former Director of the National Institute of Mental Health and Neurosciences (NIMHANS), Bangalore, began with a summary of the current evidence regarding the factual nature of the "subject"—the "observer"—based on neurological investigations with PET, SPECT and MRI by the neurologist Austin and published in his book *Zen and Brain*. In this book Austin presents evidence of unitive reality as revealed by activated portions of the brain as recorded by the instruments. Prof. Varma pointed out that advances in cognitive neurosciences and cognitive psychology are now discovering that what they considered as simple basic functions are more complex, and may not be localized and committed to any specific region. They are shifting and are context specific. There is evidence for plasticity as well as renewability in brain structure and function. The nature of the "subject" as knower, as a doer and as an experiencer is yet to be scientifically clarified.

The next session was on *Subjective Foundations of Sciences*. Professor S.G. Kulkarni of the University of Hyderabad, spoke on the subject *Foundations of Science: The Subjective Dimension*. He started his talk with some remarks on "*Foundationalism*". He said that Foundationalism aimed at establishing the objectivity, rationality and progressives of science—the epistemic virtues which were supposed to make science distinct from and superior to and ideal for other types of knowledge. The focus in this workshop is on Foundations of Sciences and therefore distinctly different from the monolithic foundationalism. In a sense it is antithetical to foundationalism which denies any place to "subject" in the cognitive context. Then Prof. Kulkarni discussed the question of "objectivity" in the light of the works of Kant, Popper, Feyerabend, Mary Hesse and Kuhn. The rationalists supported the idea that self-evident truths because of their self-evident character provided objectivity to science. Kant attempted to show that the basis of science was constituted by synthetic *a priori* principles of pure understanding—the application of categories ensure objectivity, because the applications of categories make our experience, experience of "objects", i.e. objective experience. In the empiricist version of foundationalism, experience was the foundation of science and experience could be pruned of subjectivity and made objective.

The dependence of theory on observation and vice versa and their independence was then discussed. The upshot of this discussion was that the role of the subject and thus the locus of the subjective foundations lie in the creation of taxonomic frameworks on the one hand and the ability of the subject to perceive similarities and dissimilarities in the operating framework.

Dr Shobhini Rao of NIMHANS, Bangalore, spoke on the topic *Subjective Foundations—Cognitive Foundations of Science.* Cognition which is the basis of scientific knowledge is a process of construction. The brain interacts with the environments to construct the cognitive process. The sensory world is interpreted based on previous knowledge and the current expectations leading to perception and on to cognition. The building bricks of cognition are attention, perception, executive functions, learning and memory. These influence each other in top-down and bottom-up fashion.

The reductionistic method with features of objectivity, measurability of observation, experimentation, repeatability ensure uniformity of cognitive process. The representation of the physical world in the cognitive domain is accurate when the physical world is measured with instruments. The interpretation of the readings is along set paths defined by that of science. Cognitive sets based on which scientific data are interpreted, are formed over time and acquire the level of automaticity of processing. The brain's measures for economy ensure that scientists are slaves of their automatic thought patterns. Innovative cognitive patterns are rare.

The zest for objectivity in science has ensured a commonality of cognition of the external world. The phenomena of subjective experience are studied only when it is objectively measured. A large body of subjective experiences is excluded because of the rule of objectivity. Chief among these are artistic and spiritual experiences. In spirituality and art, objectivity is ensured in commonality of the subjective experiences across different practitioners. There is a shared cognitive world similar to the shared cognitive world of science.

Dr Sundar Sarukkai of NIAS gave his talk on *Consciousness, Reason and Language as Subjective Foundations of Science.* Most human activities presuppose that our subjective states actually correspond to some objective states of the world. What then is special to the relationship between the subjective and objective in the case of science? Science is built on the foundations of the subjective. We have to consider three important elements of subjective experience in constructing the objective universe of science. The idea of knowledge, whether it be scientific knowledge or other kind of knowledge, necessarily needs the notion of consciousness and reason. The subjective/objective dichotomy of consciousness and reason needs to be addressed. Language plays a fundamental role in the creation of science and not just in the representation of ideas. Dr Sarukkai also spoke about the subjective elements in mathematics.

Dr Shiv Viswanathan of Centre for the Study of Developing Societies spoke on *Social and Political Influence on Foundations of Science.* The Indian nationalist movement, according to Shiv Viswanathan should be looked upon as an interacting matrix of different groups from traditionalists, Marxists, neo-vitalists, the organic technologists, the theosophists and the Gandhians. The movement reflected an encounter between nation state and civilization. In the Nehruvian period there was a narrowing down of alternative frameworks where science is the creation of nation state. The earlier pluralism disappears and is replaced by the import substitution model of science and technology. He then discussed the various alternative models that have been tried out or are in the offing. In these the attempt has been to reach into civilization and civil society, countermanding status science.

In the session on *Ontological Foundations (Life Science)* Dr Anindya Sinha of NIAS spoke on *Of Charitable Cats and Cultured Chimpanzees: Reflections on the Science of Animal behaviour and Cognitive Ethology.* Observations on human behaviour have been going on before the dawn of recorded history. However, the study of animal behaviour as a coherent branch of intellectual study actually began in the 19th century in England. Charles Darwin however refuses to attribute human-like emotional responses to animals, whose instinctive behaviour he describes. In the 20th century Morgan introduced the law of parsimony in explaining animal behaviour. J.B. Watson who, while introducing the "behaviourist" approach to the study of human and animal psychology, absolutely ruled out the use of subjective data and private introspection in studies of animal cognition. The behaviourists, for decades after Watson maintained that the mind and consciousness of animals are intractable and a true science of behaviour must only be concerned with observable—stimulus and response. During the 1930s K von Fritsch, K Lorenz and N Tinbergen advanced the field of behavioural ecology and conservation biology by bringing in ecological perspective into the study of animal behaviour. The book of R.A. Fisher on genetic and natural selection was influential in advancing the field of behavioural genetics and social biology. The four major questions that Tinbergen concerned himself in ethology were (i) causation, or the underlying physiological mechanisms causing a behaviour, particularly involving the endocrine and the nervous systems, (ii) ontogeny involving the genetic programme and the environment and experiences, (iii) survival value or functional significance, built upon the notion that behaviour has been shaped by natural selection and (iv) evolution, involving the comparative study of the phylogeny or similar behavioural patterns across related species.

The ethological programme emphasizes the importance of mechanism and ontogeny and provides a powerful, pragmatic framework for the study of animal cognition. On the other hand, the cognitive research programme encompassing various methodological approaches provides a potent rubric for understanding the cognitive progresses underlying the behaviour of animals. Thinking about how animals might think has generated many interesting experiments and led to the discovery of unsuspected abilities of animals. Ethology today stands on the threshold of a new era—especially with the use of non-invasive functional brain imaging methods.

Prof. Vidyanand Nanjundiah of Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, talked on the subject of *Life and Consciousness.* Being alive is a property that is common to unusual combinations of molecules that are found on the earth. The existence of life is consistent with the known properties of matter, but is not predictable from them. In that sense 'life' is not a necessary consequence of the laws of physics applied to matter. Consciousness is a phenomenon associated with life, in particular with, creatures that possess the nervous system. The word 'consciousness' describes a state or set of states involved in the processing of information. The information often originates from the outside world, but in sufficiently complex living organisms, may be self-generated. An evolutionary viewpoint offers valuable insights into understanding both life and consciousness.

Dr G. Nagarjuna of Homi Bhabha Centre for Science Education, Mumbai, proposed his new model of life and cognition.

In the session on *Ontological Foundations (Physical Sciences)* Prof. Virendra Singh presented his paper on *Quantum Mechanics and Reality.* "What exists?" i.e. ontology in classical physics provided a description of physical phenomena. The microworld however necessitates the introduction of Quantum Mechanics for its understanding. It is almost certain that the world is Quantum mechanical at the microscopic as well as macroscopic level. The problem of ontology of a quantum world is a difficult one. It also depends on which interpretation is used. First the interpretation in which quantum mechanics does not provide a complete framework, but has to be supplemented by extra ingredients (interpretations of Bohr, Heisenberg, von Neumann, de Broglie and Bohm) were discussed, followed by Everett-de Witt's many world interpretation and quantum histories and decoherence interpretations.

Prof. Dipankar Home of Bose Institute, Kolkata, spoke on *The Quantum Measurement Problem: Present Status and Outlook.* The quantum measurement problem is an intriguing paradox that reveals an inherent inconsistency within the standard framework of quantum mechanics. This was first highlighted by Schrödinger in 1935 through his famous "Cat paradox" and is now widely regarded as "the most important puzzle in the interpretation of quantum mechanics". The basic question is how to ensure within the standard framework of quantum mechanics the occurrence of a *definite individual outcome* in a *single measurement* which can be distinguished from other possible results. In quantum mechanics, the results of measurements can only be predicted probabilistically. These can be verified by measurements on an *ensemble* of identically prepared systems. There is *no* ingredient in the standard quantum mechanical treatment which corresponds to a definite outcome of an individual measurement. One of the vexing problems of quantum mechanics is that there is no specification of *at what stage* a measurement result is recorded in *stable* and *discernible* form.

The conceptual aspects of a new method of using biomolecular analogue of the measuring device to study the measurement problem were also presented.

Prof. C.S. Unnikrishnan of the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, Mumbai, in his presentation on '*Cosmic Relativity: The Only Consistent Ontological Foundation for the Theory of Space-time and Relativity*', first summarised the special theory of relativity as proposed by Einstein in the early part of the 20th century, and pointed out the following anomalous situation regarding space-time: (i) space-time transformations are the basis of all physics, (ii) the special theory of relativity displaced the concepts of all-pervading ether, absolute space and absolute time, and provided a simple framework for the description of physical laws, (iii) recent experiments have confirmed that space-time in our universe is approximating like that of special theory—flat and simple—if we ignore the expansion which is not so relevant here, (iv) however the space time of cosmology is approximately like that of the space-time of Newton, yet is indistinguishable from the space-time of Mach which exists always in relation to matter and energy in the universe and (v) this is a consequence of the matter content being too small to make the difference.

Prof. Unnikrishnan points out that it is possible to bring back the concepts of absolute space and absolute time by using the characteristics of the universal microwave background—the temperature of the cosmic microwave background could be used to infer our velocity through the cosmos and its slowly changing temperature could be used as the absolute time. With these new ideas of absolute space and absolute time it is necessary to refer to all phenomena in nature and they have to be examined in this framework, and naturally the predictions differ from the theory of relativity. He claims that some new experimental results support this new viewpoint of cosmic relativity and not special relativity.

Prof. G. Srinivasan of the Raman Research Institute, Bangalore, spoke on the topic *The Present Revolutions in Astronomy*, the question "Was there a beginning?" has been at the base of all religions and philosophies. Yet this question remained meaningless in science till about forty years ago. A fundamental and essentially mathematical result due to Penrose and Hawking provided a rigorous framework to pursue this fundamental question. This was soon followed by the discovery of the cosmic microwave background radiation, presumably the relic of a hot beginning. By the end of 20th century, it was firmly established that this radiation had all the properties that one would expect of the relic radiation. Most importantly, the observed anisotropy of this radiation gave credence to the hypothesis that galaxies and larger structures in the universe grew out of primordial density fluctuations.

Even as it appeared that things are falling into place, major mysteries have surfaced during the past two or three years. To mention a couple of them, it now appears that matter contributes only about 25% of the mass-energy density of the universe. The remaining 75% comes from *vacuum*. The recent demonstration that the expansion of the universe is *accelerating* supports this startling conclusion.

If they stand the test of time these discoveries may have a direct bearing on the foundation of physics. Indeed, an understanding of the universe at the largest scales may require a drastic revision of physics. One may be on the threshold of the next great revolution in physics.

In the last session on *Technology and Cultural Foundations*, Prof. B.V. Sreekantan of NIAS spoke on *The Role of Experiment and Technologies in Foundations of Sciences.* The role of mathematics, logic, philosophy and epistemology on foundations of sciences has been well recognized and adequately referred to in the concerned literature. Somehow, the role of experiments and technologies is only marginally referred to except by professional scientists who recognize that it is experiments carried out with the aid of more and more sophisticated technologies that are responsible for the advancement of science and also for the radical transformation of our ideas on the very foundations of sciences—ideas of space, time, mass, energy, adherence to and breakdown of laws etc. It is to be emphasized that change of concepts occasionally necessitated in science is not a weakness, but a strength. While the "hard core" may not change for considerable periods of time, the "frontier science" which is the real contributor to advancement has the freedom to indulge in wide departures and speculations from the conventional ideas, until they are established or disproved.

He gave several examples of crucial experiments that changed the course of our thinking on the nature of light, on the nature of space, relation between space and time, matter and energy. Some instances of major discoveries about the creation of new types of fundamental particles, their spontaneous transformation to other particles through decay, creation of anti-particles were cited. These discoveries profoundly influenced and brought about radical changes in our ideas of the very foundational elements of science—matter, energy, space, time, causality and creation. He also referred to the new developments in the field of neurosciences based on the use of tomographs, FNMR's, lasers etc. that have given fresh insights into the working of the brain and the emergence of consciousness.

Prof. Roddam Narasimha spoke on *The Yukti in Classical Indian Astronomy.* Any attempt to compare the cultural/philosophical roots of the scientific enterprise in different civilizations must give considerable weight to their classical (pre-Newtonian) astronomics. Different civilizations have devised different schemes in the past to predict planetary positions as a function of time. The classical Hellenist Ptolemic system generally geometric in character and Euclidist in style and it proceeds through deductionistic logic to clear consciousness. This led Galileo to say "*the book of nature is written in the language of mathematics—i.e. triangles, circles, and other geometrical figures*". On the other hand the *Āryabhaṭīya* (+499) describes a predictive scheme that basically consists of nearly sixty algorithms. The physical concepts underlying these are rarely stated. *Āryabhaṭīya* awards a central role of *number* (rather than geometry of formal logic). Herman Weyl (1929) writes

> Occidental mathematics has in past centuries broken away from the Greek view and followed a course which seems to have originated in India and which has been transmitted, with additions, to us by the Arabs; in it the concept of number appears as logically prior to the concepts of geometry.

Prof. Narasimha then referred to the works of the Kerala astronomers Nīla-kaṇṭha (i) *jyotir-mīmāṁsa* and (ii) *Siddhānta-darpaṇa.* Among other things, these works (i) propose a *parīkṣā-sūtra* that emphasizes the crucial importance of observation, (ii) identify comparison of calculation with observation to achieve agreement (*dṛg-gaṇita-sāmya*) as a primary goal of science, (ii) display a studied distrust of *anvēṣaṇa* (iv) declare that the roots of the subject are in *yukti,* not in āgama (scripture, authority).

Indeed the concept of *yukti*—with its connotation of skill in the use of computation tools, observational instruments and associationist argument—appears central to Indian scientific (and mathematical) thinking.

Prof. P.G. Vaidya of NIAS who spoke on *Chaos Theory and the Foundations of Science* explained how chaos theory originated in an attempt to explain the irregular motion of the Moon. Although this origin is now more than a century old, it has still to be regarded as a new theory in transition. Recently, it has been showing a lot of promise of unifying a large number of disciplines. Its potential impact on the foundations of science promises to be comparable to that by the advent of quantum mechanics. In fact, there are claims that it could parallel, and perhaps even subsume quantum mechanics. In any case, it sheds new light on the issues of determinancy, predictability and even epistemology. A lesser known, but interesting effect of the practice of chaos theory is on the practice of the scientific method, itself. Repeatability of observations is being replaced by some notions about the existence of invariance in the multiple narratives. This transition has taken place without any serious debate in the research community.

B.V. SREEKANTAN
Director of the Workshop

Sandhān, Vol. IV, No. 1, January–June 2004

Seminar on The Enworlded Subjectivity: Its Three Worlds and Beyond, New Delhi, 8–10 March 2004

Under the auspices of the Centre for Studies in Civilizations a three-day seminar from 8th to 10th March 2004 was held in India International Centre Annexe, New Delhi. With a view to highlight the issues connected with "Consciousness, Science, Society, Value and Yoga" (CONSSAVY), which has been designed as a sub-project of PHISPC, the theme of the seminar was focussed on "The Enworlded Subjectivity: Its Three Worlds and Beyond". The papers presented at the seminar will be brought out in the form of a separate volume entitled, "*The Enworlded Subjectivity: Its Three Worlds and Beyond*". Apart from the inaugural session, there were two sessions each day. All the contributors excepting four from abroad and two from India attended the seminar. The papers presented in the Seminar took care of the issues connected with consciousness, science, society, and value with the focus on the individual, the enworlded subjectivity, who is in the midst of three worlds. The presentation of each paper was for about 30 minutes, and then the paper was discussed for another 30–40 minutes. The Indian perspective was highlighted during the discussion of the main issues.

While delivering the inaugural address, Professor Kireet Joshi, Chairman, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, traced the origin and development of the Project and its further consolidation under the dynamic leadership of Professor D.P. Chattopadhyaya. He added that the Centre for Studies in Civilizations which has undertaken the Project (PHISPC) has been entrusted with a sub-project on the study of *Consciousness, Science, Society, Value and Yoga* (CONSSAVY). Considering the importance of the main and the sub-projects, the Centre is institutionally supported, among others, by the Indian Council of Philosophical Research and the Indian Institute of Advanced Study.

Individual scholars drawn from different disciplines have been extending whole-hearted cooperation in the execution of the multidisciplinary and comprehensive Project. Also, he gave an account of the conceptual volumes, major volumes in different parts, and monographs published by the Project.

Professor R. Balasubramanian, the Volume Editor and the Director of the Seminar, dwelt at length on the scope and focus of the Seminar. Every individual who is placed in this world becomes an enworlded subjectivity encountering and experiencing three worlds. The Self or the pure Ego which is the essence and therefore the reality of every individual is conditioned by the mind-sense-body complex, and so the Self or the pure Ego becomes the jīva or the empirical ego. Every human being as a particularized entity becomes an enworlded subjectivity encountering and experiencing three worlds. We have the Vedāntic model which speaks of the worlds of waking (*jāgrat*), dream (*svapna*), and deep-sleep experience (*suśupti*). Every normal human being not only experiences, but is also aware of, these three worlds. The Vedāntic tradition also mentions the Fourth (*caturtha*) as what is beyond these three worlds, and gives us the assurance that it is possible for everyone to experience the Fourth, the Beyond, by transcending the three worlds. In recent times Karl Popper and John Eccles speak of three worlds constituting the whole reality. The external world consisting of physical objects and states, and all of biology including human brains constitute World 1. The World of consciousness in which the pure Ego or the Self functions as the principle of unity of all kinds of experiences of both the outer sense and the inner sense constitutes World 2. According to them, all human beings move back and forth between World 1 and World 2. There is again World 3, which is the world of culture completely unknown to animals. The world of culture is the most wonderful contribution of human beings. Of these three worlds, World 2 is the primary reality whereas World 1 and World 3 are secondary realities.

Professor Bhuvan Chandel, Project Co-ordinator, spoke on the theme "The Individual-in-society" highlighting the close relation that obtains between the individual and society. The relation between them, she said, is so close that it can be characterized even as an organic relationship. The individual is able to achieve all his/her objectives, including spiritual transcendence, through society. There is the need to strike a balance between the philosophy of individualism and that of communitarianism. The Indian tradition, she added, has recognized the claims of both the individual and society.

The papers presented (and taken note of) in the seminar can be grouped under four sections as follows:

SECTION ONE

HOLISTIC SOCIETY

Vedic Society on the Quadrant: Men and Gods, Earth and Heaven, *Professor Satya Prakash Singh* (Vedic Research Centre, New Delhi)

Sangam Society on the Quadrant: Men and Gods, Earth and Heaven, *Dr (Mrs) Prema Nandakumar* (Sri Aurobindo Scholar, Tiruchirapalli)

Civil Society in Indian Culture: Its Presuppositions, Problems, and Projects, *Dr Sudarsan Padmanabhan* (University of South Florida, USA)

The Ideal of Unity: From the Vedic Seer Through Gandhi and Tagore, *Professor Pabitrakumar Roy* (Emeritus Professor, North Bengal University)

SECTION TWO

ENCOUNTER WITH THE OTHER

Encounter with the Worlds of Common-sense and Science, *Professor Subhash Kak* (Lousiana State University, USA)

Existence, Communication and the Other-directedness, *Professor Ramakant Sinari* (Emeritus Professor, IIT, Mumbai)

Beyond Self-integration and Social-integration, *Professor R. Balasubramanian* (Emeritus Professor, Madras University)

Orthodoxy and Orthopraxis of Three Traditions: Hinduism, Jainism, and Buddhism and Their Divergence and Convergence, *Professor Sabhajit Mishra* (Emeritus Professor, Gorakhpour University)

SECTION THREE

CONSCIOUSNESS, MIND AND BODY

Consciousness, Cognition and Knowledge, *Professor R.C. Pradhan* (University of Hyderabad)

Consciousness and Self-consciousness: A Review and Reappraisal, *Professor Kisor K. Chakrabarti* (Duke University, NC, USA)

Levels of Consciousness, *Professor H.R. Nagendra* (Vivekananda Yoga Anusandhana Samsthana, Bangalore)

Supracortical Consciousness: An Opening to Multiple New Doors of Science, *Professor A.K. Mukhopadhyay* (AIIMS, New Delhi)

Self, Mind, and Body, *Professor K. Bagchi* (Emeritus Professor, Visva-Bharati)

Mind, Supermind, and a New World Order, *Professor N. Jayashanmukham* (Sri Aurobindo Scholar, Pondicherry)

SECTION FOUR

VALUES AND CULTURE

Levels of Reality and Hierarchy of Values, *Professor S.R. Bhatt* (Emeritus Professor, University of Delhi)

Logical Value, *Professor Srinivasa Rao* (Emeritus Professor, Bangalore University)

Ṛta, Ṛṇa, and Dharma, *Professor N. Veezhinathan* (Emeritus Professor, Madras University)

Aesthetic Value, *Professor Kapil Kapoor* (JNU, New Delhi)

Traditional Roots and Cultural Efflorescence: A Plea for a Systematic Indian Ethics, *Professor Joseph Prabhu* (University of California, Berkeley)

Values and Society, *Professor A.V. Afonso* (University of Goa)

Linguistification of the Sacred, *Professor S. Panneerselvam* (Madras University)

Between Apathy and Hegemony: Essay on Modern Indian Thought, *Professor Saranindra Nath Tagore* (National University of Singapore)

The Foundations of Indian Culture and Its Bearing on the Self and Society, *Professor G.C. Pande* (IIAS, Shimla)

R. BALASUBRAMANIAN
Director of Seminar

Sandhān, Vol. IV, No. 1, January–June 2004

NEWS & NOTES

A Brief Report on the Activities of Centre for Studies in Civilizations

PHISPC SEMINARS

The following seminars were organized by PHISPC during January–June 2004.

1. February 19–22, 2004. *Seminar on the Mother and the Yoga of Evolution;* Auroville.
2. February 26–28, 2004. *Seminar on International Relations of India with South Asian and Some Neighbouring Countries;* New Delhi.
3. March 8–10, 2004. *Society, Self Consciousness and Value;* New Delhi.
4. March 15–17, 2004. *Seminar on Buddhism;* New Delhi.
5. March 18–20, 2004. *Seminar on Jainism;* New Delhi.
6. March 20–22, 2004. *2nd Seminar on Economic History of India from the 13th to 17th Century;* Aligarh.
7. April 15–17, 2004. *Law, Ethics, Economics and Education;* Kolkata.
8. April 24–25, 2004. *Contribution of Gujarati Language in Philosophy, Science and Culture;* Ahmedabad.
9. April 26–27, 2004. *India and Asia: Glimpses of the Aesthetic Discourse;* New Delhi.
10. April 28–29, 2004. *Harmony in Arts: Tagore Recalled;* Kolkata.
11. May 10–12, 2004. *Srimanta Sankaradeva;* Guwahati.
12. May 28–29, 2004. *Nature and Culture;* Bangalore.

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PHISPC and CONSSAVY (EXTENDED PHISPC PROJECT) Publications

Under the PHISPC series, publication of major volumes and monographs has been undertaken. The following are the Volumes in this series.

CONCEPTUAL VOLUMES

*Part 1	*Science, Philosophy and Culture: Multi-disciplinary Exploration*, D.P. Chattopadhyaya & Ravinder Kumar (ed.)
*Part 2	*Science, Philosophy and Culture: Multi-disciplinary Exploration*, D.P. Chattopadhyaya & Ravinder Kumar (ed.)

VOLUME I THE DAWN AND DEVELOPMENT OF INDIAN CIVILIZATION

*Part 1	*The Dawn of Indian Civilizations (up to c. 600 BC)*, G.C. Pande (ed.)
*Part 2	*Life, Thought and Culture in India (from c. 600 BC to c. AD 300)*, G.C. Pande (ed.)
†Part 3	*India's Interaction with South East Asia*, G.C. Pande (ed.)
†Part 4	*A Golden Chain of Civilizations: Indian, Iranian, Semitic and Hellenic*, G.C. Pande (ed.)
†Part 5	*Puranas, History and Itihasa*, Vidya Niwas Misra (ed.)

VOLUME II LIFE, THOUGHT AND CULTURE IN INDIA (AD 300–1100)

*Part 1	*Life, Thought and Culture in India (AD 300–1000)*, K. Satchidananda Murty (ed.)
*Part 2	*Advaita Vedanta*, R. Balasubramanian (ed.)

Already Published
†*In the Process of Publication*
‡*Under Plan*

*Part 3 *Theistic Vedanta*, R. Balasubramanian (ed.)
*Part 4 *Origin and Development of the Vaisesika System*, Anantalal Thakur
†Part 5 *A Social History of India in the First Millennium AD*, B.D. Chattopadhyaya (ed.)
†Part 6 *Purva Mimamsa from an Interdisciplinary Point of View*, K.T. Pandurangi (ed.)

VOLUME III DEVELOPMENT OF PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN INDIA AND NEIGHBOURING CIVILIZATIONS

*Part 1 *History of Indian Science, Technology and Culture (AD 1000–1800)*, A. Rahman (ed.)
*Part 2 *India's Interaction with China, Central and West Asia*, A. Rahman (ed.)
*Part 3 *Development of Nyaya Philosophy and its Social Context*, Sibajiban Bhattacharyya
†Parts 4 & 5 *Philosophical Concepts relevant to Science in Indian Tradition*, Pranab Kumar Sen (ed.)
†Part 6 *India and China: Twenty Centuries of Civilizational Interaction and Vibrations*, Tan Chung & Geng Yinzeng
†Part 7 *History of Indian Ocean: India and Littoral Countries*, Om Prakash (ed.)

VOLUME IV FUNDAMENTAL INDIAN IDEAS OF PHYSICS, CHEMISTRY, LIFE SCIENCES AND MEDICINE

*Part 1 *Chemistry and Chemical Techniques in India*, B.V. Subbarayappa (ed.)
*Part 2 *Life Sciences and Medicine in India*, B.V. Subbarayappa (ed.)
*Part 3 *Indian Perspectives on the Physical World*, B.V. Subbarayappa
†Part 4 *History of Indian Astronomy and Mathematics*, B.V. Subbarayappa

VOLUME V AGRICULTURE IN INDIA

†Parts 1 & 2 *A History of Agriculture in India*, Lallanji Gopal and V.C. Srivastava (eds)

**Already Published*
†*In the Process of Publication*
‡*Under Plan*

Volume VI Culture, Language, Literature and Arts

†Part 1 *Aesthetic Theories and Forms in Indian Tradition*, S.S. Barlingay, D.P. Chattopadhyaya and Kapila Vatsyayan (ed.)
*Part 2 *Indian Art: Forms, Concerns and Development in Historical Perspective*, B.N. Goswamy (ed.)
†Part 3 *Architecture in India*, M.A. Dhaky (ed.)
†Part 4 *Language, Grammar and Linguistics in Indian Tradition*, V.N. Jha (ed.)
‡Parts 5–10 *Regional Languages and Literatures*

Volume VII The Rise of New Polity and Life in Villages and Towns

†Parts 1 & 2 *Social History of Medieval India*, J.S. Grewal (ed.)
†Parts 3, 4 & 5 *Religious Systems of India*, S.R. Saha, N.S.S. Raman, M. Rafique and others (ed.)

Volume VIII Economic History of India

†Part 1 *Economic History of India from Thirteenth to Seventeenth Century*, Irfan Habib (ed.)
†Parts 2 & 3 *Economic History of India from Eighteenth to Twentieth Century*, B.B. Chaudhuri (ed.)

Volume IX Colonial Period

*Part 1 *Medicine in India: Modern Period*, O.P. Jaggi
†Part 2 *Women in India: Ancient and Medieval Period*, Bhuvan Chandel (ed.)
†Part 3 *Women in India: Colonial and Post-colonial Period*, Bharati Ray (ed.)

Volume X Towards Independence

*Part 1 *Development of Indian Philosophy from Eighteenth Century Onwards*, Daya Krishna
†Part 2 *Colonial Development, Education and Social Awareness up to 2000*, S. Gopal, Ravinder Kumar & S. Bhattacharya (ed.)

**Already Published*
†*In the Process of Publication*
‡*Under Plan*

*Part 3 *Historical Perspectives of Warfare in India: Some Morale and Material Determinants*, S.N. Prasad (ed.)
†Part 4 *Cultural Foundations of Mathematics: The Nature of Mathematical Proof and the Transmission of the Infinitesmial Calculus from India to Europe in the 16th c. CE*, C.K. Raju
†Part 5 *Development of Indian Thought in Relation to the Social Sciences in Modern India*, S. Bhattacharya (ed.)
†Part 6 *International Relations of India with South Asian & Some Neighbouring Countries*, Jayant Kumar Ray (ed.)
†Part 7 *Political Ideas and Ideals in India in Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, V.R. Mehta (ed.)

Volume XI Consciousness, Science, Society, Value and Yoga (CONSSAVY)

*Part 1 *Philosophical Consciousness and Scientific Knowledge: Conceptual Linkages and Civilizational Background*, D.P. Chattopadhyaya (ed.)
†Part 2 *Self, Society and Science: Theoretical and Historical Perspectives*, D.P. Chattopadhyaya (ed.)
†Part 3 *Consciousness, Indian Psychology and Yoga*, Kireet Joshi and Matthijs Cornelissen (ed.)
‡Part 4 *The Enworlded Subjectivity: Its Three Worlds and Beyond*, R. Balasubramanian (ed.)

Volume XII Levels of Reality (CONSSAVY)

‡Part 1 *Elements in Indian Systems of Thought*
†Part 2 *Reality, Consciousness and Value*, Rajendra Prasad (ed.)
*Part 3 *Vedic View of Reality and Consciousness*, S. P. Singh
‡Part 4 *Modern Atomism in Europe and India*
‡Part 5 *Materialism and Immaterialism in India and Europe*
†Part 6 *Life and Vitalism*, N. S. Rangaswamy (ed.)

Volume XIII Theories of Natural and Life Sciences (CONSSAVY)

‡Part 1 *Indian Role in Global Physics: Then and Now [Independent[*, A.N. Mitra (ed.)

**Already Published*
†*In the Process of Publication*
‡*Under Plan*

†Part 2 *From Physiology and Chemistry to Biochemistry*, D.P. Burma (ed.)
‡Part 3 *Psychology and Psychoanalysis* (Under plan)
‡Part 4 *Cognitive Sciences: Brain, Psychology and Computer*
†Part 5 *On the Foundations of Sciences*, B.V. Sreekantan (ed.)
†Part 6 *History of Science and Philosophy of Science*, P.K. Sengupta (ed.)

VOLUME XIV NATURAL AND CULTURAL SCIENCES (CONSSAVY)

‡Part 1 *Relations between Nature and Culture* (Under plan)
†Part 2 *Types of Social Sciences*, Yogendra Singh (ed.)
‡Part 3 *Law, Ethics and Economics*, Subhash Kashyap (ed.)
†Part 4 *Different Types of History*, Bharati Ray (ed.)

VOLUME XV SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY (CONSSAVY)

†Part 1 *Science, Technology, Imperialism and War*, J.B. Dasgupta (ed.)
†Part 2 *Science and the Public*, Ashok Jain (ed.)
‡Part 3 *Science, Literature and Aesthetics* (Under plan)

VOLUME XVI YOGA (CONSSAVY)

†Part 1 *Psychology, Parapsychology and Yoga*, K. Ramakrishna Rao (ed.)
‡Part 2 *History of Yoga in India*, S.P. Singh
†Part 3 *Varieties of Yogic Experience*, Manoj Das (ed.)
‡Part 4 *Synthesis of Yoga*, Kireet Joshi
‡Part 5 *Yoga, Evolution and Mutation of Human Species*, Kireet Joshi

MONOGRAPHS

*1 *Science, Philosophy and Culture in Historical Perspective*, D.P. Chattopadhyaya & Ravinder Kumar (ed.)
*2 *Some Aspects of India's Philosophical & Scientific Heritage*, D.P. Chattopadhyaya & Ravinder Kumar (ed.)
*3 *Mathematics, Astronomy and Biology in Indian Tradition: Some Conceptual Preliminaries*, D.P. Chattopadhyaya and Ravinder Kumar (ed.)
*4 *Language, Logic and Science in India: Some Conceptual and Historical Perspectives*, D.P. Chattopadhyaya & Ravinder Kumar (ed.)

**Already Published*
†*In the Process of Publication*
‡*Under Plan*

*5 _Primal Spirituality of the Vedas: Its Renewal and Renaissance_, R. Balasubramanian
*6 _Interdisciplinary Studies in Science, Technology, Philosophy and Culture_, D.P. Chattopadhyaya
*7 _Ancient Yoga and Modern Science_, T.R. Anantharaman
*8 _Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures & Civilizations_, Daya Krishna
*9 _Science and Spirituality: A Quantum Integration_, Amit Goswami and Maggie Goswami
*10 _On Rational Historiography_, V. Shekhawat
*11 _Kautilya Arthasastra Revisited_, Surendra Nath Mital
*12 _Ways of Understanding the Human Past_, D.P. Chattopadhyaya
*13 _The Architecture of Knowledge_, Subhash Kak
*14 _Karnataka Music as Aesthetic Form_, R. Sathyanarayana

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*_Already Published_
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Contributions will be acknowledged as received.

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